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1Chapter 1: Introduction
The Nature of Art
Robert Hooke's Micrographia is a work of  contradiction. On the first page of  this 1665
catalogue of  objects scrutinised with a microscope, Hooke reported to his readers how printed
pages appear  to  enlarged  eyesight.  Even  the  most  delicate  engravings  turn  “disfigur'd”  and
“irregular”  when  examined  through  a  lens. A  full  stop,  made  with  runny  ink  impressed  by
moulded type on rough, laid paper, makes a “great splatch of  London dirt” (Figure 1.1). Engraved
lines  become the “smutty  daubings” of  an extinguished firebrand.1 The products  of  the finest
artistry do not stand up to such close examination; they grow ugly when “examin'd with an organ
more acute then that by which they were made.”2 The  irony is that the rest of  the book, of
course, uses exactly  these arts to represent the intricacies of  tiny nature in enlarged, graphic
detail.  Giant  fleas  fold  out  of  the  large  folio  book,  and  slices  of  cork  reveal
1 Hooke, Micrographia, 3.
2 Ibid., 2.
Figure 1.1: Full stop. Micrographia scheme 2
detail, opposite p. 1.
2Figure 1.2: Figures observable in frozen water and urine. Micrographia, scheme 8, opposite p. 88.
3chambers like so many monk cells.3 Hooke's gigantic flies, frosts, and feathers, though engraved
and printed seem to invite as close a scrutiny as their live muses (see Figure 1.2).4
Far from undermining his work, this irony is Hooke's message. Hooke was translating
nature to a human scale.5 It was revelatory to find  that  the smallest creatures display the same
signs of  life as larger ones, or that crystals resolve into geometric patterns. In contrast to artifice,
natural bodies “shew us the greatest Excellencies” when magnified.6 This was both an argument
for naturalists to pay attention to the vanishingly small as well as the large  – perhaps the most
fundamental aspect of  Hooke's approach to natural philosophy – and an apology for the book
itself.7 The utility of  art was that it could make nature available to us in a way that it ordinarily
was not. Hooke had provided a document of  inhuman nature which was accessible to a human.
Micrographia was the inverse of  the tiny writing which was fashionable at the time – and which did
not escape his attention. When Hooke looked through his lens at a  coin-sized  scrap of  paper
onto which were crammed several bible verses, he found “pitifull bungling scribbles and scrawls,” and
reading it “wanted a good fantsy well preposest to help one through” reading it.8 His engravings,
on the  other  hand, needed no such imaginative  interpretation,  only  plain observation.9 They
displayed marvellous nature writ large through art, not art itself  as a superficial marvel, destined
to collapse on  closer inspection.  His crafted images of  insects magnified to the size of  small
mammals were exactly intended to be examined with organs the same size as those by which they
3 Hooke's description is the origin of  the modern biological use of  the word 'cell.' See his Observation 18.
4 For more on early modern printing practices, see Johns, The Nature of  the Book. Johns discusses these same 
observations of  Hooke (430-431). Joseph Glanvill mentions another irony also found in Hooke: that of  printing
in a book the belief  that to advance knowledge people need to move past the knowledge found in libraries and 
begin a fresh investigation of  nature. See Glanvill, The Vanity of  Dogmatizing , sig. A5r.
5 Throughout this thesis I silently 'correct' Hooke's and others' use of  “Man” to “human.” That this is not always 
a correction at all but often alteration of  a deliberate and important part of  their thought I have been recently 
been made aware of  through a talk given by Moira Gatens.
6 Hooke, Micrographia, 2.
7 For the former aspect, see for instance Hooke's words in Micrographia, sig. A2r.
8 Hooke, Micrographia, 3.
9 See also Adrian Johns' point that the presentation of  craft knowledge in a book such as Micrographia was for the 
education of  gentlemen, not as an instruction manual for other craftspeople. Using the instrument was not 
necessary for Hooke's audience to follow him through the microworld: Johns, The Nature of  the Book, 107. See 
for example Samuel Pepys' excitement at reading “the most ingenious book that I ever read in my life:” 21 
January 1665: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1971, 5:18. Though Pepys did later buy a microscope for 
entertainment, he can not be called a microscopist in the vein of  Hooke, Leeuwenhoek, Malpighi, Swammerdam
or Grew.
4were made: the gross art of  the burin was suited to fat human eyes.
Hooke's  microscopy  was underwritten by certain assumptions about nature, humans,
and knowledge.  This  thesis investigates  this epistemology embodied by the instrument. Behind
his famous drawings lies a lesson not only about his subjects, but about the person watching
them  –  about the person for whom the world looks  a certain way. From microscopical  and
astronomical  observations  to  wondering  how  the  world  would  appear  to  a  fly,  Hooke's
experimental  philosophy  was  underwritten  by  an  attentiveness  to  the  fact  that  things  look
different  in  different  conditions,  to  different  creatures,  from different  perspectives.  “[T]hose
things seem pleasant in the Smell to other Creatures Senses,” he observed, “which to our Senses
seem quite otherwise.”10 If  the natural world revealed itself  so differently to different creatures
and different senses, what kind of  knowledge of  it might we realistically hope for? Was the hum
of  an insect's wing only audible to us,  but  visible to that insect?  Even as it revealed our limits,
artifice could  help us  escape our limited perspective. Hooke's instrument use was premised on
the recognition that natural philosophy is a human endeavour, and that knowledge of  the world
is constructed not by interrogating the world 'directly,' but by making natural qualities available to
the limited senses of  humans.
Before outlining my project in detail, it will be useful to situate my particular interests in
some context, both biographical and historiographical.
Context
It  is  a  platitude  in  the  history  of  science  that  Hooke  was  an  early  advocate  of
experiment  and  instrument  use in  natural  philosophy.11 Even  before  he  was  Curator  of
10 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 8.
11 The field of  Hooke scholarship has blossomed since the last decades of  the twentieth century. Particularly 
important is the classic collection of  essays – a good way to approach his life as a polymath, multiply-employed 
and tireless worker – in Hunter and Schaffer, Robert Hooke: New Studies. Since then a similarly multi-faceted 
approach has been taken in Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo; Cooper and Hunter, Robert Hooke: Tercentennial 
Studies; Chapman and Kent, Robert Hooke and the English Renaissance. For more directed studies of  particular 
aspects of  his work, see Drake, Restless Genius; Gal, Meanest Foundations and Nobler Superstructures; Hunter, Wicked 
5Experiments  for  the  early  Royal  Society  of  London,  he  was  a  member  of  John  Wilkins'
experimental philosophy group at Wadham College in Oxford.12 He helped to design, build, and
operate  the air pump,  that emblematic  machine  of  natural philosophy  in  seventeenth century
England, as well as  instruments for grinding lenses,  projecting images,  plumbing the depths of
the sea, regulating clocks, mounting telescopes, and measuring refraction.13
Hooke  had  arrived  at  Christ  Church,  Oxford  in  1653,  following  John  Locke  and
Christopher Wren from Westminster School.14 In 1654 he began living with and working for the
doctor and experimentalist Thomas Willis, whose father-in-law knew Hooke's father from the
Isle  of  Wight.15 While  he  joined  Locke,  Wren,  and  others  in  working  with  Willis,  a  more
apprentice-like  position  ensured  his  education  differed  from  their  more  traditional  bachelor
degrees.  Under  Willis  he was likely engaged in glass-making,  brewing,  tanning,  smelting,  and
other mechanical  arts needed for chemical  practice.  His  Oxonian philosophical acquaintances
broadened when he joined  John Wilkins'  group,  which  included future Royal Society Fellows
John Wallis, Jonathan Goddard, William Petty, and Robert Boyle, the last of  whom Wilkins had
succeeded in enticing to move from Dublin around the same time Hooke had arrived in town. In
1656 Hooke went to live with Boyle, and their famous pneumatic collaborations began.
Micrographia grew out of  a task delegated to Hooke in 1661 by the newly founded Royal
Society – in fact the first thing they ever asked him to do. In 1655, Wren had been preparing an
illustrated book of  microscopical observations.16 Though he likely never finished the project,  in
early 1661 he presented the newly restored King Charles II with a present of  drawings of  a louse,
a flea, and the wing of  a fly.17 Charles told the Society he would like some more, but when the
Intelligence.
12 Often with good reason seen as the precursor of  the Royal Society. For the founding of  the Society, see 
especially Hunter, Establishing the New Science; Webster, The Great Instauration.
13 For biographical works on Hooke, see:  ’Espinasse, Robert Hooke; Inwood, The Man Who Knew Too Much; Jardine, 
The Curious Life of  Robert Hooke; Chapman, England’s Leonardo. For the air pump as the grounds of  the contest 
between the Royal Society and its critics, see especially Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump.
14 For Hooke at Westminster, see Smith, “Hooke and Westminster.”
15 For more on Hooke's Oxford life, see Kent, “Hooke’s Early Life at Oxford.”
16 Bennett, The Mathematical Science of  Christopher Wren, 73. Bennett's book includes a typographical error which 
gives the date as 1665.
17 Both Christiaan Huygens and Balthasar de Monconys reported seeing these images in the king's cabinet. See 
6Fellows  wrote to Wren  to relay the king's charge,  he  asked to be “eased” of  the task.18 At the
suggestion of  Wilkins, the Society instead enlisted Hooke.19
Hooke's  appointment as Wren's successor probably had a lot to do with his skill as a
draughtsman.  Seeing  something  through  a  microscope  was  not  a  straightforward  thing,  but
drawing  it  was  another  complication. In  his  Brief  Lives,  John  Aubrey  described  Hooke  as  a
“precocious painter”  –  he had been apprenticed to the portraitist  Peter Lely  before leaving his
workshop  complaining  of  headaches.20 Though  there  is  little  indication  of  Hooke's  early
experience  with  practical  optics,  Willis'  and Wilkins'  groups were  using  both  telescopes  and
microscopes.21 Wren had pioneered a  method of  making  observations  with  both  eyes  open,
allowing him to draw as he observed his object, which he presumably taught to Hooke. Hooke's
prefatory words  in  Micrographia indicate his excitement at  his opportunity,  his awareness  of  its
importance, and his admiration for his friends and fellow experimenters.
I was to follow in the footsteps of  so eminent a Person as  Dr. Wren, who was the first that
attempted  any  thing  of  this  nature;  whose  original  draughts  do  now  make  one  of  the
Ornaments of  that great Collection of  Rarities in the Kings Closet. This Honour, which his first
beginnings of  this kind have receiv'd, to be admitted into the most famous place in the world,
did not so much incourage, as the hazard of  coming after Dr. Wren did affright me.22
Hooke  has  certainly  benefited  from  the  recent  trend  in  the  history  of  science
scholarship which has focused on these sorts of  social and material circumstances of  knowledge
production.23 Perhaps overlooked by early twentieth century historians looking back to precursors
Ibid.
18 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:21; Wren, Parentalia, 210–211.
19 They also solicited a Van der Diver, who has not been identified. Moray, who gives the names in a letter to Wren,
also appears to have been unfamiliar with him. (See Wren, Parentalia, 211). For Wilkins' involvement, see Hooke, 
Micrographia, sig. G2r.
20 Aubrey, Brief  Lives; “The Life of  Dr. Robert Hooke,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, iii; For Hooke’s artistry, see 
Hunter, “Hooke’s Figurations”; Doherty, “Discovering the ‘True Form.’”
21 Though see Neri, “Some Early Drawings by Robert Hooke.” I discuss this further in Chapter 2.
22 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. G2r.
23 There is also something odd about the pervasive idea that Hooke's reputation has suffered due to the 
machinations and agendas of  his contemporaries (see Jardine, “Robert Hooke: A Reputation Restored”). 
7of  a particularly systematic and theoretical idea of  science, he awaited the attention of  scholars
eager to reconstruct the quoditian  craft and skill  of  the  naturalist's enterprise.24 His persona in
the story of  the scientific revolution has become that of  the the workman. If  René Descartes has
been thought of  as the philosopher of  the scientific revolution, Hooke is the ingenious builder
and  operator  –  mechanically  minded,  unsystematic  and  slightly  eccentric,  bent  and  altered
physically and mentally  by  his  service  to such a physical  grasp of  knowledge.25 Much  of  the
recent attention on him has been a project of  restoring his reputation, highlighting his many and
varied achievements  which were occluded by history's lack of  interest in labourers.26 His is the
name we can now put on the invisible mechanic, performing the experiments of  those of  higher
social standing, or which more 'systematic' minds integrated and made rigorous.27
Thesis Topic
As  a  complement  to  existing  scholarship,  in  this  thesis I  will  interrogate  the
epistemology gestured at by words like 'instrumentalism,' 'ingenious,' or 'empirical:' words that
follow Hooke through both contemporary and historical literature.28 I will focus particularly on
Hooke's microscope use as a proxy for his wider instrumentalism, and examine the knowledge he
produced  in  Micrographia.  This  thesis is,  to  use  Peter  Dear's  term,  an  epistemography  –  an
“attempt to give an empirical account of  knowledge-practices.”29 I will not give a biography of
Hooke,  nor  comprehensive  history  of  his  microscopy,  but  move  backwards  and  forwards
Responsibility lies with us as historians of  science to find in the past those things that count in that narrative. 
Even Joseph Priestley, in his considerable history of  theories of  light and vision, does not write of  Hooke as 
though he were his intellectual forebear as a Man of  Science. See Priestley, The History and Present State of  
Discoveries Relating to Vision, Light, and Colours, 146, 172.
24 See especially Ofer Gal's work on how Hooke's programme for celestial mechanics arose from his craft skill in 
optics and mechanics: Meanest Foundations and Nobler Superstructures.
25 Shapin, “Who Was Robert Hooke?”; Feingold, “Robert Hooke: Gentleman of  Science”; Pumfrey, “Ideas Above 
His Station”; Jardine, “Robert Hooke: A Reputation Restored.”
26 As well as the sources already mentioned, see Pugliese, “The Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke”; Cooper,
“A More Beautiful City.”
27 Or stole. See again Gal, Meanest Foundations and Nobler Superstructures.
28 Jim Bennett has championed this approach since the 1980s. See especially his “Instruments and Ingenuity.”
29 Dear, “Philosophy of  Science and Its Historical Reconstructions,” 71.
8between his activities in the workroom and the public lecture space, and broader anthropological
and metaphysical issues, to tread a path between micro-history and the big picture of  the rise of
experimental philosophy. Micrographia was produced in such a liminal space, at the crossroads of
literary and material technology. It was a printed encapsulation of  the highly skilled craft of  early
microscope use,  which could be stabilised in print only in the institutional setting of  the Royal
Society.  Hooke  could  argue  this  highly  contingent  situation  would  contribute  to  natural
philosophy only given certain assumptions about human nature and the nature of  knowledge.30
For example, Jim Bennett has insightfully suggested that 'ingenuity' performed for Hooke a role
similar to that which clarity and distinctness did for Descartes. As a virtue of  an experimenter, it
mimics the virtues of  the world itself, and so secures a link between the philosopher and nature. 31
The idea that the assumption of  mechanical nature influences the very values of  the investigator
is an excellent place to begin:  if  nature is a machine, knowledge of  it  would  not only come
through experiment, but could well be expressed in machines rather than axioms. The point of
connection and difference with Hooke's near-contemporary is pertinent too. To look at Hooke is
see someone both wedded to his context and outside it.  The influences especially of  Descartes
and Francis Bacon loom large in Hooke's philosophy, as well as, more immediately, the likes of
Wilkins and Wren. But Hooke figured so prominently in his world that it morphed around him:
his work was the creation of  a new approach to natural philosophy.
A more historiographical motivation for my thesis is the very fact that so much Hooke
scholarship has  been  a recovery project,  which indicates the  importance of  being attentive to
Hooke's own objectives and epistemic ideals.  When his copper-plates were reprinted in 1745 as
Micrographia restaurata, it may have been good news for coffee table naturalists, but it was not the
sort of  legacy he wanted for his work.32 Hooke's approach to natural philosophy in no small part
30 The Society certainly struggled to extend the meaning of  their experiments beyond their meeting room, and 
universalise their findings. See Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance”; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air 
Pump.
31 Bennett, “Instruments and Ingenuity,” 75.
32 Hooke, Micrographia Restaurata. The subtitle makes clear the diminished importance of  natural philosophy in the 
reprint: 'the copper-plates of  Dr. Hooke's wonderful discoveries by the microscope, reprinted and fully 
9involved its  reform  into an iterative  and snowballing  endeavor,  where  successive  generations
would build on the work of  their predecessors.  As we understand our limited senses  and  our
place in nature better, we can hope for new inventions, and “new matter for Sciences may be
collected, the old improv'd, and their rust rubb'd away.”33 The provenance of  discoveries should be
remembered only insofar as it affects the trustworthiness of  the knowledge, “or at most nothing
but the bare Name of  the Person” should be noted. “Epithets taken from Antiquity or Novelty,
or Honour, or Greatness, or Will, or Eloqeunce” are irrelevant to the accretion of  knowledge.34
The  successful  institutionalisation  of  Hooke's  own  approach  to  natural  knowledge
predicted  his  overshadowing.  Only  because  people  continued  to  be  “rather  taken  with  the
plausible and  discursive,  then  the  real and  the  solid  part  of  Philosophy,”  do  we  focus  on  the
systematisers.35 If  this sits uneasily with Hooke's anger at not receiving credit for his design of  a
spring-balanced watch, or the numerous irritated precedence claims scattered through his work,
Larry Stewart reminds us: there is the history of  the institutionalisation of  experiment, and the
history  of  its  discontents.36 For  John  Desaguliers,  one  of  Hooke's  successors  as  a  public
experimenter,  only  true  philosophers could  navigate  between  “the  Scylla  and  Charybdis  of
patents and false projects.”37 If  the “true”  course of  philosophy ran between the two evils of
projecting  and  metaphysics,  but  the  job of  the  philosopher  was  increasingly  defined  by
institutional norms, anyone but a saint would be disgruntled by the award of  credit to the wrong
person.
Good historical work has recovered and synthesised his fragmented opus, and important
philosophical  work  has interpreted  the  meanings  of  his  mechanical  demonstrations  or  his
interactions with craftspeople and nobility alike. But there is a complement to these kinds of
explained: whereby the most valuable particulars in that celebrated author's Micrographia are brought together in
a narrow compass.'
33 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. B2v.
34 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 63.
35 Hooke, Micrographia, G1r.
36 For the watch controversy, see Adams and Jardine, “The Return of  the Hooke Folio.”
37 Stewart, The Rise of  Public Science, xix.
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story  which  is  the  basis  of  this  thesis.  Hooke's  connections  with  canonical  inventions  or
discoveries of  the scientific revolution which in some way legitimise the gaze of  the historian are
interesting, but it is important also see his success in crafting the kind of  approach to knowledge
of  which we  now  consider it  important to understand the origins: institutionalised, empirical,
consensus-driven investigation.  It is not enough to call Hooke an 'experimenter' or simply note
that he worked for an institution founded on 'Baconian' ideals, when he was himself  integral in
shaping the categories we pick out with these words.
Chapter Outlines
As I mentioned, my approach will revolve around the microscope. Chapters 2 through 5
relate directly to this instrument, before I take a broader view and situate Hooke's work both in a
philosophical and an institutional context.  In Chapter 2 I deconstruct the microscope, and in
doing so Hooke's method in using it. Hooke's process was a kind of  tacit, craft knowledge: he
mobilised different materials and techniques contingent on one another, loosely gathered around
what it was he wanted to examine. Out of  this material milieu came a surprising result, which I
turn to in Chapter 3: a theoretical explanation of  coloured light. As Hooke learnt how his lenses
and other materials altered the appearance of  specimens, what he was learning to manipulate was
the light entering his eye, and how it had been affected by passing through his instrument. This
kind of  auxiliary knowledge demonstrates both the way particular norms of  reporting discovery
were becoming entrenched in the experimental community, and the inseparability of  practice and
theory for Hooke.
Chapters 4  and 5  approach  the  microscope  from a  more  conceptual  angle.  First  I
address the  optimism its advocates  had for it  at its surge in popularity in the mid-seventeenth
century.  While  naturalists  who  adopted  the  instrument  with  enthusiasm  often  associated  it
directly with a particular matter theory – corpuscularianism  – for  Hooke  the most important
11
aspect of  microscopy was its ability to alter appearances. His exploration of  the micro-world was
not the search for explanans of  higher level phenomena, he often uncovered objects which were
themselves mysteries to be analogically explained by their likeness to more familiar, macroscopic
objects.  For him, the microscope indicated that things would look different to creatures with
different  eyes.  Margaret  Cavendish,  an early  critic  of  his  work,  and experimental  philosophy
generally, pointed out exactly the inhuman nature of  this perspective. Her outsider's view of  the
Royal Society lets us see the implicit values and assumptions Hooke was making, and on which
the meaning of  experiment depended.
The microscope was thus part of  more general themes in seventeenth century thought.
Chapter 6 looks at how Hooke responded to the optical revolution sparked by Johannes Kepler
and Descartes, within the Baconian context of  Restoration England. I will look at Hooke's ideas
on vision, memory, and cognition, which  supplement the  elements of  experimental philosophy
which take place outside the head: the  work of  the  eyes and hands.  Finally, in Chapter 7 I will
turn to Hooke's explicitly methodological  works, and interpret them both as descriptions of  an
ideal approach to philosophy, and a prescription of  Hooke's own role in that philosophy. The
two facets are inextricable: Hooke's actions as the Royal Society's most important experimenter
shaped the meaning of  experiment and instrument.
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Chapter 2: Robert Hooke's Microscope
The Frustrations of the Early Modern Microscopist
What did Hooke do? When he first moved to London and started observing things with
the microscope, what did this actually entail? He stayed with Boyle's sister Lady Katherine Jones,
Viscountess  Ranelagh, at her house in Pall Mall.  There are a few things that suggest it was a
comfortable enough arrangement:  they had their disagreements, but  Hooke repeatedly visited
Lady Ranelagh after moving to Gresham College in 1664, often to visit Boyle who moved there
in 1668, but sometimes alone.1 Though Boyle had Hooke design a laboratory for the house in the
1670s, a decade earlier Hooke probably had a simple room in which to do his work.2 What it was
like we can only guess. There were two houses, now 83 and 84 Pall Mall, that were both occupied
by the Ranelaghs, but the earliest image of  the site dates from after they were refronted or rebuilt
shortly after Lady Ranelagh and her brother both died in 1691. They were significantly altered
again by the autioneer James Christie in the late eighteenth century, then demolished in 1850. 3
Lady Ranelagh was an important node in an intelligence network of  natural philosophers, writers,
and activists,  but the house would have been large enough to avoid crowds of  visitors,  and for
Hooke these days are before the busyness which characterises his diary entries.4 He probably had
1 See for instance Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, 1:42. As for arguments, on 20 January 
1673/4 Hooke records “Dind at Lady Ranalaughs. Never more,” (81) and again on 20 June 1678 “she scolded 
&c. I will never goe neer her againe nor Boyle” (364). Of  course he did not stick to his resolutions. Her name 
recurs throughout his diary, and Margaret 'Espinasse counts  at least thirty dinner visits in 1677 alone:  
’Espinasse, Robert Hooke, 111.
2 Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, xvi-xvii, 280ff. See also Shapin, “The Invisible Technician.”
3 Sheppard, “Pall Mall, South Side, Past Buildings: Nos 83-84 Pall Mall: Lady Ranelagh’s House: Christie’s: Board 
of  Ordnance,” 367–368.
4 Hooke never mentions the company at her house, but for a while Henry Oldenburg lived next door and tutored 
her son, and Charles Webster has speculated that in the 1640s the Invisible College may have met at her house: 
Hall, Henry Oldenburg: Shaping the Royal Society, 23; Webster, The Great Instauration, 62. For more on Lady Ranelagh, 
see: Pal, “Katherine Jones, Lady Ranelagh: Many Networks, One ‘Incomparable’ Instrument.”
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few friends in town – at least Wren and Boyle were not in London – and he had no nieces to fret
about  or  apprentices to train.  In Westminster  he  was  a  fair  distance from the Royal  Society
meetings in Gresham College, in the City of  London, and when they found him lodgings in the
College a large part of  the reason seems to have been to make him more available to them.5 The
Fellows  rarely  recommended observations,  let  alone dropped by  Pall  Mall  to  bring curios  to
examine or instruments to use.6 Hooke was anxious about the opportunity, and has he was slowly
encouraged  by  the  approval  the  Royal  Society  showed  towards  his  work,  his  observations
probably took up a good deal of  his time.7 He had a south facing window, probably large, letting
in essential sunlight, and we can imagine an ornate compound microscope on a table nearby.8
“The  Microscope, which for the most part I made use of, was shap'd much like that in
[Figure 2.1],” wrote Hooke.9 It was about “six or seven inches long, though, by reason it had four
Drawers,  it  could very  much be lengthened,  as  occasion required.”  It  was fitted with “three
Glasses; a small Object Glass [...] a thinner Eye Glass [...] and a very deep one” in the middle of
the tube. This last could be added or removed, again as occasion required.10 The microscope was
made by Richard Reeve, who had a reputation at this time for being the best lens grinder in
England, and likely bought for Hooke by Robert Boyle.11 It would have cost a pretty penny at
around £5 10s – when Samuel Pepys bought one from him on 13 August 1664 he justified this
price to himself  with the claim that “[Reeve] makes the best in the world.”12
5 See Chapter 7.
6 See Chapter 4.
7 Hooke, Micrographia, sigs. G2r-v.
8 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D2v.
9 Ibid., sig. F1r.
10 Ibid., sig. F1r.
11 This is A. D. C. Simpson's suggestion: Simpson, “Robert Hooke and Practical Optics,” 43, footnote 36. For 
more on Reeve see Simpson, “Richard Reeve - The ‘English Campani’ - and the Origins of  the London 
Telescope-Making Tradition.”
12 13 August 1664: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1971, 5:240. This was roughly the same as a printing press, and 
a fifth of  the cost of  an air pump: Johns, The Nature of  the Book, 76; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air 
Pump, 34. At its founding, the Royal Society's operator (not the Curator – see Chapter 7) was to be paid £4 per 
year. Presumably the idea was that experiments may be carried out by such a person, but the equipment would 
be purchased by the Society.
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We can imagine him, narrow-faced and long haired, hunched over a book. His blue eyes
moving side to side and thin lips moving silently, he is engrossed in a traveller's tale or a recent
natural philosophical treatise.13 It is early autumn.14 About to turn the page, Hooke spies an insect
creeping over the paper. “Having a Microscope by me, I observ'd it to be a creature of  very unusual
form.” Here is a learned, scholarly man with the innate curiosity of  a diligent naturalist. He drew
a quick picture of  a 'crab-like insect' with eight pointy legs and two large claws growing out of  its
13 The description of  his appearance comes from Waller's introduction to Hooke, Posthumous Works. Waller's 'grey 
eyes' are likely what we would these days call blue, as Leah Marcus has discussed (and Rita Angus's recent 
portraits of  Hooke depict): Marcus, Unediting the Renaissance, 12. For more on Hooke's appearance, see Aubrey, 
Brief  Lives; Jardine, The Curious Life of  Robert Hooke, 15–19; Jensen, “A Previously Unrecognised Portrait of  Joan 
Baptista Van Helmont (1579-1644).” Jensen's paper is a response to Jardine's.
14 The following observation took place in September: Hooke, Micrographia, 207.
Figure 2.1: Hooke's microscope. Micrographia scheme 1, fig. 6, opposite. p. 1. The objects fig. 4 and fig. 5 are
different instruments, to which I shall return below.
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head (Figure 2.2).
This  sort  of  textual  evidence about  the  details  of  Hooke's  isolated activity  requires
some  interpretation;  his  descriptions  of  his  observations  are  not  always  faithful.  Such  a
Figure 2.2: The 'Crab-like Insect', Micrographia, scheme 33, fig. 2, opposite p. 207.
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picturesque description – drawn from Hooke's account in Micrographia – belies the vexations and
limits of  the microscopist's task. One does not just pick up a microscope and examine a scuttling
insect  through it  for long enough to ink such a detailed picture, not now any more than in the
1660s.  Viewing a live  specimen through a compound microscope was  an arduous  and time-
consuming task.  The wriggling  creature had to be mounted,  lit,  then peered at  from various
angles, and drawn. Each step took time and was dependent on the others for success.
A more accurate account of  the process comes from comparing Hooke's  published
narrative to his notes accompanying an early draft of  the insect from 1661, which Janice Neri has
brought to light (see Figure 2.3).15 Hooke's description of  this picture gives more information: “A
Kind of  Teek found creeping upon paper, it was drawn dead.”16 That gave him time to examine
it. But there are more disparities between the early draft and the published account which beg for
an explanation. The draft is dated 11 April 1661. In Micrographia, Hooke says he only ever found
one such creature, and that was in September. Both drawings are surely of  the same specimen:
not only are their shapes similar but Hooke depicted them in the same pose, one claw up, one
claw down.17 Even more mysterious is that the earlier picture shows an insect with six legs, but in
the later picture it has eight. Neri's plausible explanation for these discrepancies is that the 1661
picture is a draft of  a master drawing which went to the engravers, and that neither image was in
Hooke's possession when he wrote the insect's  description for Micrographia.18 He was relying on
his memory to serve him with a date,19 and the image itself  transformed under the requirement
to produce intricate and impressive pictures for engraving. The claws made Hooke think of  the
creature as 'crab-like', and he filled in details with facts he had read about crustaceans: crustaceans
have eight legs, he knew, so he drew this crustacean like creature with eight legs, despite his initial
15 Neri, “Some Early Drawings by Robert Hooke.”
16 Quoted in Ibid., 46, footnote 3.
17 The left-right inversion could simply be the result of  Micrographia's printing.
18 Ibid., 44. Only one of  the original drawings that the engravings in Micrographia were made from is known to 
surivive, as Royal Society Classified Papers 20/7: 'figures frozen in urine'. The others were possibly lost in the 
Great Fire of  1666. See Harwood, “Rhetoric and Graphics in Micrographia,” 126–127.
19 For an estimation of  Hooke's leaky memory, see again Aubrey, Brief  Lives. 
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observation of  it.20
Hooke's famous method of  dunking an ant in brandy so it sat still for long enough to
draw is more revealing of  his practice, but even then he downplays the toil. He used the method
because fixing an ant's feet with glue it would still “so twist and wind its body, that I could not
any wayes get a good view.”21 Killing insects often made them shrivel unbeautifully, as he had
learnt in 1661 when dealing with a beetle “soe unruly I could not put his legges and body into a
posture to drawe him alive[,] wherefour I cut off  his head.”22 He found that leaving an ant in
fortified  wine  for  an  hour  immobilised  it  for  the  same  length  of  time.  He  did  this  twice,
observing it then catching it  when it stirred and ran off,  before leaving it  “some hours” in the
20 Particularly, Neri supposes, from Willem Piso's Historia Naturalis Brasiliae (1648): Neri, “Between Observation 
and Image,” 98.
21 Hooke, Micrographia, 203.
22 Quoted in Neri, “Some Early Drawings by Robert Hooke,” 46.
Figure 2.3: Draft of  'A Kind of  Teek'. Original held in British Library, Add. 57495, fol. 113v John Covel, "Natural
history and commonplace notebook," c. 1660 – 1713. Reproduced in Neri, “Some Early Drawings by Robert Hooke.”
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brandy, which gave him three or four more hours to examine it. 23 How he came to this method
he does not say: how many ants drowned and how many other spirits did he try? Even from the
hours he  does  mention though, already a whole day has passed. The light through his window
was in “continual variation” and necessitated continual adjustments to his instrument,24 and each
time the ant was inebriated he had to “put its body and legs into a natural posture.”25 Quite how
he did this he does not say – only his eyes, not his fingers, were assisted by the microscope, it was
no doubt  a  fiddly  task!  Such frustrations  were  common for  the  early  modern  microscopist.
Antoni van Leeuwenhoek reported spending several days and killing over one hundred mosquitos
trying  to  present one to his  instrument so as  to get  a  good look inside its  mouth.26 Marian
Fournier quotes Marcello Malpighi's appraisal of  the line of  work:
My dissertation on Bombyx [De Bombyce, 1669] was an occupation to the last degree laborious
and fatiguing,  because of  the  novelty,  minuteness,  fragility  and entanglement of  the  parts.
Hence the prosecution of  the task made it necessary to develop entirely new methods. And
since I pursued this exacting work for many months without respite, I was afflicted in the
following autumn with fevers and inflammation of  the eyes. Nevertheless in accomplishing
these researches, which brought to my notice so many strange marvels of  nature, I experienced
a pleasure which no pen can describe.27
Malpighi's retrospective is an unusually candid account from an early microscopist of
the trials of  his task,  while  Micrographia is, in a sense, a highly disingenuous report of  Hooke's
microscopical observations. In his text Hooke confesses, even makes into a virtue of, the fact that
many drawings in Micrographia are composed of  multiple observations. Still, when he asks us to
believe in the creature in Figure 2.2 above, it is not merely composite of  different views, it is an
23 Hooke, Micrographia, 204.
24 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. E1r.
25 Ibid., 204.
26 Ruestow, The Microscope in the Dutch Republic, 151.
27 Quoted in Fournier, The Fabric of  Reality, 39.
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image  modified away from  observation  by  Hooke's  acquired  knowledge  of  the  abstract
classification of  animals. But the finished book is a polished, bound, complete work; trustworthy
and  comprehensive.  It  disguises  well  the  extent  of  the  difference  between  observing  and
reproducing.28
In this respect he differed from other contemporary microscopists.  When the  scholar
and travel writer Zacharias von Uffenbach visited Antoni van Leeuwenhoek in 1710 he recorded
seeing hundreds of  microscopes, each with a different object attached.29 He entered a showroom,
a museum almost, with lots of  small instruments each dedicated to a single view of  one tiny
object, like so many little windows into the microworld. Likewise when Leeuwenhoek dedicated
26 of  his microscopes to the Royal Society on his death, they arrived with specimens attached –
or  detached only  in  the  rough transit.30 Leeuwenhoek made  a  different  instrument  for  each
different  observation:  they  were discrete,  self-contained  units,  each  instrument  a  separate
experimentum. He went to great pains to prepare each vision, and once prepared it stayed prepared.
This  method lasted.  In the  eighteenth century,  writers  like  Henry  Baker  and George Adams
began to popularise the microscope, and write practical introductions to the instrument. They
focused  largely  on  mounting  specimens  in  such  a  way  as  to  preserve  them,  providing  the
collection of  ready-made observations needed for the  microscope's growing use as a parlour
toy.31
In contrast, Hooke's visions were much more ephemeral.  Leeuwenhoek crafted rigid
experiences  of  observation  which  Von  Uffenbach  could  pick  up  and  partake  in.  Hooke's
observations were stabilised only on the page. The lasting artifact he produced was Micrographia, a
book not an experiment, containing views clearer and more distinct than anyone could hope for
28 See Pamela Smith's work on craft knowledge: Smith, The Body of  the Artisan; Smith, “In a Sixteenth-Century 
Goldsmith’s Workshop.”
29 Ruestow, The Microscope in the Dutch Republic, 151.
30 Baker, “An Account of  Mr. Leeuwenhoek’s Microscopes.”
31 Fournier, The Fabric of  Reality, 34; Turner, “The Impact of  Hooke’s Micrographia and Its Influence on 
Microscopy.” Henry Baker's works included The Microscope Made Easy (1743) and Employment for the Microscope 
(1753), George Adams wrote Essays on the Microscope (1787).
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through a lens. The drawings in it are composites, combining the information from observations
made  under  different  lights,  of  different  individual  specimens,  under  different  aspects,  with
abstract knowledge gathered from books and communication. Hooke's experiences depended on
the angle of  light and whether he diffused it through paper, on the clarity of  his lenses, and the
quality  of  the  material  he  used  as  specimen  mounts.  His  drawings  contain  none  of  these
contingencies.  The first  book to popularise  the  view through the microscope  is  not  at  all  a
realistic  account of  what things actually  looked like.  Lady Ranelagh,  peering over  her  lodger's
shoulder, would not have seen objects as they are depicted in Micrographia.
It is worth mentioning a caveat to this. the figures and decriptions on the manuscript
drafts Neri discusses are signed off  with initials “R. H.,” but some descriptions also include other
initials: “R. G. being present,” “D. C. being present,” “E. T. Ocul. Testis (eye witness).” 32 It is
notable that E. T., the only 'eye witness' was also the only observer who added information to the
sketch: the colour of  the insect. The others were purely silent presences. It is speculative, but in
these  early  days  perhaps  Hooke  was  practicing  the  art  of  microscopy,  or  of  drawing  his
observations. These initials lend credibility to Hooke's drawings, affirming they represent what
others,  as  well  as  Hooke,  saw.  The  jury  vanishes  from  Hooke's  assured,  single-authored
publication.33
With these general points in mind, the rest of  this chapter focuses on what Hooke did
in order to see the things which he then translated onto the page. This translation was an act of
interpretation and artistry, but even observation itself  required creativity and ingenuity.  To the
extent that it was easy to see anything at all through an early microscope, it was easy to see things
that  were  not  there.34 Colours  and  shapes  were  distorted,  absences  looked  like  presences,
32 See Figure 1, Folio 113v. of  Covel's notebook, reproduced by Neri. Neri's suggestion is that one presence could 
be Ralph Greatorex, an instrument maker who collaborated with Hooke on the air pump around this time, and 
Stephen Gaukroger has suggested to me that another could be Daniel Colwall, a rich Londoner and early patron 
and Fellow of  the Royal Society. See: Neri, “Some Early Drawings by Robert Hooke”; and for Colwall: Hunter, 
The Royal Society and Its Fellows.
33 Neri, following Steven Shapin, suggests that Micrographia became the work of  Hooke alone because he was 
anxious to establish for himself  the persona of  the reliable and solitary observer, disengaged from the idols of  
the mundane world: Neri, “Between Observation and Image,” 99.
34 See Leeuwenhoek's 'discovery' that many different types of  body were made of  small globules, and his later 
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imperfections in the lens looked like markings on an insect. Letting the microscope produce its
visions was  not  straightforward,  and different  difficulties  needed different  responses. Hooke
knew that there were certain technical or theoretical advantages to certain forms of  microscope,
but to make his drawings he most often fell back on the standard compound microscope.  The
best microscope was the one he could grab and move easily, set up and leave alone, and come
back to tomorrow. The overruling desideratum of  his practice became convenience.
In  Hooke's  later  writing,  as  he  began  to  lament  the  failure  of  the  philosophical
community to embrace the microscope, he gives more clues as to his practice, especially about
the  range  of  materials  he  used.  What  surrounded  him  while  he  laboured  away,  one  eye
transported down a tube into the microworld, the other the same scale as his hand which drew
what he saw, was a system of  interrelated objects and processes. Lenses, looking glass plates, glass
balls  full  of  water,  sheets  of  mica,  sunlight,  and water-filled tubes  were  all  constantly  being
swapped, changed, and altered. As  several of  these objects switched  back and forth between
being parts of  the instrument and objects of  inquiry themselves, Hooke gained more familiarity
with  his  apparatus  than with many of  the  subjects  of  his  observations.  The story  of  these
materials is the focus of  this chapter.
The Perfection of Lenses
As we dissect Hooke's microscope, it is important to see how it fits back together, and
how its parts are mutually dependent. The aim of  a microscope is not to change the direction of
travel of  a ray of  light, the aim is to provide a clear, magnified image. The things which enabled
this – light, refraction, the indefinite complexity of  nature – were the same things that made it
difficult. There were three main technical bugbears of  early microscopy: aberration, illumination,
and specimen preparation.35 Aberration came in two major varieties, chromatic and spherical. But
discovery that these were just apparitions and misleading appearances through his lenses: Phinney, “A Revisionist
History of  Microscopical Sciences,” 126. See also Chapter 4 of  this thesis, footnote 71.
35 The technical development of  the microscope has been well documented, and I will not repeat it here. See: 
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calling these things 'problems' obscures the reality of  the practice. They were simply inextricable
effects of  lens use – 'problems' so deeply a part of  the instrument's form that a 'solution' would
have  been  a  change  to  the  operation  of  the  entire  system.  Thus,  though  the  technical
imperfection of  lenses has been a favourite explanation for why the microscope failed to achieve
the iconic status of  the telescope, even on occasions when theoretical optics suggested to Hooke
that he should alter the instrument he was using, the choice not to do so was not an uneducated
choice, and rarely due simply to a lack of  the technical ability to reach theoretical perfection.36
This was especially evident in the case of  aberration.  Hooke knew that  refraction was
what gave his compound microscope its power:
first, [by] augmenting the figure in the [microscope] Tube, by the smallness of  the object-Glass,
and the length of  the Tube: and secondly, by the augmenting that image in the bottom of  the
eye; and that is by the Eye-glass.37
The light coming from an object and into the eye is refracted en route. Consequently
what the eye sees is that object stretched out into a larger image. Unfortunately, rays which refract
from the outer area of  a spherical lens focus at a different point to those rays which refract from
its centre. The focus of  a spherical lens is not a point but a line, which means the image from it is
not all in focus to a viewer at a particular location, but  fuzzy and distorted. This is spherical
aberration, a widely  discussed issue in early lens use.  The challenge was to create a lens that
brought things into clear focus, and a challenge it was. Ibn al-Haytham (Alhacen) made the issue
central  in  optical  writing,  and seventeenth century  attention focused on conic  section lenses
following  Descartes'  Dioptrique of  1637.  Descartes suggested  that  an  elliptical  shape  –  now
known as Cartesian ovals – would not suffer the problematic fuzziness and built a lens grinding
Turner, Essays on the History of  the Microscope; Disney, Hill, and Baker, Origin and Development of  the Microscope; 
Bennett, “The Social History of  the Microscope.”
36 See: Hacking, “Do We See Through a Microscope?”; Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-
Century Microscopy.”
37 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 101.
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machine  for  the  purpose,  but  with  little  success.38 A  technical  solution  was  widely  sought:
Constantijn  Huygens  worked  with  Descartes  on  the  problem  in  the  1630s,  Wren  designed
another lens grinding machine in the 50s, and Newton experimented with non-spherical glasses
in the mid-1660s.39 In early  1668,  Francis  Smethwick showed the results  of  his  new  way of
grinding aspherical lenses to the Royal Society  which were found to give clearer magnification
than the “common, yet very good” instruments they were tested against.40 While working on
Micrographia, Hooke himself  experimented with reflection microscopes, and with lenses made of
gum, resin, salt, arsenic and oil.41 But  the clearest, cheapest, and most convenient  were  usually
simply ground glass spherical lenses. They were so much simpler to make (Micrographia details a
machine for grinding them)42 that despite any theoretical advantages and even the odd technical
success,  in  practice  spherical  lenses  out-performed aspherical  ones.  In  other  words,  the  very
provenance of  lenses  inhibited  their use.  The easiest  and most  successful  way  to  overcome
aberration  was  just  to  restrict  the  viewing  area  to  the  centre  of  the  lens.  This  meant  less
aberration but the side effect was a smaller lens area, meaning less light could enter, and a darker,
more indistinct image.
Consequently, the rule of  thumb that came to underlie Hooke's microscope use was that
as  far  as  lenses  were  concerned,  “the  more  the  worse.”43 Though  it  was  what  granted
magnification, he actively sought to reduce the number of  refractions in his microscopes, because
“always the fewer the Refractions are, the more bright and clear the Object appears.” 44 He rarely
made use of  the third (field) lens he could insert in his Reeve microscope which allowed him to
see more of  his  subject  at  once,  preferring a smaller  but  much clearer image,  and  he began
38 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology. See especially Optics discourse 8. See also 
Dijksterhuis, “Constructive Thinking”; Gaukroger, Emergence of  a Scientific Culture, 390; Schuster, Descartes-
Agonistes.
39 Burnett, “Descartes and the Hyperbolic Quest.”
40 “An Account of  the Invention of  Grinding Optick and Burning-Glasses, of  a Figure Not-Spherical, Produced 
before the Royal Society.”
41 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F2r.
42 Ibid., sigs. E1r-v.
43 Hooke, “The Uses and Advantage of  Microscopes.”
44 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F1v.
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making for himself  simple microscopes, with single lenses – the style more commonly associated
with Leeuwenhoek (see Figure 2.4). Hooke wrote to Boyle on 3 July 1663 to tell him: “[I] made a
microscope object glass so small,  that  I was fain to use a magnifying glass to look upon it.”
Unfortuntely, it “did not succeed so well as I hoped; but I suppose it might be, because this being
the  first  I  had  made,  the  tool  was  not  very  true,  nor  my hand well  habituated  to  such an
employment.”45 He  persevered,  and  in  the  preface  to  Micrographia described  the  process  of
making such small lenses by holding a shard of  glass over a flame until it melted and a droplet
formed. He filed the droplet into a bead and polished it smooth, then attached it with wax against
a small hole punched through a metal plate. Holding an object very close to one side of  the bead,
and with his eye very close to the other, he could see things greatly magnified.
The quality  of  such a lens was  essentially  a  process of  trial  and error  –  its  optical
performance was dependent on the shape,  size,  and clarity  of  the glass,  and the  amount of
control in creating a bead a few millimetres across would surely have been minimal. When they
were good they were very good. Nicolaas Hartsoeker claimed to achieve a magnification of  up to
770  times  with  his  best  such  lens.46 He seems  to  have  produced  simple  microscopes  more
powerful than those Hooke was making  –   when Hooke sent one of  his  creations  to Boyle in
November 1664,  he said it would “magnify the object, and make it as clear, when conveniently
placed, as one of  Mr. Reeve's largest.”47
45 Hooke to Boyle, 3 July 1663. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 2:98.
46 Ruestow, The Microscope in the Dutch Republic, 14.
47 Hooke to Boyle, 21 November 1664. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 
2:364.
25
Unfortunately, he also found them “very troublesome to be us'd.”48 Though they could
be made at home with some old glass and a lamp – surely an advantage to a waged Curator new
to London and lodging in someone else's townhouse – it must have been a tedious process filing,
afixing, and using glass beads so small they themselves needed to be viewed through a magnifying
glass. They were fiddly and delicate; he broke the first one he tried to send to Boyle.49 To add pain
to inconvenience, Hooke repeatedly claimed that they were all very well for those people who
48 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F1v.
49 Hooke to Boyle, 21 November 1664. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 
2:364. He sent a complete instrument later in the month: see Hooke to Boyle, 28/29 October 1664. In Ibid., 
2:371.
Figure 2.4: Leeuwenhoek's microscope. The lens is the small blister near the top
of  the metal plate. The specimen is placed on the spike, and can be adjusted both
laterally and vertically. From Dobell, Antony van Leeuwenhoek and His “Little
Animals,” 328.
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could  endure  it,  but  the  tiny  lenses  hurt  his  eyes.50 Optical  performance  was  not  his  only
consideration, and Hooke made little use of  simple microscopes despite recognising their clear
benefits.  He published a description of  the  instrument,  and later  lamented that  no one had
followed it.51
Another related benefit was that they did not produce as many of  the “colours which
do much disturb the clear vision in double Microscopes.”52 Because different colours of  light
refract different amounts,  when  white light refracts through even the same part of  a lens,  the
different  colours  focus  to  different  points,  producing  a  fuzzy  coloured  halo  around  images,
known as chromatic aberration (Figure 2.5).
50 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 96.
51 Ibid., 99; Hooke, “Hooke Folio,” f. 96. Leeuwenhoek was probably the most prolific simple microscope user, 
but even after death he was secretive about his instruments. Though he left some to the Royal Society, even then
he probably withheld his best instruments. See Baker, “An Account of  Mr. Leeuwenhoek’s Microscopes.”
52 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 97.
Figure 2.5: The slight chromatic aberration of  a flea. The left image is a photo taken through an eighteenth century
microscope, and shows a coloured halo, though not enough to completely obscure the image. (Image copyright The
Whipple Museum of  the History of  Science, University of  Cambridge [Wh.0080]). The right image, for comparison
of  the detail visible, is Hooke's flea from Micrographia, scheme 34 detail, opposite p. 210.
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Achromatic lenses, made from two types of  glass with differing refractive qualities, were
reliably made by the middle of  the eighteenth century.53 Before that, Hooke was not without
more feats of  instrumental dexterity as he sought to decrease the number of  refractions still
further. When examining a liquid through a microscope, it was possible to:
spread a little of  the liquor on the Looking-glass plate, then apply the said plate with liquor,
next  to  the  Globule  (lens),  till  the  liquor  touch.  […  T]his  liquor  being  of  a  specifique
refraction, not much differing from glass, the second refraction is quite taken off, and little or
none left but for that of  the convex side of  the Globule next to the eye.54
A  one-refraction  instrument  seems  ideal,  “capable  of  the  greatest  clearness  and
brightness that any one kind of  Microscopes can possibly be imagined susceptible of.”55 Hooke,
preferring not to use simple microscopes, even made a compound version: a water microscope.
This was a tube, filled with water, with a plano-convex lens at each end (Figure 2.6).
53 Priestley, The History and Present State of  Discoveries Relating to Vision, Light, and Colours, 729; Hutchison, 
“Idiosyncracy, Achromatic Lenses, and Early Romanticism.”
54 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 98–99.
55 Ibid., 98.
Figure 2.6: Hooke's water microscope in cross section. The object lens is at the far left, the eye piece at the
right. The screw at the top can be removed to pour in water. Micrographia, scheme 1 detail, opposite p. 1.
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By using water instead of  air inside the tube, light refracts less when it leaves the object
lens, and enters the eyepiece lens. Less refraction means less magnification, and less aberration.
Hooke's  particular design may have been new, but Descartes had suggested something similar,
and Newton would later agree it “perform[ed] the office of  one Glass.”56 Unfortunately, optical
performance  was  again  trumped  by  practical  matters.  Unspecified  “inconveniences”  meant
Hooke hardly used this instrument.57 The water needed to be incredibly clear, the tube well made
and water-tight.  Perhaps it  leaked,  or the water softened the wax seal  around the lenses and
caused them to shift.
In Hooke's inventive approach to his instrument, the things he found important and the
things  that stymied his pursuit of  them, we can see a constant interplay between aims, theory,
material and ability. Ingenious he certainly was. Ofer Gal has called Hooke's willingness to replace
two lenses with one “anti-theoretical” – what theory there was to practical optics in Hooke's time
was based on the interactions of  two lenses of  different shapes or sizes.58 Indeed, the same could
perhaps be said of  the  decision to use well made spherical, rather than badly made hyperbolic,
lenses.59 In general, it is too simplistic to say that aberration necessitated workaround solutions.
After all it is the same process, refraction, that both produced the unwanted aberrations and the
sought-after magnification, as Hooke well knew.60 In the 1670s, Hooke and Newton debated the
likelihood of  creating a refracting instrument with sharp focus, and wondered whether or not it
wouldn't be better to focus on constructing reflecting instruments.61 Hooke was not prompted by
a  conception  of  the  microscope  as  purely  a  magnifying  instrument,  but  rather  by  the
requirements  of  his  immediate  task to  gain  clear  and bright  views  of  the  micro-world,  and
arrived at his own rules of  practice independent from the theoretical optics of  the time which
56 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 120; Newton, “Mr Isaac Newtons Answer to Some
Considerations upon His Doctrine of  Light and Colors,” 5085.
57 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F2r.
58 Gal, Meanest Foundations and Nobler Superstructures, 50.
59 For another instance of  Hooke emphasising that the best instrument is the one suitable for the situation see his 
“Animadversions on the First Part of  the Machina Coelestis,” 8.
60 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D2v.
61 See their letters and replies to one another in Turnbull, The Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:92, 110, 171.
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ostensibly  explain  the  operation  of  the  instrument. Daily  work  and physical  contraint  made
Hooke innovate, and move back time and again to his store-bought, rather fashionable parlour
instrument, its size and stability the most important considerations for making observations day
in, day out.
The Invisible Material: Light
Perservering  with  this  instrument  meant  a  balancing  act,  and  Hooke  began  to
manipulate something other  than his  lenses.  The one truly essential  ingredient  of  the  whole
instrumental milieu  was light.  The vehicle of  vision, it was refracted through lenses to provide
magnification.  But  more  magnification  brought  more  aberration.  Reducing  aberration  meant
using a tiny aperture, and a tiny aperture meant a darker image. “[G]ive therefore light enough to
the object, and you may increase the image at the bottom of  the eye to what proportion you shall
desire.”62
The light through his window was in “continual variation,” and even on sunny days
Hooke found he could rarely complete an observation in daylight hours.63 Lamplight was a start,
and Hooke certainly  worked hard at improving lamps.  He designed a lamp which would burn
with  an  even  flame  and  for  as  a  long  a  time  as  possible –  both  strong  desiderata  for  the
microscopist.64 But working through the night with his eye to the microscope, even lamplight by
itself  was not enough. Hooke amplified it through a glass globe full of  water.
This is  the globe marked G in  Figure  2.7, and seems to have been a fairly standard
means  of  light  amplification  in  the  seventeenth  century.  When  Samuel  Pepys  bought  a
microscope from Richard Reeve, it came with a 'scotoscope'; “a curious curiosity it is to  [see]
objects in a darke room with.”65 Though he does not describe it, and there is some ambiguity
62 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 101.
63 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. E1r.
64 Hooke, Lampas.
65 13 August 1664: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1971, 5:240.
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about what the now-obsolete word refers to, R. H. Nuttall's convincing suggestion is that it is
identical with the device Hooke describes in his preface.66 “By means of  this instrument […] the
small flame of  a Lamp may be cast as great and convenient a light on the Object as it will well
indure.” Often he would diffuse the light through a piece of  oily paper so the specimen could be
evenly lit, without any hard shadows or glare.67
As well as the quantity of  light, the angle it lit a specimen from was crucial. Again and
again in  Micrographia  and  the later “Microscopium” Hooke mentions that objects look like one
thing in one light, and another in another.68 He agreed with Henry Power that under certain light
flies' eyes looked like a lattice of  tiny holes, but in brighter sunlight they  turned into  a surface
66 Nuttall, “That Curious Curiosity: The Scotoscope.”
67 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. E1r.
68 e.g. Ibid., sig. F1v; Hooke, “Microscopium,” 92; Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:349. 
Figure 2.7: The scotoscope, from Micrographia scheme 1, figure 5, opposite p. 1.
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covered  in  nails  or  pyramids.  Often,  rather  than  finding  just  the  right  way  to  illuminate
something, Hooke found it more useful to light and view it from various angles, and be wary of
those features which altered.69 It was not just the specimen or the light that Hooke moved to get
a good view. His drawing of  his instrument in Micrographia (Figure 2.1 above) appears to be the
first depiction of  a microscope mounted as it is, on a pillar by a ball and socket joint, rather than
sitting immobile on a tripod.  The way he describes the instrument in  "Microscopium" implies
this was his own innovation – perhaps Reeve supplied only the tube and lenses.70 Though in fact
both the pillar and the tripod designs persisted into the eighteenth century – indication perhaps
that ease of  use or optical quality were not the only arbiters of  design for an instrument that was
a fashionable accessory and a toy more often than a philosophical instrument – Hooke's method
has clear advantages.71 The microscope tube itself  was  mobile in any plane, allowing Hooke to
shift his lens, the specimen, and the light in “what posture I desir'd.”72 The able microscopist, it is
clear,  was  not  only  reliant  on  the  ability  of  lens  grinders  to  approach  theoretical  optical
perfection, but would possess a good degree of  mechanical ingenuity too. In a lecture from 1693,
Hooke criticised Philippo Bonanni for using a microscope with “too much apparatus and clutter
and yet [...] wanting of  many accommodations for examining or as it were handling & turning the
Object into all postures & for all lights.”73
Seeing What Was There: Specimens
The design of  a microscope and what you wish to see through it are not things that can
be changed independently of  one another. An object needs to be placed so close to the lens of  a
simple microscope to be magnified by it – even touching it – that the instrument is useless for
69 I return to his point in Chapter 4.
70 Hooke set aside “the common pedestal hitherto made use of  in Microscopes,” and instead “I fix into the 
bottom of  the Tube of  the Microscope, a cylindrical rod of  Brass or Iron.” Hooke, “Microscopium,” 91.
71 See Bennett, “The Social History of  the Microscope.”
72 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F2r.
73 Hooke, “The Uses and Advantage of  Microscopes,” f. 4. See Appendix.
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viewing  opaque  things.  Attach  a  fly  to  the  underside  of  the  glass  bead,  and  it  cannot  be
illuminated from above or the side, but only behind, casting a giant shadow on the microscope
lens. Conversely, when using a compound instrument “the transparency of  most Objects renders
them yet  much more difficult  then if  they  were  opacous”.74 The wrong angle  of  light  added
shadows  to or  changed the  appearance  of  anything,  but  translucent  subjects amplified  the
problem.  Again magnification  was not the only game in town. Loyalty to a particular subject
matter could determine the form of  the  instrument used, and vice versa.  At the extreme end of
this contraint is Margaret Cavendish's absurd request to see a whale under the microscope in her
story The Blazing World. The hapless experimenters she asks ready their largest microscope, “but
alas! The shape of  the whale was so big, that its Circumference went beyond the magnifying
quality of  the Glass.”75
Marian Fournier has pointed out that though these kinds of  aspects of  microscopy were
much  less  discussed  than  optical  aberrations,  they  were  equally  if  not  more  important  in
determining research with the instrument.76 Hooke's microscopical inspiration were the drawings
of  insects Wren had given Charles II, and he was probably further prompted by Henry Power's
observations,  also  made  with  a  compound  instrument.77 Despite  his  knowledge  of,  and  his
willingness to make, new instruments, Hooke's chosen subjects helped determine to some extent
the instrument that he used. Through use, the reverse also became true: Hooke found it much
easier to use a compound than a simple microscope; lighting specimens for the latter was a “great
inconvenience,” and his eyes were pained by their tiny lenses.78 The form of  the instrument and
the programme of  its use were mutually reinforcing considerations. If  there was a limitation to
Hooke's work in magnifiying  his senses, it was not so much theoretical optical knowledge nor
technical ingenuity as the material bodies of  the plants and insects he observed.
74 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F2v.
75 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 32. I return to Cavendish in Chapter 5. See also Bacon's words on the 
microscope: Novum Organum book 2, aphorism 39, in Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:345.
76 Fournier, The Fabric of  Reality, 34.
77 See Chapter 4.
78 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 92.
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Hooke  and Power  used  mainly  compound  microscopes  to  look  at  (mainly) insects,
plants, and seeds. The simple microscopists like Leeuwenhoek and Jan Swammerdam wrote much
more frequently on anatomy, blood cells, spermatozoa, and the tiny nematodes in liquids. When
Leeuwenhoek wrote to the Royal  Society and told them about these tiny animals  in pepper-
infused water, the two programmes crossed paths. In October 1677, Hooke dusted off  his old
instruments. “I put in order such remainders as I had of  my former Microscopes (having by
reason of  a weakness in my sight omitted to use them for many years) and steeped some black
pepper in River water.”79 Little thereafter was straightforward. His recreation of  Leeuwenhoek's
observations  was  not  an  exact replication  –  he  persevered  with  a  compound  instrument,
confident he could see things at the scale Leeuwenhoek claimed to have, even if  his instrument
was of  a different type.80 The episode demonstrates how tricky it could be simply to see what
there was to see, even when you knew it was there.
For one thing, preparing a specimen is not easy. Ian Hacking has said that in order for
the microscope to become a successful and fashionable parlour toy, it needed to be packaged
with a box of  specimen slides, which would routinely have cost more than the instrument itself.81
Limiting though they did the objects one could view, and therefore the microscope's usefulness
and interest as an investigative tool, without such preparations most people would not have been
able to view anything at all.  When Pepys bought his instrument from Reeve, he and his wife
thumbed through Power's Experimental Philosophy to get an idea of  what to expect, sat down with
their instrument,  and  still  had  “great difficulty before we could come to find the manner of
seeing any thing.”82 When Hooke sent Boyle his first simple microscope, he thoughtfully attached
a “small brush of  hairs” for him to look at.83 In Hacking's words, “[y]ou did not just put a drop
79 Ibid., 82. Leeuwenhoek's letter is reproduced by Hooke in this same lecture. The following events are patched 
together from “Microscopium,” the minutes in Birch, and extra meeting information omitted from Birch but in 
the Hooke Folio, Royal Society MS 847.
80 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:346; Hooke, “Microscopium,” 82, 89.
81 Hacking, “Do We See Through a Microscope?,” 138.
82 14 August 1664: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1971, 5:241.
83 Hooke to Boyle, 28/29 October 1664. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 
2001, 2:371.
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of  pond water on a slip of  glass and look at it.”84 For one thing,  as  Hooke tells us,  the slip of
glass needs to be “very clear and thin[, ...] very smooth and plain on both sides, and clean from
foulness,” so artifacts in the glass are not mistaken for discoveries.85 For another, the pond water
must have in it the things you wish to see. On 1 November, Hooke looked for Leeuwenhoek's
pepper worms for the first time and saw nothing.86
It was not immediately clear to the  Fellows of  the Royal Society what to blame the
failure on. Either the microscope or the specimen could have been culpable. Leeuwenhoek did
brag  about  the tiny size of  the animals he could see, and he refused to divulge secrets of  his
microscope design.87 Perhaps Hooke's microscope was not strong enough. Then again, this first
observation was made with plain water, not infused with pepper.88 The Fellows resolved to change
both  the  instrument  and  the  specimen  for  the  next  meeting.89 Hooke  himself  blamed  the
interface between the two – the specimen mount. Leeuwenhoek used thin glass pipes to hold the
liquid, and Hooke conjectured the pipes themselves must have been acting as magnifying glasses,
doubling the effect of  viewing them through a lens.90 His own mounts did not have the same
effect.
Hooke used different techniques for mounting different objects.  A solid body  could
simply be placed on a pin under the object glass (see M in Figure 2.7 above), or placed on a small
sheet of  mica (which Hooke calls 'muscovy glass') attached to it. Mica can be split very thin, until
it is “hardly perceivable by the eye,” perfect for an unobtrusive slide.91 A liquid could likewise be
spread across such a slide; a  viscous  or uneven fluid  like “Fat, Oyl, Brains, Rhobs, Pus, tough
84 Hacking, “Do We See Through a Microscope?,” 138.
85 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 93.
86 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:347; Hooke, “Microscopium,” 82–83.
87 See for instance his letter to the Royal Society of  October 1676: after estimates at the size and quantity of  the 
tiny animacula, he says that “the make of  the Microscopes, employed by me, I cannot yet communicate.” 
Leeuwenhoek, “Monsieur Leewenhoeck’s Letter to the Publisher,” 845.
88 This is according to the minutes in Birch, and despite the fact that he implies it was pepper water in 
"Microscopium". On a couple of  occasions Birch and Hooke's later recollection do not match. I have tended to 
follow the minutes, which at this time, post-Oldenburg, were in any case taken by Hooke.
89 Clearly they had never played Cluedo.
90 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:346–347.
91 Hooke, Micrographia, 47.
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concreted Flegm, and the like” he would press  flat  between two thin plates of  looking glass.
Small threads like tendons he would stretch between two tweezers.92
The  next  trial  was  at  the  meeting  of  8  November.  Hooke  had  a  more  powerful
compound microscope, and he had adapted it to hold Leeuwenhoekian glass tubes. One tube was
attached to a brass plate, perforated to allow light through, which could slide along another piece
of  brass fixed below the object lens, allowing different angles and views.93 It was filled with water
steeped with pepper for three days. Still there were no worms. Again the Fellows conjectured why
not. Thomas Henshaw blamed the season. It was late autumn; perhaps not the time of  year
pepper worms generate.  Daniel Whistler thought maybe the black flecks of  pepper they could
see floating about were Leeuwenhoek's “imagined creatures.”94 This response,  though seeming
uncharitable, is  pure  reasonableness:  what  they  could  see  what  all  that  exists. They  were
convinced to keep trying for two reasons, one evidential and one testimonial. Leeuwenhoek had
written  about  seeing  the  worms  both  alive  and  dead.  The  floating  specks  were  clearly  not
swimming creatures, begging the question of  how he could have noticed a difference if  they were
all he had seen. And perhaps more importantly, the Dutchman's first observation had been also
witnessed by two ministers,  a public  notary,  and five other “persons of  good credit.”95 Such
'virtual  witnessing'  helped  to  universalise  what  was  otherwise  a  private  and  contestable
experience,  and  was  an important part  of  how the Royal  Society  themselves vindicated their
experimental endeavour.96
After the failure, Hooke fell back on explaining how, by keeping both eyes open, he
could measure the magnification of  a microscope. It was suggested to him that next time he put
this skill to use and bring a more powerful microscope. The Fellows were still equating the quality
92 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 91–95.
93 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:349. These minutes just say the mount was highly adjustable, the 
detail is taken from an account of  the following observation (15 November) in Hooke, “Hooke Folio,” f. 109.
94 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:349.
95 Ibid., 3:347.
96 See especially: Shapin, A Social History of  Truth; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump; Dear, “Totius in 
Verba.”
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of  an observation with the size of  the image.97
In fact, Henshaw was not far wrong: what was needed was patience. The worms needed
longer to generate inside the pepper water, and Hooke began to notice them the following week.
“[A]s if  I had been looking upon a Sea, I saw infinite of  small living Creatures swimming and
playing up and down in it, a thing indeed very wonderful to behold.”98 At the meeting on 15
November, he showed an excitied crowd. The charmed onlookers saw tiny creatures like bubbles
or pearls wriggling to and fro.  The  tiny,  erratic  movement convinced them  they were  seeing
animals, and “there was no longer any doubt of  Mr. Leewenhoeck's discovery.”99
Excitement quickly gave way to sober inquiry.  The  Fellows suggested  more iterations:
replace the pepper with wheat, barley or nothing; replace the water with blood or another liquid.
The official minutes record a triumph of  collaborative experimental philosophy. An experiment
perfected in private by Hooke was repeated in front of  witnesses, whose names and titles are duly
recorded.  But intriguingly, the minutes – taken by Hooke in his new role as Secretary – do not
seem to document the whole meeting. Whether  an  intentional  omission  or not, both Hooke's
97 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:349.
98 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 92.
99 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:352.
Figure 2.8: Hooke's illustration of  vinegar eels from Micrographia, scheme 25, fig. 3, opposite p. 181. Hooke was
astonished to see creatures one hundredth the size of  one of  these tiny worms (see 'Microscopium,' p. 83).
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"Microscopium" and the lost minutes in the “Hooke Folio” reveal more details which make this
simple experimentum account much more ambiguous.
Firstly, the published minutes break off  after suggestions for further trials, but before
the discussion turned more speculative. Hooke thought the worms might have hatched from eggs
laid on the pepper before it was steeped, while Henshaw, Wren, and William Holder argued they
were generated directly from the pepper. Henshaw supported this view by analogy with another
case. The heat of  the pepper  fermented the mixture, which then  produced worms;  exactly as
happens  when  horses'  tails  or  lute  strings  steeped  in  water  turn  into  snakes.100 That  such
hypothetical  explanation should be omitted  deliberately from the official record is an enticing
idea,  but I do not want to overstate it. The Fellows engaged fairly freely in this sort of  excited
discussion after observations or experiments were performed for them.
There is  also  a discrepancy in  the form of  the microscope  described. Hooke, in his
omitted notes, goes on to describe the Leeuwenhoekian thin pipes, attached to brass plates, that
held the pepper water. In "Microscopium", the published version of  what was originally a public
lecture at Gresham College, he claims he saw pepper worms on a slide of  muscovy glass: a better
method “at  least  for those Microscopes I make use of;  what it  may be for those which Mr.
Leeuwenhoeck uses I know not.”101 The discrepancy could be another example of  Hooke's  leaky
memory marring a later account, or perhaps he succeeded using both ways. He suspected that a
drop of  liquid on a sheet of  muscovy glass would itself  act like a lens and, like Leeuwenhoek's
tubes, magnify things within it,  as a leaf  looks magnified  through  rain drops.102 He could  of
course have been emphasising his microscopical prowess, in succeeding by his own methods. Or
perhaps he recognised Leeuwenhoek's desire for secrecy,  and omitted  the details of  the device
out of  respect for an experimenter for whom he had great admiration and whose observations
were – as Hooke's were for him – an important part of  his livelihood.
100 Hooke, “Hooke Folio,” f. 109.
101 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 91.
102 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:351.
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In "Microscopium" Hooke emphasises another detail lacking in Birch: the ambiguity of
the observations themselves.
When the water began to dry off, the bending of  the superficies of  the liquor over their backs,
and over the tops of  other small motes which were in the water made a confused appearance,
which some not used to these kind of  examinations, took to be quite differing things from
what  they were really;  and the appearances here are so very strange,  that to one not well
accustomed to the phaenomena of  fluids of  differing figures and refractions, the examinations
of  substances this way will be very apt to mis-inform, rather than instruct him.103
Was Hooke taking the opportunity of  a public lecture to emphasise his expertise, how
“accustomed” and “used to these kind of  examinations” he was, something out of  place in the
official minutes, a text more appropriately limited to sober accounts of  collective certainty?
For whatever reason,  the  published minutes  do not  contain the whole  account.  My
explanations of  these three disparities are speculative, but there is a more general lesson. As with
the observations in Micrographia with which I began this chapter, it is only by looking through the
details  Hooke  openly  gives us  in the official  texts of  the Royal  Society  to clues in his other
writings  that  we  catch  a  rare  glimpse  of  a  classical  microscopist  admitting  the  difficulty  of
making observations. 
Crafted Knowledge
Hooke's tinkering brought an end to a year long raised eyebrow about Leeuwenhoek's
claim to see so many creatures in so little water – he had first communicated his observations in a
letter  of  October  1676.104 The  process  of  the  investigation  was  one  of  constant  iterative
manipulation.  Behind  the  the  register  of  the  witnesses'  gratified  assent  to  Leeuwenhoek's
103 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 92.
104 Ibid., 81.
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observation in the Royal Society minutes, as behind the drawings in Micrographia, lie the details of
the microscopist's task. Hooke had objects to investigate that he knew were within the horizons
of  his lenses,  but still  it  was not easy.  When the Fellows urged him to use a more powerful
microscope, what did this mean? Bigger lenses?  Smaller lenses? A different specimen mount?
More light? All of  these things were aspects of  Hooke's microscope which he could and did alter,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, searching for an accurate  vision of  an object  that he had
never seen before.
My purpose  in  this  chapter  has  been to foreground Hooke's  activities.  To say  with
Pepys, and with any number of  more contemporary writers, that Hooke's microscopical work is
“ingenious” is not inaccurate but it is vague.105 Micrographia was not simply a book intended to
impress its readers, or a  testament of  the  power of  a  artifice  to widen the limits of  human
knowledge. It was both of  these things, but it was also a painstaking work of  craftsmanship by
someone who, in the process, became an expert at manipulating certain material objects. The
microscope's  holistic  form was  constrained  by  physical  limitations:  the  subjects  of  Hooke's
enquiries, the quality of  his lenses, the length of  the English day. Things material, meteorological,
human, and perhaps above all, expedient.
The  dissected  microscope consisted of  lenses, scotoscopes, mica, looking glass plates,
water, lamp oil, and light itself. The ulterior motive of  this chapter has been to acquaint us with
these components.  I  will revisit  them in the following chapter, where I will show that Hooke's
theoretical ideas about light stem from his microscope use, and is based on the other ingredients
of  the instrument. Without his microscope – without composing Micrographia, Hooke would not
have arrived at his theoretical ideas about light and colour production.
105 21 January 1664/5: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1972, 6:18.
40
Chapter 3: The Colours in Thin Plates
The Importance of Materials
We have just seen that  there were few stable parts of  Hooke's microscope. He tried
different  numbers  of  lenses  of  different  shapes  and  materials,  different  ways  of  displaying
specimens, and different light sources. But light itself  was always there. We know something of
the lengths he went to to change the direction and shape of  the light reflecting of  his subject and
into his eye. In this chapter I will explain the detailed views of  light and colour Hooke presents in
Micrographia, and his later adaptations of  them.  These theoretical, considered ideas  in fact turn
out  to  be  the  result  of  the manipulative,  instrumental expertise  I  discussed  in  the  previous
chapter. Perhaps he later performed directed trials designed to interrogate the nature of  light, but
his ideas are fundamentally grounded in the different parts of  his microscope, and in a very real
sense the limits to his knowledge of  light are set by the materials he used to manipulate it.
Observation  9 of  Micrographia is titled 'Of  the Colours observable in Muscovy Glass,
and  other  thin  Bodies.'  Muscovy  glass  was  the  common  early  modern  English  name  for
muscovite, or mica, so called because it was a cheap replacement for glass windows in medieval
Russia.  Mica,  Hooke says, has as  many “Curiosities  in its  Fabrick as any common Mineral.”1
Importantly,  it  could be split into thin transparent plates,  making it ideal for microscope slides.
But  when  he  looked at  these  slides  through his  instrument,  Hooke  noticed  something else:
colours. There were coloured rings, radiating out from central white dots; there were thin multi-
coloured threads winding around like country roads; and there were larger splashes of  uniform
1 Hooke, Micrographia, 48.
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colours.2 The phenomena could scarcely have escaped his attention after a year and a half  of
peering down his tube at the stuff.
Hooke makes a good deal of  the benefits of  investigating colour in this context rather
than  waiting  for  “the  occasion  of  examining  the  Colours  in  Peacocks,  or  other  Feathers.”3
Feathers he looks at in Observation 36, but every “position of  it to the light makes it perfectly
seem of  another form and shape,” so much so that it was one of  the few objects Hooke was not
confident he managed to get a good view of.4 Mica, on the other hand, was easy to handle. With
it he could produce colours regularly and predictably. In preferring it to feathers, Hooke was both
using the materials he had to hand, and also explicitly privileging their immediacy over historical
precedence.  Before  Kepler  and  Descartes  there  had  been a  long-standing  distinction  made
between  'apparent'  or  'emphatic'  colours, produced  by  light,  and  'real'  colours,  which  were
properties of  bodies. Shimmering peacock feathers, whose colours change in different angles and
lights, made it obvious that even real colours depended on light in some way, and they became an
important example in discussions of  colour.5 In seventeenth century mechanical philosophy light
became  the  sole  vehicle  of  visual  information,  and  the  separation  could  not  be  sustained.6
Descartes had found he could not “approve the distinction made by the philosophers when they
say that there are some true colors, and others which are only false or apparent. For because the
entire true nature of  colors consists only in their appearance, it seems to me to be a contradiction
to say that they are false, and that they appear.”7 By the 1660s this was the accepted view. In 1664
Boyle noted that the distinction between real and apparent did not exist for the proper objects of
our other senses.8 We call all sounds 'true sounds', whether they reach our ears directly or by
echoing off  other surfaces, and all odours 'true odours'. Given all colours affect our vision, the
2 Ibid., 48–49.
3 Ibid., 49.
4 Ibid., 168.
5 See Guerlac, “Can There Be Colours in the Dark?”
6 I return to this optical revolution in Chapter 6.
7 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 338.
8 Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours in Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 4:53.
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distinction should be collapsed, and all colours called 'real'. When Hooke marshalled his inquiry
into colour around mica, he both placed himself  in this tradition, and sought to extend it.
All  colour  was  coloured  light,  and  light  was  the  paradigm  case  for  Descartes'
mathematised physics.9 Light,  he thought, was  the action of  particles on the eye.  The particles
themselves did not actually move, only 'tended' towards a certain direction, like grapes in a barrel
'tending' to move down but prevented from really doing so by the particles already resting in that
place.10 In his Météors,  Descartes showed that  when light refracts, light particles begin to rotate.
His  first  trials  were  with  water  balls to  emulate the  raindrops  of  a  rainbow  but  then,
“remembering that a prism or triangle of  crystal causes similar colors to be seen,” he abstracted
to the general case.11 The eye perceived different particles as differently coloured depending on
their ratio of  rotational  motion to linear  tendency: white light is particles  that are not rotating,
and other colours are different speeds of  rotation.
Hooke thought this was incomprehensible. A true emission theory, he later agreed, would
quickly exhaust the material of  the luminous body and fill the surrounding space.12 But Hooke
could not understand how Descartes' “propension” was supposed to replace the genuine motion
required by all mechanical effects, including vision. When a mason holds his chisel against a stone
and taps it with his hammer, Hooke analogised, the chisel must really move, albeit imperceptibly,
if  the stone is to break.13 What is more, if  light  globules do not  themselves  move  from light
sources to the eye, Hooke wondered, how can they communicate their rotation? “It cannot be by
means of  every one[']s turning the next before him; for if  so, then onely all the Globules that are
in the odd places must be turned the same way with the first[. ... B]ut all the Globules interposited
9 See his Le Monde, ou Traite de Lumiere, in Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, 1:81. See also Gaukroger, 
Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 256.
10 See the first discourse of  his Optics and chapter 13 of  Le Monde.
11 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 335. Descartes may well have remembered 
producing colours quite by accident as well – he measured the refraction of  glass using prism shaped pieces 
placed against wooden props (Optics, p. 137). For Descartes' shift to prisms as an abstraction of  colour 
production, see also Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 38.
12 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 74.
13 Ibid., 130.
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between them in the even places [...] must be quite the contrary.”14 The result, says Hooke, would
be  “no  distinct  colour  generated,  but  a  confusion.”15 More  troublingly,  Hooke  references
Descartes'  Principia and interprets him as saying that every light particle is  always rotating about
its centre.16 How could the eye possibly distinguish between this inherent motion and that which
is due to refraction?  Surely sometimes the latter would conflict with the former, and particles
would  be  static after  refraction.  Hooke  was  playing  Descartes  at  his  own mechanical  game,
applying the principles of  simple machines to the constituents of  nature. But the most powerful
criticism he levelled at  Descartes  was  the  very  thing Hooke presented as  his  motivation for
investigating colour: muscovy glass. Descartes, thought Hooke, had failed to give “any plausible
reason of  the nature of  the Colours generated in the thin laminae” of  the material.17
[I]t is most observable, that here there are all kind of  Colours generated  [...] where there is
properly no such refraction as Des Cartes supposes his Globules to acquire a verticity by.18
Hooke's reading of  Descartes was that the latter's theory required one and  no more
than one refraction. The rotation caused by light entering one side of  a body with parallel sides
would be cancelled by the refraction it suffered when leaving the other. Hooke wielded his mica
as that powerful Baconian weapon, an experimentum crucis, clearing the ground for a new theory.
This  Experiment  therefore  will  prove  such  a  one  as  our  thrice  excellent  Verulam calls
Experimentum Crucis, serving as a Guide or Land-mark, by which to direct our course in the
search after the true cause of  Colours. Affording us this particular negative Information, that
14 Hooke, Micrographia, 61. Henry More also pointed this out. More concluded not that Descartes was wrong, but 
that mechanical principles are not the only part of  Descartes' hypothesis – it needs the 'Hylarchic Principle'. See 
More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 252; Jacob, Henry More’s Manual of  Metaphysics, 2:155.
15 Hooke, Micrographia, 61. Stephen Gaukroger has pointed out to me that Hooke and More are wrong about this: 
Descartes' theory does not depend on direction of  rotation, only speed.
16 Ibid. Hooke references Descartes: Part 3, Section 86: “the globules of  the second element move in various 
different ways at the same time; and as a result they become completely spherical” Descartes, The Philosophical 
Writings of  Descartes, 1:262.
17 Hooke, Micrographia, 61 Anglophone readers had recently been made aware of  the limited application of  
Descartes’ theory through Boyle’s more comphrehensive, phenomenological text on colours.
18 Ibid., 54.
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for the production of  Colours there is not necessary either a great refraction, as in the Prisme;
nor Secondly, a determination of  Light and shadow, such as in both the Prisme and Glass-ball.
Now that we may see likewise what affirmative and positive Instruction it yields, it will be
necessary, to examine it a little more particularly and strictly; which that we may the better do,
it  will  be  requisite  to  premise  somewhat  in  general  concerning  the  nature  of  Light  and
Refraction.19
Mica  lies  at  the  intersection  of  two  related  themes  in  Hooke's  methodology:  the
relationship between theory and instrument, and the acceptable presentation of  observation and
historia in the early Royal Society. In Micrographia, the mineral was simultaneously a representative
of  Hooke's  dedication to pay  attention to the  full  extent  of  nature  as  the  foundation of  a
complete natural philosophy, and  (an unmentioned)  part of  his microscope.  This latter role it
shared with every other trial  Hooke  mentions in  his discussion of  the generation of  colours.
Recognising this will help us understand the nature of  Hooke's ideas on colours: arising from his
instrument use,  they were fundamentally manipulative.  Though the elaborate metaphysics I will
outline below were clearly not suggested to Hooke directly by his lenses and slides, his limits on
metaphysical  possibility  are the  extents  of  his  ability  to manipulate  light. Understanding this
requires seeing through Hooke's presentation of  his ideas in Micrographia – a book printed by the
Royal Society and explicitly positioned as an example of  their observational methodology. As
Peter Dear and others have demonstrated, ideas about what were acceptable ways of  describing
experiment and the knowledge derived from them were  solidifying in Hooke's time.20 My main
focus is Hooke's theory itself, but both themes will emerge through my exploration of  it.
19 Ibid.
20 Dear, “Totius in Verba.” See also Harwood, “Rhetoric and Graphics in Micrographia.” The tendency of  writers 
who have looked at Hooke's light and colour ideas has been to treat them explicitly as a theory, and a violation 
of  the Royal Society's methodology. See: Sabra, Theories of  Light from Descartes to Newton, 187.
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Hooke's Ideas on Colour Production
The  colour  phenomena  that  mica  produces,  which  I  mentioned  above,  stem  from
Hooke's observations of  other materials through his microscope. Split  into sheets of  varying
thickness, mica produced coloured rings or lines. More even plates are coloured with more even
patches. When Hooke spread a thin layer of  liquid over a plate he found more colours, and the
oils and fats he would prepare for observation by squeezing between two plates provided the
final  generalisation that “wheresoever you meet with a  transparent body thin enough, that  is
terminated by reflecting bodies of  different refractions from it, there will be a production of
these pleasing and lovely colours.”21
Because of  these particular instances, and how reliably he could produce them, Hooke
considered mica the ideal material to use to investigate colours. In fact though, as it had been for
Descartes, his primary colour generation method was  that of  refraction. He only extended the
story to cover thin plates after arriving at a theory which explained the more traditional cases as
comprehensively as Descartes' did. To begin with, Hooke took a “large Chimical Glass-body, about
two foot long, filled with very fair Water,” and over the top put a screen with a small hole in it. By
angling it just so toward his window, the sun's rays would refract down the tube, and if  he held
some paper against the bottom of  the tube, “there will appear [on it] all the colours of  the Rain-
bow” (Figure 3.1).22
Why? Because of  a physical change in light during refraction. Light, said Hooke, is the
visible effect of  the parts of  a body vibrating rapidly. The vibrations cause pulses which spread
outward through  the  surrounding  aether,  and are experienced as bright when they affect our
eyes.23 The idea of  vibrations he arrived at by considering the sorts of  things that glow: fiery
bodies; sparks; rotten wood and putrifying fish; the 'Bononian stone' (Bolognian phosphorus);  
21 Hooke, Micrographia, 53.
22 Ibid., 58.
23 For the similarities of  Hooke's ideas and those of  Hobbes, whom he certainly read but does not name, see 
Shapiro, “Kinematic Optics.” Hooke later refers to Hobbes' treatise on light published by Mersenne but appears 
unaware who its author was (Hooke, Micrographia, 100.) The text says “Moreanus” but is corrected to 
“Mersennus” in the errata.
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and diamonds “rub'd, struck, or heated in the dark”; sea water breaking on rocks or disturbed by
oars  (again  presumably  phosphorescence);  cats'  eyes;  and  the  bellies  of  glow  worms. 24 The
glowing motion must therefore be fast, because it is able to break down the body of  a rotting
fish; and vibrative, because diamonds remain hard and do not shrink as they would with circular
or linear motion.25 This eclectic list Hooke draws from was actually fairly standard, at least in
England, appearing in both Hobbes and Boyle,  both of  whom Hooke read.26 Descartes,  the
godfather of  this kind of  mechanical explanation of  light as motion, had considered the sun as
24 Hooke, Micrographia, 54–55.
25 Ibid., 55–56.
26 Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours, in Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999., Hobbes Tractatus Opticus I,
published by Mersenne in his Cogitata Physico-Mathematica.
Figure 3.1: Light rays refracting in a tube of  water.
Sunlight enters through a small peephole in the top,
refracts on entering the water, and displays a spectrum
across c d e f  at the bottom. Micrographia, scheme 6, fig, 2,
opposite p. 62.
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his primary example of  a luminous body, and considered the movement a circular one.27 Hooke
had no such ideal or privileged light source. A. I. Sabra has suggested it was exactly his prosaic
examples which led Hooke to his  different conclusion,  though as Mary Hesse has discussed,
vibrative  motion  often  played  the  role  of  a  fundamental  cause  for  Hooke,  grounding  his
explanations of  various phenomena.28
So  light  is  pulses  spreading  out  in  concentric  sphere  from vibrating  bodies.  When
travelling in a homogeneous medium, the sphere of  light grows uniformly.29 That is, at all points
of  the sphere the direction of  travel (outwards from the centre) and the pulse itself  (around the
centre) are at ninety degrees to one another. But when part of  a pulse meets a new medium,
refraction changes the direction of  travel. And this, says Hooke, changes the angle between the
pulse and the direction – the angle becomes oblique.30
Figure 3.2 shows light refracting by, for instance, entering water from air. AD, BE, CF
represents a section of  a pulse moving through the air L toward the surface, O, of  the water M.
The pulse is longitudinal, so each vibration of  the glowing body sends the pulse from AD to BE
to CF and so on. AB can be considered something like the 'length' or 'strength' of  the pulse.
Hooke is vague about these details and they are not so important here, but I will return to them
below.  The  lines  that  bound  the  pulses,  AC  and  DF,  are  mathematical  rays  –  geometrical
abstractions which are the direction of  the pulse's trajectory. When the pulse hits O, the light
changes direction. At this point, this figure actually represents  two possibilities: light could be
moving from air to water, or water to air.  If  M is a denser medium than L, the rays will refract
toward the perpendicular: ABC – CHK, but if  M is rarer they will move away: ABC – SRI. The
same two things happen for either option  which give  Hooke his oblique pulses,  so I will only
27 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 67. See also the end of  chapter 13 of  his Le Monde.
28 Sabra, Theories of  Light from Descartes to Newton, 188–190; Hesse, “Hooke’s Vibration Theory and the Isochrony of
Springs.”
29 See Hooke's later 'Lectures of  Light' for his more extended treatment of  this, and his geometrical explanation of
the inverse square law: Hooke, Posthumous Works, 114, 131.
30 Sabra and Shapiro are the main commentators on the details of  Hooke's theory, though both treat it as part of  a
developmental story in some sense, the “wave theory” from Hobbes to Hooke to Huygens, or as a precursor to 
Newton. Sabra, Theories of  Light from Descartes to Newton; Shapiro, “Kinematic Optics”; Shapiro, “Newton’s 
Definition of  a Light Ray.”
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describe the former case where M is denser than L. First,  the ray is refracted by a certain angle,
and second the light changes speed. For the direction, Hooke divides the pulse FG, into four equal
units, and draws a circle with a radius of  three of  these units around point C. This is the smaller
dotted arc in the diagram.  This gives him point T, the point on this circle with a tangent that
intersects G. BC refracts towards T. But T is not where the pulse ends up. To calculate the speed,
which gives the position of  the pulse after refraction, Hooke reverses the quantities. He divides the
pulse before refraction into  three units, and it moves  four  of  these after refraction: FG is three
quarters of  CH, giving the pulse GH, oblique to the direction of  movement.
The issue is confused because both calculations appear to rely on the speed of  light, in
one case moving slower after refraction and in one case quicker.  In fact, while the ratio 3:4 is
Figure 3.2: Oblique pulses of  light, after refraction from medium L into medium M.
Micrographia, scheme 6, fig. 1, opposite p. 62.
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given by the relative densities of  the media, the calculations are quite separate from one another.
For the direction of  refraction he only gives a geometrical construction (not an explanation), based
on the sine law and consistent with observation.31 He was following Descartes in assuming that
denser media transmit light more quickly than rarer, whereas Hobbes, Huygens, and Fermat all
thought the reverse. This is a fundamental part of  Hooke's mechanism of  colour generation, and
from there his explanation of  light.  Hooke rejected that light moves slower in water because it
was “impossible from that supposition, that any colours should be generated from the refraction
of  Rays; for since by that Hypothesis the undulating pulse is always carried perpendicular [...] with the
Ray.”32 An explanation of  refraction was no explanation unless it showed how colours resulted,
and colours simply had to be a geometrical change in light.33
Undoubtedly successful and in many ways unremarkable, the physical nature of  Hooke's
refraction trial is still worth taking notice of. The first thing to say about it is that it is not a prism.
Prisms were common enough objects, available in London, and not too expensive. Isaac Newton
was buying them from county fairs and on visits to London in the 1660s, some for a shilling a
piece, some for up to sixteen.34 They were common in natural magic texts as harmless deceivers,
used  to  cast  delightful  colours  around  for entertainment  and  decoration  –  figures  like
Giambattista  Della Porta,  Thomas Harriot,  and,  a little  later,  Jan Marek Marci  all  used them
expressly to create colour. Simon Schaffer has traced their increasing status in natural philosophy
following Descartes – the following generation, Boyle described the glass prism as “the usefullest
Instrument Men have yet imploy'd about the Contemplation of  Colours.”35 Hooke had read this
31 See Shapiro, “Kinematic Optics,” 197, and Sabra, Theories of  Light from Descartes to Newton, 192–195, for 
lamentations about the apparent contradiction in Hooke's ideas which 'prevent' him from arriving at the concept
of  a wave front. Hooke designed and built a device for easily measuring refractive indices – see his Micrographia, 
sigs. E2r-F1v, and scheme 1, fig. 2.
32 Hooke, Micrographia, 100.
33 See also Hooke's criticism of  Huygens' ideas about light: they were incomplete because they did not explain 
colour. It is published in Hall, “Two Unpublished Lectures of  Robert Hooke,” 221–222.
34 Schaffer, “Glass Works,” 79.
35 Schaffer, “Glass Works.” See also Shapiro's critique of  Schaffer's constructivist approach to the acceptance of  
Newton's optical theory, and his emphasis on the importance of  theoretical issues: Shapiro, “The Gradual 
Acceptance of  Newton’s Theory of  Light and Colour.” Boyle, Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours, in 
Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 4:117.
50
accolade. He also read Henry Power, who used the instrument in his Experimental Philosophy, and
Descartes.36 But despite belonging to this new generation of  colour theorists, he was not part of
the emerging instrumental norm.
Instead  he  used a device that bears a strong resemblance to his water microscope. A
tube  full  of  water,  with  a  small  hole  at  one  end and a  larger  one  at  the  other.  The  water
microscope was designed for exactly  the  opposite  purpose  as  the  water glass  –  to minimise
chromatic aberration in microscopic observation. These opposite purposes are the results of  the
same underlying process manipulated differently. Changing the shape of  the interface between air
and water  – by adding a  small  lens  – caused light  rays to converge into the eye  instead of
diffusing  into  a  spectrum.  The  lack  of  the  “usefullest  Instrument”  in  Hooke's  experimental
apparatus is  another good indication that  his optical ideas  arose  during  his  microscope  use.  In
Pall Mall Hooke was not surrounded by the plethora of  philosophical instruments he would later
be in his Gresham lodgings,  he had his microscope and those things he  supplemented  it  with
lamps: glass, mica, lamps, and tools to make lenses with.
Hooke had discovered a way that  light was altered through refraction.  But  with his
ontology, only one  such  change is possible.  That is, after refraction every  pulse  of  light would
have the same angle relative to the direction it was moving in. How could this produce the multi-
coloured phenomena that Hooke observed? Light that refracts closest to the perpendicular turns
blue, and that furthest away turns red. There must be some  further  difference in the pulses  at
either edge of  a ray of  light.
Oblique  pulses  have  a  leading  edge  and  a  trailing  edge.  Hooke  supposes  that  the
preceding edge of  the pulse “must necessarily  be somewhat more  obtunded, or  impeded by the
resistance of  the transparent medium than the other part or end of  it which is subsequent, whose
way is,  as it  were, prepared by the other.”37 The aether is resistant.  Figure  3.3 shows another
36 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 73.
37 Hooke, Micrographia, 62–63.
51
refracted light ray. This time Hooke adds a detail. The vibrations of  the pulse at H are 'deadened'
as they travel from B to O. This deadening affects the pulses more and more the further the pulse
travels after refraction, causing a triangle BOR, of  weaker vibration, weakest at O and stronger at
R. The other side of  the pulse, A, remains strong because it has not had to forge a path through
the medium. Strong enough, in fact,  that it  excites the aether beside it, again  an effect which
increases the further the pulse travels. Another  triangle is created,  NAM, this time outside the
mathematical ray, strongest at N and weaker at M.38 Different colours appear in different places
depending whether the weak part of  the pulse or the strong part of  the pulse arrives first.
38 Figure 3.3 actually illustrates what happens when two light rays are incident on the refractive surface. The details 
are the same but this mixing effect is enhanced.
Figure 3.3: The compounding of  oblique pulses to form colours. Micrographia
scheme 6, fig. 4, opposite p. 62.
52
Hooke concludes:
From the consideration of  the proprieites of  which impressions, we may collect these short
definitions of  Colours: That  Blue is an impression on  the Retina of  an oblique and confus’d pulse of
light, whose weakest part precedes, and whose strongest follows . And that Red is an impression on the Retina
of  an oblique and confus’d pulse of  light, whose strongest part precedes, and whose weakest follows.39
Hooke does not emphasise this but colour, properly speaking, is not an oblique pulse at
all but an impression –  a 'secondary quality',  though Hooke does not use the term –  resulting
from the mechanical interaction of  the world and the senses. Light pulses are focused onto the
retina, and the resulting impressions are coloured (Figure 3.4).
For  Hooke,  the  range  of  colours  in  the  spectrum  is  created  by  three  different
mechanisms. First there are the primary colours of  blue and red, which are the only direct results
39 Hooke, Micrographia, 64.
Figure 3.4: Coloured light focused to a point by
the cornea CBA. Micrographia scheme 6, fig. 5,
opposite p. 62.
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of  refraction altering white light. Second, these colours can be strong or diluted to light blue and
yellow respectively. They  are strongest when they are adjacent to a dark medium, and diluted
when they are in the middle of  a projected patch of  light. Finally, where different colours overlap
– where different pulses arrive at the same point – they mix. He writes about this last in a striking
way.
[After refraction] there will be generated the two principle colours, Scarlet and Blue, and all the
intermediate ones which arise from the composition and dilutings of  these two, that is [...] Scarlet
[...] is diluted into a Yellow; [… and] deep Blue [...] is gradually [...] diluted into a pale Watchet-blue.
[… T]he two diluted colours, Blue and Yellow are mixt and compounded into a Green; and this I
imagine to be the reason why Green is so acceptable colour to the eye, and that either of  the
two extremes are, if  intense, rather a little offensive, namely, the being plac'd in the middle
between the two extremes,  and compounded out of  both those,  diluted also,  or  somewhat
qualifi'd, for the  composition, arising from the mixture of  the two extremes  undiluted,  makes a
Purple, which though it be a lovely colour, and pretty acceptable to the eye, yet it is nothing
comparable to the ravishing pleasure with which a curious and well-tempered Green affects the
eye.40
Diluted yellow and pale blue mix to give green, and undiluted red and blue give purple.
Both purple and green Hooke apparently prefers to the primaries, which seem a little 'offensive'.
But green is singled out as especially pretty, which is not only a mixture, but a mixture of  already
diluted colours. Hooke uses his personal phenomenology in an evidentiary manner. It is plain to
see that green is the nicest colour to look at,  and this makes perfect sense if  it is  a tempered
mixture of  the extremes.41
40 Ibid., 58.
41 The general idea that colours are nicer to look at because of  some sort of  underlying harmony goes back as far 
as Theophrastus' De Coloribus. Hooke's reasoning is reminiscent of  Mersenne's in his Harmonie Universelle, in 
which he wondered which musical instrument was the finest, based on the qualities of  their sound.
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Another thing  worth  noting  about  the  refraction  in  Figure  3.3  but  not  explicitly
mentioned by Hooke is the dispersion of  light following refraction. The ray of  light grows wider,
illuminating a larger area than does the ray before refraction. This is the feature of  the spectrum
that  Newton  would  later  claim  stimulated  his  investigations  in  the  area.42 Dispersion  was  a
necessary effect of  refracted pulses for Hooke, as he says in his critique of  Newton's first optical
writing: “that the Ray of  Light is as twere split or Rarifyd by Refraction, is most certaine.” 43 He
could see nothing much new in Newton's observations, and claimed that the obliquation that a
pulse  undergoes  in  refraction  explains  the  phenomenon  of  dispersion.  In  fact,  in  his  later
'Lectures of  Light' Hooke reversed the explanation to make obliquation the result of  dispersion:
on refraction a ray is “dispersed, split,  and opened by its Refraction […] and from a Line is
opened into a diverging Superficies, and so Obliquated.”44
Hooke is clear to point out that oblique pulses are created both by single refractions and
the double refraction of  the water ball, ensuring that both of  Descartes trials were within the
scope of  his explanation.45 The water ball was another element of  his microscope set up, the
scotoscope, as discussed in the previous chapter. Hooke could scarcely have been unaware of  its
tendency  to  tinge  his  careful  observations  with  spectral  colours.  After  reaching  a  coherent
explanation of  these canonical  colour generation instances,  Hooke extends the  story  to thin
plates like mica and to solid bodies.
[These] properties, as they have been already manifested, in the Prisme and falling drops of
42 Newton, “A Letter of  Mr. Isaac Newton ... Containing His New Theory About Light and Colours.” Hooke's 
failure to explicitly address the topic leads to a difference in opinion of  two main commentators on his theory. 
Sabra correctly sees dispersion as implicitly taken account of  by and essential for Hooke's colours: Sabra, 
Theories of  Light from Descartes to Newton, 257. Shapiro takes it to be an ad hoc adjustment to fit observation which 
“played no further role” in colour generation: Shapiro, “Newton’s Definition of  a Light Ray,” 198. Shapiro's 
misreading is summed up by a diagram on p. 198 of  this paper. He depicts blue and red as the results of  oblique
and acute pulses respectively. Given the change in angle is produced by a single refraction, in a single direction, it 
is difficult to see how this could be the case, and indeed Hooke denies the possibility explicitly in Micrographia, 
67.
43 Hooke to Oldenburg, 15 February 1671/2. In Turnbull, The Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:111.
44 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 82. It is possible he had by this time altered his view in 
response to Newton's ideas (see below).
45 Hooke, Micrographia, 59–61. In fact, Hooke claims the water ball contradicts Descartes' own ideas. I will return to
this below.
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Rain, to be the causes of  the colours there generated, may be easily found to be the efficients
also of  the colours appearing in thin laminated transparent bodies, for the explication of  which,
all this has been premised.46
Hooke's casual “may be easily found” disguises a complex situation.
A pulse of  light, ab on the far right of  Figure 3.5, approaches a plate of  mica, which is
thinner at the end AE and thicker at DF.47 Most of  the light reflects off  the top of  the plate, but
some passes through and reflects off  the bottom of  the plate instead. This light follows the rest
of  the ray out the top, but has been refracted twice, on entering and leaving the mica.  Thus, two
pulses  depart  the  mica  where  only  one  approached:  a  “confus'd  or  duplicated pulse,  whose
strongest part precedes, and whose weakest follows.”48 This, recall, is perceived as red. Different
46 Ibid., 64.
47 Hooke notes that this figure is “wholly Hypothetical.” He was unable to measure the thicknesses required for 
certain colours. Newton is now eponymous with the phenomenon ('Newton's Rings') following his later success 
at doing so. This became a point of  contention between him and Hooke in 1675 when priority claims briefly 
became important between the two men: see Newton to Oldenburg, 21 December 1675. In Turnbull, The 
Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:406.
48 Hooke, Micrographia, 66.
Figure 3.5: Light rays reflecting off  a transparent plate of  varying thickness, Micrographia scheme 6, fig. 6,
opposite. p. 62.
56
plate thicknesses  produce  different  gaps  between the stronger  and weaker  pulses.  When  the
weaker pulse lags so far behind the stronger that it preceeds the next one, the it is perceived as
blue. In between we get green, and the other mixed colours. The story is similar for solid bodies.
Hooke  supposes  everything  must  be  covered  in  a  “tinging  substance,”  distributed  over the
surface of  bodies. Some of  the light incident on a body is reflected immediately, and some passes
through the tinging substance and is then reflected.  Again  a  single incoming pulse splits into  a
confused double pulse, one stronger and one weaker.49
The description of  red and blue perceptions is the  same  in all  colour generation, but
there are confounding dissimilarities between these latter ones and that of  refraction. Refraction
causes an “oblique and (therefore) confus'd” pulse, thin plates and solid bodies cause a “confus'd
(because) duplicated” one.  Refraction  clearly  results in only two primary colours,  whereas  thin
plates appear to produce all colours directly by the geometry of  light pulses – colour depends on
the distance between the strong and the weak pulse, not on dilution or mixing.  In fact, Hooke
held firmly  to his  two-colour  idea,  and it  became  the major  point of  disagreement between
Newton and himself  in 1672, following the  former's 'Theory About Light and Colours.'  The
issue turns on what Hooke meant by 'diluted' and 'mixed'. Because colours are after all perceptual
qualities, mixed colours are mixed perceptually, not metaphysically. When Hooke says of  colours in
thin films that “when the weaker pulse is just in the middle between two strong ones, then is a
deep and lovely  Purple generated,” this just  is  mixing. Purple  is a mixture of  the  impressions  one
gets when looking at a preceding strong pulse (red) and a preceding weak one (blue), but it does
not mean the blue- and red-generating pulses mix ontically.50 In Observation 10 of  Micrographia he
presented an experimental argument for the primacy of  red and blue, using two liquid-filled glass
wedges, one of  a red tincture which diluted to yellow at the tip, and the other a blue which
diluted to light blue. Holding the wedges in front of  two pinholes in a dark room, he could
49 Ibid., 68–69.
50 As opposed to Descartes' and Newton's corpuscular accounts. See Hooke's discussion of  dilution: Micrographia, 
70ff.
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present various thicknesses of  the wedge to the light, and so vary the hue of  the colour, making
“the Paper [opposite] appear of  what colour I would[. ...] Whence I experimentally found what I
had before imagin'd, that all the varieties of  colours imaginable are produc'd from several degrees
of  these  two colours.”51 It  did not necessarily  have to be the same mechanical  action which
caused all instances of  purple. So long as every perceivable colour could result from blue and red
only, these were the primary colours.52 
Crafting a Novel Experience
Hooke concluded: “By this Hypothesis there is no one experiment of  colour that I have
yet met with, but may be, I conceive, very rationally solv'd.”53 The  mechanisms which produce
colour  are  very different  in different situations, but they are unified  by the idea of  a 'confused
pulse' – a vibration in the aether.
All of  this was grounded in mica. Mica was not only expedient but emblematic: that it
was  not  peacock  feathers  demonstrated  Hooke's modernity,  and  that  it  was  not  the  prism
demonstrated that he was moving  beyond  other moderns.  This  was  largely  rhetoric, and  Hooke
overstated its importance as a guide to theory. In fact, the relationship between observations and
metaphysics in Descartes was too vague for the colours in thin plates to be an experimentum crucis.
Descartes  had started  by saying that “there must be at least one refraction, and even one such
that its effect was not destroyed by another,”  but this was only  his conclusion from trials with
prisms.54 His more pressing lesson was the collapse of  the distinction between real and apparent
colours, that all colour is mechanically produced in the eye by rotating light particles. The colours
of  solid  bodies  forced  Descartes  to  admit  that  refraction  itself  was  “not  always  necessary.”
Instead, the “size, shape, situation, and movement of  the particles of  bodies we call coloured can
51 Hooke, Micrographia, 73–74.
52 It may have been an old – ancient – idea, but adapted to mechanical philosophy and the collapse of  real and 
apparent colours, Hooke's primary colours bear more resemblace to Helmholtz's than Aristotle's.
53 Hooke, Micrographia, 69.
54 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 335.
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variously compete with light, in order to increase or diminish the rotation of  [light particles].” 55
Hooke no doubt read enough Descartes to have reached this statement. But when he presented
his  ideas, he  elected  to  privilege  a  colour  phenomenon  which  Descartes  had  said  could be
explained, but had not in fact explained.
Whether  it  proved  what  he  claimed  it  did,  Hooke's presentation  of  mica as  an
experimentum crucis  is  illustrative of  the  importance  of  poetics  in his new science.56 The words
themselves are important. 'Experimentum crucis', that much-vaunted phrase so associated with Isaac
Newton, came to Hooke, via Boyle, from Francis Bacon's 'instantia crucis'.  What this meant was
that  when  a  given  effect  may  seem  to  be  equally  well  follow  from  various  causes,  certain
observations will show that only one cause is “constant and indissoluble” in producing the effect,
while the others are “variable and separable.” Bacon called such decisive observations 'instances
of  the  fingerpost,'  pointing  the  way  to  accurate  knowledge.57 The  shift  from  instantia  to
experimentum was not innocuous. Hooke also levelled an  instantia crucis against Descartes, and it
was a subtly but importantly different kind of  thing.
Hooke's  instantia was the water ball – an old and reputable optical instrument used by
Ibn al-Haytham, Roger Bacon, Theodoric of  Freiburg, and Descartes. As we have seen, it was a
common  item  outside  philosophical  treatises  too:  Hooke  and  Pepys  both  used  them  as
scotoscopes to amplify the  sun's rays.  Descartes knew that if  white light  enters  a water ball at
certain angles,  after  two refractions  and a reflection coloured light  will  emerge.58 Yet Hooke
thought the phenomenon showed Descartes' theory was wrong. He argued that because the two
refractions were of  equal angles,  “according to the  [...] Cartesian principles there should be no
colour at all in a Ball of  Water or Glass.”59 The rotation gained from the first refraction would be
55 Ibid., 339.
56 See Aït-Touati, “‘The Spirit of  Invention.’”
57 Novum Organum, book 2 aphorism 36. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:320. Boyle coined the phrase 
'experimentum crucis' in his 1662 Defense Against Linus.
58 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 332–335.
59 Hooke, Micrographia, 60. Hooke quotes a section of  Descartes at length on p. 59, from p. 335 of  Olscamp's 
translation of  Descartes' Optics.
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cancelled by the second. Hooke labelled it an “Instantia crucis, as no one that I know has hitherto
taken notice of.”60 Least of  all Descartes!
Hooke was wrong about this too,  as  Henry More  later pointed out,  because the two
refractions  happen in  the  same direction.61 Descartes  himself  had said  that  “refractions  that
occur on the same side cause [particles] to turn in the same direction.”62 If  anything the rotation
would be augmented.  In any case it is difficult to see how Hooke's explanation would succeed
while Descartes' failed in such a straightforward refraction case.63
There was nothing novel about Hooke's water ball. It produced a routine phenomenon
which was agreed on by Descartes and Hooke. Hooke's objection was purely metaphysical – an
assumption about how hypothetical globules of  light might behave.  With mica,  on the other
hand, Hooke  could point to  an  experience Descartes had not  had.  Frédérique Aït-Touati  has
suggested that the linguistic shift to 'experimentum' perhaps signifies the increasingly dominant role
of  instruments  and  experiments  in  crafting  and  creating  natural  philosophical  knowledge.64
Hooke was not observing ordinary happenings, he was intervening. Hooke split muscovy glass
into thin plates  himself,  smeared them with liquids,  and examined them through magnifying
lenses  to  make  colours  appear.  He  contrived  the  phenomenon,  and  he  was  not  discussing
something familiar. His use of  the term experimentum crucis emphasised his activity in crafting a
new paradigmatic colour phenomenon that needed explaining.
But had Hooke crafted the phenomenon? He certainly crafted his presentation of  it. To
read Micrographia, he stumbled across an observation which falsified the dominant existing theory
and thus necessitated a new explanation. He introduced his investigation  into colours as if  his
interest had just been piqued. “It will certainly be very well worth our inquiry, to examine the
60 Ibid., 59.
61 For More's discussion, see More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 246–259; Jacob, Henry More’s Manual of  Metaphysics, 
2:151–155. Hooke was not convinced, he retorted that if  this were the case mirrors would colour their 
reflections too: Hooke, Lampas, 36–41.
62 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 336.
63 Unless, presumably, reflection changed the direction of  spin of  the globules.
64 Aït-Touati, “‘The Spirit of  Invention,’” 118.
60
causes and reasons  of  [coloured rings in  mica],  and to consider,  whether  from these  causes
demonstratively evidenced, may not be deduced the true causes of  the production of  all kind of
Colours.”65 Nowhere did he mention that while he was diligently examining gnats and nettles his
microscope  slides,  his  light  amplifier,  and  even  certain  of  his  microscopes  themselves  were
tinging the English sunlight with spectral colours. Such an admission would surely have been out
of  place in a book advertising the usefulness of  the instrument to natural philosophy.
In fact, Hooke generally accepted that crucial instances or experiments were not the sort
of  thing one stumbled across.
Such Experiments therefore, wherein Nature is as 'twere put to Shifts and forc'd to confess,
either directly or indirectly the Truth of  what we inquire, are the best if  they could be met
with: But these being hard to find at the beginning, it will be best to be first a little acquainted
with the Method of  Nature, in her most evident Manifestations of  her self.66
Through practice and manipulation, and through instruments, Hooke certainly had been
acquainted with evident manifestations of  colour. This introduces a general philosophical point
which will recur throughout the rest of  this thesis: through naïve work, the natural philosopher
must  craft surprises to gain insight. This is what Hooke did with his muscovy glass. He began
noticing  rainbows of  colour  in  his  microscope  slides.  It  was  no doubt  an annoyance  which
obscured and tinted his  observations of  other  things.  But  then  he began to notice patterns.
Those plates he had split to a particular thickness would show one colour, and those of  variable
thickness would show rings ordered like a secondary rainbow. It was only  in combination with
more work with light and  studying Descartes'  ideas that muscovy glass became anything like
crucial.  And only in  Hooke's  presentation  that it  became an  experimentum.  As Hooke  himself
wrote, natural philosophy is to begin with the “Hands and Eyes, and to proceed on through the
65 Hooke, Micrographia, 49.
66 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 34. See Paul Feyerabend for a classic articulation of  the idea that
facts only become refutations when made sense of  in alternative theories: Feyerabend, Against Method.
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Memory, to be continued by the Reason; nor is it to stop there, but to come about to the Hands
and Eyes again.”67 Hooke's first acquaintance with white light tinged with colours came from his
muscovy  glass  microscope  slides,  but  reasoning  more  theoretically  about  the  phenomenon
allowed him to place the material more centrally in his presentation of  his colour theory. From
this position it  became again  an important material to observe. Hooke's ideas were the  novel
results of  novel practices, crafted both  as he observed specimens through his microscope, and
again as he marshalled his insights about colour into an Observation in his book.
The Irony of Acceptance: Newton's Influence on Hooke
Hooke's  experimentum  crucis did not  have a glorious career.  The novelty  of  mica was
meant to move light and colours away from Descartes'  ideas. When Henry More objected, it
illustrated  the  danger  of  relying  on  new  materials.  More  discussed  Hooke's  criticisms  of
Descartes, particularly those to do with refraction, as with the water ball mentioned above. When
it came to mica, he concluded it was not worth worrying very much about such non-paradigmatic
cases because the material was “greatly uncertain and irregular,” and its unknown internal texture
might  move  light  particles  in  any  number  of  erratic  ways.68 Mica  was  not  immediately  a
trustworthy material. By the time Hooke responded to More's “Subterfuge” in Lampas (1677), the
objection was in any case out of  date, at least within the Royal Society. But it was not clear that
the coloured rings showed all that Hooke said they did.69
Isaac Newton had also been investigating the colours in thin plates since the early 1670s,
and  at  the  end  of  1675  his  letters  about  light  and  colour prompted  much  excitement  and
discussion in Society meetings.70 Newton professed, at least, to be completely uninterested in the
67 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. B2r.
68 More, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, 250. “Sed de hac prima Objectione non est quod simus adeo foliciti, cum sit in 
materia magis incerta ac inaequali, cujus interna contextura videatur globulorum motus variis modis posse 
mutare.” See also Jacob, Henry More’s Manual of  Metaphysics, 2:153.
69 Hooke, Lampas, 37.
70 Westfall, Never at Rest, 269, footnote 95. See Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:272–278, 280-295, 296-
305.
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kind of  mechanical,  'simple machine' criticisms that Hooke had against Descartes. He wanted a
different kind of  explanation of  observable phenomena: not an hypothetical ontology which was
consistent with observations, but  a more general “doctrine”  about  the necessary relationships
between  different  colour  phenomena.71 In 1672 he and Hooke had disagreed about this.  While
trying to remain agnostic about the ontic nature of  light,  Newton argued for the primacy of
spectral colours, and that they combined to produce white light. Hooke  could not find reason
enough to accept this from the experimental evidence, and maintained white light's primacy and
that colours  resulted from  its  modification.72 Importantly,  Newton denied Hooke's conclusion
that there were only two primary colours even though he accepted the importance of  muscovy
glass.  His  claim that  his observations  about  the  behaviour  of  colour  were  inconsistent  with
Hooke's  metaphysical  hypothesis  were  much more damaging to the Curator than More's  mere
scepticism.  In  1675  the two “prickly” men notoriously  clashed again, but  their argument and
Newton's ideas generally are largely beside my point here.73 Here, as an epilogue to Hooke's light
and colour theory, I  want to entertain the prospect that Hooke changed his ideas because of
Newton's  observations,  and  that  1675  was  a  possible episode  of  collaboration,  rather  than
dispute, between the two men.74 I intend this not so much as a contribution (or antidote) to the
idea of  lifelong antagonism between the two, but as a further exploration of  Hooke's methods of
mechanical philosophy.
71 See his 'Hypothesis of  Light' read at the Royal Society, Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:247–260. 
Especially 249. Newton's views on matter theory have been written about at length: see Gaukroger, Emergence of  
a Scientific Culture, 379–399; Walsh, “Did Newton Feign the Corpuscular Hypothesis?”
72 See Newton, “A Letter of  Mr. Isaac Newton ... Containing His New Theory About Light and Colours”; Hooke’s
considerations in Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:10–15. Newton replied with “Mr Isaac Newtons 
Answer to Some Considerations upon His Doctrine of  Light and Colors.”
73 'Prickly' is Westfall's term for Hooke, Westfall, Never at Rest, 272. They disagreed about the importance of  their 
respective contributions to the investgation of  colour. For Oldenburg's possible role in the fracas, see also 
Shapiro, “Twenty-Nine Years in the Making,” 425–426; Inwood, The Man Who Knew Too Much, 225–231; Hall, 
Henry Oldenburg: Shaping the Royal Society, 174–175. Though any antagonism was quickly mollified by private 
correspondence (see Turnbull, The Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:412–413, 416-417), the dispute has been 
suggested as the cause of  Newton's delaying publication of  his Opticks until the year following Hooke's death in 
1703. This is the view of  A. Rupert Hall (Hall, All Was Light, 92,) Sabra (mentioned in private communication 
with Shapiro – see the latter's “Newton’s Experiments on Diffraction and the Delayed Publication of  the 
Opticks,”) and Westfall (Westfall, Never at Rest, 638). See also Shapiro, “Twenty-Nine Years in the Making,” for 
the contrary view that there was simply no Opticks to publish until then (435).
74 Prompted by a brief  note from 1967: Hall and Westfall, “Did Hooke Concede to Newton?”
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Newton first  visited  the  Royal  Society  on 18  February  1675,  when he  met,  among
others, Hooke.75 They were apparently on friendly terms. That evening Hooke took the visitor to
the Crown Tavern where they talked about Newton's “way of  polishing metall on pitch.” They
met a few more times outside Royal Society meetings, mostly at other Fellows' houses, and maybe
going  bookshopping  together.76 Newton  also mentions  “discoursing”  with  Hooke  about
reflection and possible optical experiments with the air pump.77 Newton left London before the
winter recess  and famously wrote  to Oldenburg his  thoughts about colour which Oldenburg,
infamously,  read  at  the  Royal  Society.78 In  the  first  that  was read,  Newton's  'Hypothesis
Explaining the Properties of  Light',  Newton referred to his earlier disagreement with Hooke
before noting:
I was glad to understand, as I apprehend, from Mr. Hooke's discourse at my last being at one
of  your assemblies, that he had changed his former notion of  all colours being compounded
of  only two original ones  [...] and accommodated his hypothesis to this my suggestion of
colours, like sounds, being various, according to the various bigness of  the pulses.79
Hooke records that Newton left town on 17 March, which would make the last meeting
he attended that of  the 11th.80 On this day, the person scheduled to give a discourse did not arrive,
and an old observation of  Boyle's about “shining flesh” was read instead. This prompted Hooke
to hold forth about light.  He recorded in his diary: “I propounded my hypothesis of  Light and
Colours by the Lenth  [sic.]  of  the pulse.”81 This comment,  brief  though it is, seems to directly
75 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:181. The same meeting in which Oldenburg related, to a surprised 
Hooke, Huygens' discovery of  a spring-regulated watch.
76 Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, 1:148. Hooke's diary references to 'Mr. Newton' are 
presumably those times when they met outside meetings: Feb 21, 25, and March 16. On this last, Hooke notes 
“At Dean Tilotsons. Sir W. Jones. Newton. Duck Lane” – a street known for its booksellers before sliding into 
the slum of  Dickens' 'Devil's Acre'.
77 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:247.
78 See the above references on the 'Hooke-Newton controversy', footnote 73.
79 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:248.
80 Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, 1:153.
81 Ibid., 1:152.
64
corroborate Newton's 'apprehension'. The suggestion that he refers to in his letter was from his
reply to Hooke's objections of  1672,  and was that  his observations could be accounted for  by
Hooke's vibration hypothesis, if  only the Curator would accept that:
Vibrations  in  the  æther [were]  of  various  depths  or  bignesses,  which  being  promiscuously
propagated through that  Medium to our Eyes, effect in us a Sensation of  Light of  a  White
colour; but if  by any means those of  unequal bignesses be separated from one another, the
largest beget  a  Sensation of  a  Red colour,  the least  or  shortest,  of  a deep  Violet,  and the
intermediat ones, of  intermediat colors; much after the manner that bodies, according to their
several sizes,  shapes, and motions, excite vibrations in the Air of  various bignesses,  which,
according to those bignesses, make several Tones in Sound.82
Hooke even repeated the same analogy. The minutes of  the meeting of  the 11th record
Hooke saying that:
light is a vibrating or tremulous motion in the medium [...] produced from a like motion in the
luminous body,  after the same manner as sound was then generally explained by a tremulous
motion of  the medium conveying sound [...] and that, as there are produced in sounds several
harmonies  by  proportionate  vibrations,  so there  are  produced in  light  several  curious and
pleasant colours, by the proportionate and harmonious motions of  vibrations intermingled.83
That “proportionate” vibrations themselves would “intermingle” certainly seems like a
departure from his earlier view that it is possible to create the phenomenal experience of  all colours
from  one  oblique  pulse.  But we are  left  with  records  of  lectures,  rather  than  the  lectures
themselves, of  Hooke's “Lenth of  the pulse.”  Whether he revised his mechanistic account is
speculative, though there are some further developments worth briefly recounting.
82 Newton, “Mr Isaac Newtons Answer to Some Considerations upon His Doctrine of  Light and Colors,” 5088.
83 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:194.
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Intriguingly, at the following meeting – on 18 March – Hooke delivered another lecture
to  the  Royal  Society  about  “several  new properties  of  light,”  much  of  which  Newton  had
apparently heard despite having returned to Cambridge the previous day.84 “Mr. Hooke, you may
remember,” he later wrote to Oldenburg, “was speaking of  an odd straying of  light, caused in its
passage near the edge of  a razor, knife, or other opaque body in a dark room.”85 Indeed Hooke
had,  in his lecture on the  18th,  described an odd shaft of  light cast into the shadow of  a razor
held across  the pinhole of  a camera obscura.86 Likely Hooke's discourses of  the 11th and 18th
overlapped:  Newton  also  says  that  “some  days  before”  (on  the  11th?)  he  had  heard  Hooke
compare  the same phenomenon to  sound  straying around corners.87 Or perhaps the  apparent
conflict  in dates  is explained by  their  extra-Societal  talks,  or  an  ambiguity  in  Hooke's
chronicling.88 What is interesting about Hooke's later talk, whether or not Newton was there to
applaud him for saying it, is that he shied away from  discussing the  “Nature and Essence of
Light.” Having “many Doubts in my own Thoughts concerning the same,” he said, “I have made
it my aim [...] to examine and inquire farther into the Nature thereof, by such Observations and
Experiments as I judged might be any ways helpful. [...] I have not been altogether unsuccessful,
having discovered several Proprieties therein, whereof  before I had no Notion or Information.” 89
Had Hooke realised his muscovy glass was not the decisive experimentum it had been a decade
previously?  The loss of  his emblematic material  threatened his hypothesis,  and now it was the
eyes' and hands' turn to do some work, to find some further observations with which to refine
his theory.
84 Ibid. The lecture is apparently that published by Waller: Hooke, Posthumous Works, 186–190.
85 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:268.
86 Hooke, Posthumous Works, 187.
87 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:268. See also pp. 193-194 for the record of  Hooke's discourse. 
Newton mentions that William Petty asked a question of  Hooke, but neither Birch nor the Hooke Folio (which 
for these meetings generally does not add anything much beyond Birch) mention Petty on either day. Newton 
also says that Hooke was due to perform his (Newton's) experimentum crucis for the Society but the day was 
cloudy, and Newton left town before another meeting. On 11 March Hooke was ordered to prepare the 
experiment for the next meeting (Ibid., 3:194). Newton arrived back in Cambridge on the 19th (Turnbull, The 
Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:417, footnote 3).
88 Hooke's entry for 17 March simply says: “Newton out of  towne.” Maybe he took a day trip? Hooke, The Diary 
of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, 1:153.
89 Hooke, Posthumous Works, 186.
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References  to  the  topic  of  colours in  Hooke's later  writing  are  either  vague,  non-
committal,  or both.  After  Oldenburg read  Newton's 'Hypothesis' at  the  Society in December,
Hooke felt he had heard little he had not discussed in Micrographia.90 Then, on New Year's Day
1676, Hooke, Wild, Hill and Wren had the first meeting of  their 'New Philosophicall Clubb', and
talked sub sigillo about light.91 Here Hooke confided that Newton had adopted his “hypothesis of
[...] a double puls moving together[,] the one a stronger or quicker and the other a weaker or
slower puls.”92 It is difficult to know what to make of  these  two comments.  The first possibly
refers only to Newton's attention to the colours in thin plates, and Hooke was again reiterating
the novelty of  his  experimentum in  Micrographia.  The second seems like a misunderstanding of
Newton's  hypothetical  explanation  of  this phenomenon.93 Possibly  Hooke  is  picking  up  on
Newton's idea that when light impacts the retina it sends vibrations of  varying strength up the
optic nerve, causing perceptions of  various colours, and equating it to his hypothesis.
Two years later, in Lampas,94 Hooke reiterated that colour is caused by an oblique angle
between a pulse and the direction of  its travel. The form of  the explanation is certainly familiar,
but  there  is  nothing  like  the  intricate  mechanism  in Micrographia.  He  mentions  neither  the
'bignesses' nor 'length' of  pulses, nor – importantly – the idea that there are two primary colours,
from which all the others are compounded.95 Hooke's 'Lectures of  Light,' delivered in the early
1680s,  are  largely  a geometric analysis  of  light and how it  affects  the eye.  Here  Hooke also
mentions colour only as the result of  oblique pulses, and gives no further details.96 Despite this,
90 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:269. Which comment Oldenburg reported to Newton, prompting 
an aggrieved reply (Turnbull, The Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:405.)
91 Robinson and Adams note this was the first attempt to form such a club in the Royal Society (Hooke, The Diary
of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1:205, footnote). Hooke was an active political campaigner in the Society, 
scheming to bump Viscount Brouncker from the presidency and of  course Oldenburg from the Secretaryship. 
See Hunter, Establishing the New Science, chap. 6. For an interesting discussion of  what they discussed in a more 
private context, see Poole, “The Genesis Narrative in the Circle of  Robert Hooke and Francis Lodwick.”
92 Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, 1:206.
93 Newton explained reflection and refraction by recourse to vibrations in the aether, but explicitly stated that light 
itself  was not these vibrations: Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:262–269.
94 Lampas bears the date 1677, but throughout this 1675 episode I have been discussing Hooke was bringing 
designs for lamps along to meetings which appeared in the text. When he wrote the digression addressing More 
I do not know.
95 Hooke, Lampas, 39–40.
96 'Lectures of  Light,' in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 82.
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colour remained an important topic for Hooke. In his comments on Huygens' Traité de la Lumierè
in 1690, he implied that an explanation of  light which did not explain colour was no explanation
at all:
This  Phenomenon therefore (I say) of  the Coloration of  the Rayes by Refraction becomes a
watch word, Lapis Lydius or touch-stone by which the various hypotheses of  Authours ought
to be tried. for if  they doe not answer to this they must necessarily be fals and Sophisticate.97
In  summary,  Newton's visit  to London in the spring of  1675 profoundly influenced
Hooke's  approach to explaining colour.  He did not reject  his  vibrating matter ontology  – as
Newton said, this itself  was not inconsistent with observations – but neither did he cling to the
details of  colour production. He reiterated the importance of  his emblematic material, mica, and
his precedence in investigating it. The problem, if  anything, was Newton's gracious acceptance
of  this. The Lucasian Professor wrote to the Curator of  Experiments saying Hooke had “added
much”  to  the  investigation  of  light,  “especially  in  taking  ye colours  of  thin  plates  into
philosophical consideration.”98 Hooke's ideas, though, had arisen ultimately from his instrument
use, they were not systematic trials. Further into this famous letter of  Newton's it is hard not to
see cynicism in his certainty that Hooke had “divers very considerable experiments besides those
you have published.” This was an era in which the very word 'experiment' was contested, let alone
the  powerful  but  nascent  idea  of  an  experimentum crucis.  Hooke  and Newton both  fashioned
crucial  experiments  from  their  messy  experience  of  hundreds  of  observations.99 What  an
experiment meant could shift across contexts and people. Did the colours in mica still mean the
same thing to someone who did not have Hooke's familiarity with it? Or who had only read
about  it  in  his  Micrographia?  The  emerging  rhetorical  style  of  the  experimental  philosophy
required a particular narrative presentation of  experience. In private communication, both Hooke
97 Hall, “Two Unpublished Lectures of  Robert Hooke,” 222.
98 Newton to Hooke, 5 February 1675/6. In Turnbull, The Correspondence of  Isaac Newton, 1:416.
99 See again Schaffer, “Glass Works.”
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and  Newton  appeared  to  acknowledge  the  potential  for  this  to  obscure  the  nature  of  the
explanation that was at stake.
Hypotheses and Practical Knowledge
The point I wish to make is not simply that Hooke had stumbled into a debate he had
not, in fact, made the experiments to equip him for. Hooke's ideas about light and colours had
arisen ultimately from his instrument use. Of  course, looking through a microscope did not itself
impart his elaborate metaphysics, any more than looking at a prism told Descartes anything about
rotating  particles.  While  the  troubled  relationship  the  early  Royal  Society  had  with  such
metaphysical hypotheses is well known, this story seems the reverse of  the official party line. The
Society wanted philosophical knowledge, but thought philosophical hypotheses ought to be left
out of  initial investigations, until they could be made certain. Hooke, on the other hand, arrived
at the metaphysical nature of  light as part of  his investigation of  it. In practice, hypothesis was
necessary. As Newton wrote:
I have observed the heads of  some great virtuosos to run much upon hypotheses, as if  my
discourses wanted an hypothesis to explain them by, and found, that some, when I could not
make them take my meaning, when I spake of  the nature of  light and colours abstractedly.100
Hooke was one of  the main culprits Newton was obliquely referring to. It was an astute
diagnosis.  Hooke never questioned Newton's experimental results, but for him observation and
hypothesis never neatly separated. So when Newton calmly accepted the importance of  mica but
disputed Hooke's metaphysics of  light, it challenged the reliability of  Hooke's knowledge. Mica
was the point of  difference with Descartes, that he had laid down as a reason and motivation for
a  new  metaphysical  account.  After  Newton  severed  this  connection,  an  uneasy  vagueness
100 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:249.
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characterises Hooke's subsequent discussions of  colour.
Hooke used his microscope successfully, and successful use meant knowledge of  light
just  as  it  meant  knowledge  of  lenses.  The  material,  dynamic  process  of  microscopical
observation detailed in the previous chapter was no more reliant on the objects involved than the
more speculative ideas discussed in this. Observation, while not naïve, did not require knowing
what will  happen next. But  manipulation  relied on prediction, and knowing what the effect of
changing an instrumental set up would be implied at least a guess as to why the things that are
happening are happening. To get clear views of  everything from crab-like insects to sparks to
specks of  hoar frost, Hooke had to manipulate light with increasing skill. When light entered his
window he  could  not  only  focus  it  onto  a  specimen,  he  could  foresee  its  behaviour  in  his
apparatus.  It  bounced around his  water  ball  and  curved through his  lenses,  it  diffused  over
specimens, and concentrated down a tube and into his eye. It changed colours and changed back
again. When it rained it dimmed, and when the sun came out it returned not only brighter but
harsher. Concentrating it to a point might “singe or burn the Paper” he positioned to soften the
shadows, while refraction and inflection would cause the white light to break into “all the colours
of  the  Rain-bow.”101 This  manipulative  expertise is  exactly  what  the  theoretical  treatment  of
colour in Micrographia lacks.
This  and the  previous  chapter  together  form a  kind of  material  micro-story  which
exhibits many of  the themes that will arise more explicitly from now on. How an experimenter
like  Hooke  conceives  of  their  apparatus  influences  their  experimental  programme  and  the
knowledge they can create.  The particular material conditions which began Hooke's association
with microscopes gave him an aim which was initially more aesthetic than epistemic. In the clear
and accurate images intended for the King's cabinet, Hooke saw the opportunity to view objects
in a way not naturally available to humans. Instead of  conceiving of  a microscope as a magnifier,
a sharper eye, he had a sloppy, open-ended system of  materials. He incorporated new techniques
101 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. E1r, 58.
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and materials for theoretical and anti-theoretical reasons: for convenience, comfort, and through
frustration. Many of  them then traversed the line between black-boxed instrument and object of
inquiry.102 The  more  he  used  them,  the  more  he  learnt,  and  the  more  he  was  able  to  do:
knowledge, practical and theoretical, arose simultaneous with manipulation. Ultimately the single
essential  ingredient  of  microscopy,  light  itself  –  “the  most  obvious,  though  yet  the  most
abstruse”  thing  of  all  –  found  itself  interrogated  by  Hooke's  instruments  even  as  it  was
harnessed by them for the observation of  specimens.103
102 “Epistemic thing” and “technical object,” in the parlance of  Rheinberger: Rheinberger, Towrads a History of  
Epistemic Things, 24.
103 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 71.
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Chapter 4: The Man with Microscope Eyes
The Hope of the Microscope
By 1665 the microscope was a recognisable instrument.1 By 1692, Hooke was lamenting
that  it had already run through  “Invention, Improvements, Use, Neglect and Slighting.”  Only
Antoni van  Leeuwenhoek was using the instrument as something other than a “Diversion and
Pastime”, a  portable toy, “easy to be carried in one's Pocket.”2 The objects revealed  in it were
more familiar and easier to comprehend than  were  celestial  novelties through a telescope,  and
observations of  insects, plants and anatomy fascinated and shocked men and women alike.3 The
instrument was being used, but  apparently  not for  what Hooke thought was  the right purpose.4
Arguably it remained a fringe instrument, unnecessary for serious research, into the Victorian era.
The Microscopical Society of  London (later the Royal Microscopical Society) was founded in
1839 with the stated aim of  “the advancement of  the science of  the microscope,” But even then
it was unclear what this science was.5 Other Societies were being founded not around instruments
but areas of  research: geology, chemistry, or astronomy – where the telescope found a home.
Several historians of  the microscope have attempted to explain this apparent fall out of
love with it  as  an instrument  of  inquiry,  and the  consequent  asymmetry with  its  cousin  the
telescope,  but Harry Phinney has argued that even the narrative we get from Hooke is hugely
1 For the coining of  the term by Giovanni Faber of  the Accademia dei Lincei, see Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and 
the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century Microscopy.”
2 “Discourse Concerning Telescopes and Microscopes,” in Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 261.
3 Marjorie Nicolson has recorded the effect of  the 'terra-incognita' of  the microworld on the English imagination,
and its influence on themes in literature, metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics: Nicolson, The Microscope and English 
Imagination.
4 See also Hooke's review of  Filippo Bonanni's attempt to “revive” the art in Italy with his Micrographia curiosa the 
following year (in the lecture reproduced in the Appendix to this thesis).
5 Bennett, “The Social History of  the Microscope,” 276.
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exaggerated.6 Publications  on  microscopical  observations  were  made  steadily  throughout  his
lifetime,  and  did not  fall  off  much after  Leeuwenhoek's  death.7 Microscopical  research
programmes in biology and anatomy were productive in the eighteenth century.  More to the
point of  this chapter is,  as Catherine Wilson and C. H. Lüthy have separately pointed out,  that
such a story of  promise, unfulfilled or not, can only make sense if  we recognise what the promise
was in the first place.8 The problem with this is that in fact the technology in the microscope was
hardly novel. Magnifying lenses were commonplace items,  which  in Europe  had most typically
been  used  as  a  straightforward  aids  or  correctives for  artisans' and scholars'  eyes.  Jewellers,
illustrators, and transcribers working in monasteries all used them to create more miniature and
detailed work.9 Lüthy's evocative phrase is that “the microscope was never invented.”10 It is the
sudden enthusiasm of  philosophers  like Hooke which  transformed magnifying glasses into a
stable instrumental form which is more mysterious than the subsequent wane of  that fashion.
What could a microscope do? Now that we have seen something of  the skill and craft in
manipulating them, and the optical knowledge that Hooke gained by doing so, in this chapter I
will consider the instrument from a more conceptual angle. Hooke may have adopted it to make
drawings with, but the reason the Royal Society thought these drawings would  make a  suitable
gift  for  Charles  II  was  because  they  were  made  with  an  instrument  symbolic of  their  new
experimental  natural  philosophy. What  was  the  philosophical  lesson  to  be  learnt  from  the
microscope? Why was it adopted by natural philosophers,  and what was it that they hoped for
from it?
Hooke's 1692 lament is also a call to arms. He and other seventeenth century advocates
of  the microscope often wrote of  it answering a real and present need.
6 See for instance Fournier, The Fabric of  Reality, chap. 2.
7 Phinney, “A Revisionist History of  Microscopical Sciences,” 129.
8 Wilson, The Invisible World; Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century Microscopy.”
9 See Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, chap. 2; Enoch, “The Enigma of  Early Lens Use.”
10 Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century Microscopy,” 2.
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[W]ith the present Generation of  Men the Opinion prevails, that the Subjects to be enquired
into are exhausted, and no more is to be done. […] But those, who make such Estimates, may,
perhaps, find themselves very much mistaken in their Judgment.  […] I may observe that a
further Improvement and Use of  them, will, in all Probability, afford much greater, and more
considerable [knowledge(?)], not only for the perfecting and compleating the Knowledge of
those Particulars which have been already, in Part, detected; but also for making of  other new
Discoveries, which as they are yet much further removed from the Power of  the Senses to
comprehend,  so  they  have  been,  upon  that  Account,  never  afforded  Entrance  into  the
Imagination and Intellect;  if  at least  Aristotle's Maxim be true, That there is nothing in the
Intellect, but what was first in the Sense.11
Francis Bacon had warned that “the testimony and information of  the sense is always
made to the measure of  man and not the universe.”12 Our senses do not tell us about nature as it
is,  only  as  it  seems to  us,  and  the  mid-century  experimenters  that  followed him assumed a
straightforward identity between the limits of  the senses and the limit of  knowlege. Hooke was
aware of  the philosophical consequences:
[T]he limits, to which our thoughts are confind, are small in respect of  the vast extent of
Nature it self; some parts of  it are too large to be comprehended, and some too little to be
perceived. And from thence it must follow, that not having a full sensation of  the Object, we
must be very lame and imperfect in our conceptions about it.13
To listen to this rhetoric, imperfect knowledge was a problem for which the microscope
was a simple and necessary remedy.14 Henry Power gushed in the preface to the first English
work on microscopy: “How much therefore are we oblig'd to modern Industry, that of  late hath
11 “Discourse Concerning Telescopes and Microscopes,” in Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 261–
262.
12 “The Plan of  the Work,” in Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:34.
13 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. A1v.
14 Bacon too mentioned the “recently invented glasses” in his Novum Organum, book 2 aphorism 39, in Bacon, The 
Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:343.
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discover'd this advantageous Artifice of  Glasses[?]”15
How much indeed?16 Wilson and Lüthy point out that Power's unambiguous gratitude to
the  “darling  Art” of  microscopy  glosses the  fact  that  his  descriptions  of  microscopical
observations  owe  as  much  to  earlier  traditions  of  nature  observation  as  they  do  to  the
instrument. He repeatedly refers to Thomas Moffett,  for instance, and as Lüthy says, historians
have been unable to decide if  Moffet used a magnifying lens when making his observations.17 So
what  did  it  really  mean  for  Power to  explicitly  advertise  his  work  as 'New  Experiments
Microscopical'?
The microscope  was a corpuscularian's  instrument.18 Though  Francis  Bacon  himself
was less sure of  its  benefits,  he felt  sure  Democritus “would have been overjoyed” to  see a
microscope,  thinking  “that  a  means  of  seeing  atoms  […]  had  been  discovered.”19 In  the
seventeenth century, exactly Democritus' style of  minute physical substructure was redescribing
the  Renaissance idea  of  the  subtlety  of  nature.20 Scholastic  thought  described  objects  as
monoliths, compounded of  Forms which did not  exist  independently  but mixed to produce
objects  with  unified  inner  essences.  Mechanical  philosophy  dissolved  these  monoliths  into
phenomena that were the productions of  a concealed structure, structure which existed spatially
and was potentially visible.21 The idea that  understanding an object required looking beyond its
superficial  appearance  became  redescribed.  Now  all  there  was  was  surfaces,  not  just  of
macroscopic objects  but  of  their  microscopic parts,  and looking beyond the surface became
15 Power, Experimental Philosophy, sigs. C2r-v.
16 See also Power's ode to the microscope: Cowles, “Dr. Henry Power’s Poem on the Microscope.” Wren's 
accession speech to the chair of  astronomy at Gresham: Wren, Parentalia, 200.
17 Power, Experimental Philosophy, sigs. C2v, 155; Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century 
Microscopy,” 2. See also Wilson, The Invisible World, 85. For comparison see Thomas Moffett's Theatrum Insectorum
(1634).
18 Wilson and Lüthy approach the same issue from opposite directions. Both associate the popularity of  the 
microscope with the rise of  corpuscularianism, but where Wilson sees the instrument playing an integral role in 
the imaginative availability of  such micro-structure, Lüthy emphasises the influence of  matter theory on the 
popularity of  the instrument. They are both undoubtedly accurate, the difference produced by the historian's job
of  condensing an era of  thought into a single narrative.
19 Novum Organum, book 2, aphorism 39, in Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:343. Bacon continues to describe 
useful possible observations which are very reminiscent of  those in Hooke's Micrographia.
20 See especially Wilson, The Invisible World, chap. 2.
21 See also Hutchison, “What Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?”
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literally a task for the sight.
Much of  the evidence that the microscope could provide for this  sort of  view was
clearly  analogical.  In  1648,  John Wilkins,  the  man  in  whose  group  Hooke  first  encountered
microscopical work, wrote:
For ought we know, there may be some Organicall bodies, as much lesse then ours, as the earth
is bigger. We see what strange discoveries of  extream minute bodies,  (as lice, wheal-worms,
mites, and the like) are made by the Microscope, wherein their severall parts (which are altogether
invisible to the bare eye) will distinctly appear: and perhaps there may be other insects that live
upon them as they doe upon us. 'Tis certain that our senses are extreamly disproportioned for
comprehending the whole compasse and latitude of  things.22
What excited Wilkins was not the  bracketed whealworms and mites  but the  general
lesson, the  gap between  the limits of  perception and  extent of  nature. The space outside our
visual awareness was populated by whole creatures, their bodies as complex as anything visible to
the naked eye. The nematodes that appeared thriving in apparently clear water were not just more
life, they were a previously unimagined scale of  existence.
As such,  a  lot  of  the  praise  for  the  microscope  was  directed at  its  future,  at  what
discoveries could be made with further improvements.23 There is something curious about this.
Lenses were the aspect of  the microscope which attracted the most discussion by early modern
microcopists,  but  they  were  also  the  most  ancient  ingredient.  It  was  only  with  the  new
importance of  eyesight for discovery in the fashionable mechanical philosophy that they became
an  object  of  fascination  and  optimism.  A  popular  way  to  talk  about  the  microscope  in
seventeenth century England became as a 'sharper eye' or a 'perfection' of  the sense of  vision.
Christopher  Wren wrote that  lenses  made sight  “infinitely  advanc'd,” and Power and Joseph
22 Wilkins, Mathematicall Magick, 115–116. See also Wilkins, Discourse Concerning the Beauty of  Providence, 49.
23 The hunt was on for hyperbolic lenses, as I mentioned in Chapter 2. See also Power's preface, and the extended 
quote from Hooke's 1692 lecture above (footnote 9).
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Glanvill both compared the microscope to the eyesight of  Adam, the perfect human.24 Even in
1713  George  Berkeley  wrote  that  “microscopes  make  sight  more  penetrating,  and represent
objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite
sharpness.”25 While  much  of  this  language  was  undoubtedly  intended  to  be  poetical,  it
nevertheless hints at a particular function imputed to the microscope; that of  bringing the world
into sharper focus, to make the perception of  objects clearer and more distinct.26 Perhaps the
lens, that familiar corrective tool of  vision, carried with it the idea of  sharp eyesight into the new
philosophy. The epistemic consequence seems to have been that if  lenses made eyes better, and
eyes were the source of  knowledge, then lenses would give better knowledge. They would reveal
the consituents of  nature.27
John Locke would criticise this view in the last decade of  the century, but a close look at
Hooke reveals a  different picture from him as well.  Just because a community of  people could
look at an object and call it by the same name does not imply that they all meant the same thing
by that name, and certainly does not imply they all agreed on what to do with it.  In this chapter I
will  outline the epistemology of  Hooke's microscope, an epistemology influenced  both by the
nature of  his initial task drawing pictures, and his more general approach to natural knowledge, as
I will discuss in following chapters. The microscope as Hooke used it bore a strong similarity to
the camera obscura as used by Vermeer to aid his painting: it was an instrument of  appearances.28
24 And perfect philosopher – a theme I will return to in the following chapter. Wren, Parentalia, 204; Glanvill, The 
Vanity of  Dogmatizing , 5; Power, Experimental Philosophy, sig. A4r.
25 Berkeley, Three Dialogues, 27. See also Boyle's words in Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours: Boyle, The 
Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 4:40.
26 The evocation of  Descartes' requisite for ideas is intentional and, if  anachronistic, not completely out of  place. 
Jacques Rohault gave a very optical reading of  Descartes' phrase in his Traite de Physique: Clarke, Rohault’s System 
of  Natural Philosophy, 1:248.
27 Jonathan Gil Harris' notion of  'palimpsested matter' captures nicely this idea of  the meaning of  an old 
technology incorporated into a new, and the danger of  finding too much novelty in something we conceptualise 
as a 'new invention.' See Harris, Untimely Matter, chap. 1.
28 Though the mention of  an artist is not intended to be a comparison of  entirely dissimilar enterprises. See for 
instance Hunter, Wicked Intelligence; Alpers, The Art of  Describing; Jardine, Ingenious Pursuits.
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Drawing Pictures
By March 1663, Hooke's task was underway. At a meeting on the 25 th he was “solicited
to prosecute his microscopical observations, in order to publish them,” and the very next meeting
he was reminded again “to bring in at every meeting one microscopical observation at least.” 29
On 8 April Hooke showed his first picture, of  “the appearance of  common moss,” which was
apparently approved of  – he was “desired to continue.” He did so, bringing over 40 observations
to meetings throughout the rest of  the year.30
Despite the clear importance the Royal Society attached to the task of  drawing pictures
for the king, Hooke's observations themselves have a curious place in Society meetings. When he
recreated Leeuwenhoek's pepper worm observation, the Fellows apparently joined him in looking
through the microscope.31 But before  August 1664,  when Hooke moved into Gresham College
full  time  and the  Society  held  their  meetings  in  his  rooms,  he  probably  made  most  of  his
observations at Lady Ranelagh's house in Pall Mall.  For this early work, neither the instrument
nor the  process of  observation were  objects of  the  scrutiny  or testimony of  the gentlemen
gathered at Society meetings. Hooke's pictures were. Only once during these years was he asked to
bring a microscope with him to  a  meeting, in order to examine the Earl of  Belcarre's bezoar
stone.32 As it happened the next meeting was cancelled, and the instrument presumably remained
in  Pall  Mall.  He  produced  a  drawing  of  the  stone  a  two  weeks  later.  Michael  Dennis  has
suggested  this  separation  of  observation  and  presentation  was  elided  by  the  intricacy  and
representativeness of  Hooke's drawings, which make present to the viewer the distant process of
microscopical  observation.  The  'virtual  witnessing'  required  by  the  Society's  collaborative
approach  was  produced  through “disciplined  seeing.”  The  Fellows  did  not  directly  observe
demonstrations, so their presence  was replaced  –  by Boyle with textual descriptions of  his air
29 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:213–215.
30 Ibid., 1:216. John Harwood has compiled a helpful table of  Hooke's microscopical observations: see Harwood, 
“Rhetoric and Graphics in Micrographia,” 124–125.
31 See Chapter 2 of  this thesis.
32 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:292.
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pump experiments, and by Hooke with detailed illustratration. As Dennis says, “we see through
Hooke to the 'things themselves.'”33
If  this is the effect of  viewing Hooke's images, it does not tell us anything about what
they show. What do we learn from looking at the things themselves? Mostly, the Fellows seem to
have been as uninterested in the natural philosophical implications of  Hooke's observations as
they were  in the practical optical experience of  looking down a microscope. Typically Hooke's
drawings  are  merely  noted  in  the  minutes:  “Mr.  Hooke  brought  in  two  microscopical
observations, one of  leeches in vinegar; the other of  a bluish mould upon a mouldy piece of
leather.”34
33 Dennis, “Graphic Understanding,” 345. 
34 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:219.
Figure 4.1: Blue Mould, from Micrographia, scheme 12, fig. 1, opposite p. 125.
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No subsequent discussion is noted.  It was Leibniz who later drew the philosophical
lesson from Hooke's work that phenomenal changes in bodies have microstructural explanation:
“Hooke shows […] in his Micrographia that iron rust is a minute forest which has sprung up; so
rust is therefore an alteration in iron but a generation of  little bushes.”35
When Hooke showed the Society a “spider appearing to have six eyes,” the minutes note
that “this latter was not yet perfectly drawn.”36 Whether this is Hooke's or someone else's opinion
is not recorded, but either way it was explicitly the the artifact of  the drawing being criticised; not
the natural knowledge it displayed, nor its means of  production.  Micrographia is full of  detailed
descriptions of  how Hooke prepared his specimens, and the difficulty both of  observing and
illustrating  the  micro-world.  It  is  very  possible  that  these  descriptions  in  fact  echo  his
presentation of  the images at Society meetings, but the minutes are notable for their lack of
discussion.
The Fellows likewise showed general lack of  interest in the topics he observed.  There
were very few occasions  when Hooke was asked to investigate something in particular.  Eels in
vinegar were a common subject of  early microscopy  which  he was asked to look at early on.
Occasionally someone would bring in an interesting found object, as Jonathan Goddard did with
a piece of  petrified wood.  Even that Hooke  was given only “in order to see, whether it would
polish,”  before it later became the subject of  microscopical scrutiny.37 A remark from George
Ent about how deer hide reacts to being submerged in water prompted Wilkins to explain its
appearance under the microscope, which Hooke was asked to verify.38 As far as I can tell, only
twice more was he ordered to make a particular observation for the purpose of  discovery: to see
if  sage leaves had pores large enough for spiders to hide in, and to look for “little insects” in
animal  blood.39 It  seems  he  never  performed  the  second,  his  dislike  of  dissection  perhaps
35 Wilson, The Invisible World, 58.
36 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:231.
37 Ibid., 1:244.
38 Ibid., 1:342. See also Doherty, “Discovering the ‘True Form.’”
39 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:250, 270. Sage's bitterness was thought to be due to the tiny spiders 
that lived in it.
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preventing him.
There is plenty more to be said about the pictures in Micrographia. Hooke's copper plates
remained  the  gold  standard  of  microscopical  drawings  for  two  hundred  years,  and  were
reproduced or copied several times for books published in England and abroad until eventually
superseded by photographic images in the late nineteenth century.40 I will return to them later in
the  chapter,  but  first  I  will  turn  in  more  detail  to  Hooke's  transformation  into  a  serious
microscopist.  By the time Micrographia received its imprimatur from the Society's Council on 23
November 1664, Hooke was a Fellow of  the Royal Society, living in London, and rewarded with a
salary. A lot had changed in a year and a half. During Hooke's transformation from unpaid sub-
contractor to lynchpin of  the Royal  Society,  Micrographia developed from a set  of  decorative
illustrations to a  classic of  early modern natural history.  It was not only the first  tome which
illustrated tiny nature in such intricacy and detail, it also explicitly vindicated the methods of  the
new experimental philosophy.
Dr. Power Comes to Town
On 24 June 1663, Dr. Henry Power arrived at the Royal Society to be elected a Fellow,
and presented at the meeting his own microscopical observations.41 Hooke wrote to Boyle with
the following review:
There is very little in Dr. Power's microscopical observations but what you have since observed;
only there is a pretty experiment he tried with the leeches in vinegar, that survived the freezing
of  the  vinegar  they  lived  in;  and  another  pretty  experiment  he  has  in  his  philosophicall
reflections upon his observations, which is of  making a certain kind of  coals kindle into a fire
and flame, by throwing water on them, when newly dug out of  the mine. I am sorry to see,
that he intends to publish several experiments about colours, which I am confident might be
40 Turner, “The Impact of  Hooke’s Micrographia and Its Influence on Microscopy.”
41 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:266.
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originally yours. He will likewise publish the experiment of  freezing an eye, to find the shape
of  it, whose invention he ascribes to another. There is not much more besides, that is very
considerable in it, and therefore I shall refer the further account of  it till your return, till when
I shall keep the book by me.42
Power's work seems to have been known to the Fellows already: Boyle had apparently
seen some, and  they were familiar with the leeches in vinegar. The way Hooke mentions “Dr.
Power's microscopical observations” with no further introduction implies they had been waiting
to  see  more.  Certainly  Power's  philosophy  in  general  well  known  in  London,  and he  was
recommended for Fellowship in 1661 but could not travel to London for the meeting. William
Croune  communicated  regularly with  him instead,  and the  Society  learnt  about  his  work  on
magnetism, subterranean observations, and pneumatics, this last playing a significant part in the
discovery of  Boyle's Law.43 “The book” Hooke refers to is most likely the first part of  Power's
later publication,  Experimental  Philosophy in Three Books: Containing New Experiments  Microscopical,
Mercurial, Magnetical. It was printed in 1664 but was a long time in the writing: the Preface is dated
August 1661 and the microscopical part was probably completed by then also.44 All of  the things
Hooke relates to Boyle appear in this part, so it seems likely what Power presented to the Society
was  an  advance  copy  of  this  section.45 Upon  seeing  it,  Wilkins,  Wren,  and  Hooke  “were
appointed to join together for more observations of  the like nature.”46
42 Hooke to Boyle, 3 July 1663. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 2:98.
43 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:22, 50, 77, 80, 86, 105, 125, 130. Power's book concludes with a 
short section on 'Subterraneous Experiments' which was the direct result of  the correspondence with the 
Society, and appears in Birch (1:133-136) as a letter received by Croune. For Power's interaction with the Society 
see also Webster, “The Discovery of  Boyle’s Law”; Webster, “Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy.”
44 Webster quotes a letter from Power to Reuben Robinson from September 1661 (British Museum Sloane MS. 
1326, ff. 20-21) stating that he and his circle of  natural philosophers owned four microscopes and that he had 
already completed one hundred observations: Webster, “Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy,” 158. This is 
also the year of  Power's poem on the microscope (which I come to below), every line of  which refers to some 
observation or comment in Experimental Philosophy (see footnote 64). It recevied an imprimatur in August 1663 
from George Stradling (a London-based engraver) which Power (who lived in Yorkshire) perhaps received on 
the same trip as his visit to the Society.
45 The eels in vinegar are on pp. 32-36, and the coal which ignites with contact with water on pp. 63-64. A short 
discourse on colours is included after the observations, pp. 72-77, and 'Anatomical Considerations about the 
Eye' concludes the section, pp. 78-83.
46 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:266.
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Was this,  a few months after Hooke began to make regular obervations, the beginning
of  Micrographia as a book, rather than a series of  drawings? There are a few details that point to
the importance of  Power's work in inspiring Hooke, and there is certainly more to it that Hooke
freely admits.  A few weeks after  the Doctor's  visit, Hooke wrote to Boyle that he was “taking
order about the engraving of  my microscopical pittance, which I hope will be very well done.”47
This reference to pictures is the only mention of  his microscopical work in a series of  letters to
Boyle  which  are  otherwise  fairly  comprehensive  accounts  of  his  work  and  the  Society's
meetings.48 It seems that even at this stage, the quality of  the engravings remained the important
aspect of  Hooke's work.  This was the impression Power  had  as well.  He alerts his readers to
“expect shortly from Doctor Wren, and Master Hooke [...] the Cuts and Pictures drawn at large,
and to the very life of  these and other Microscopical Representations.”49
It is interesting that Power mentions Wren as Sir Christopher has been proposed as the
artist behind some of  the more iconic images in the book.50 Whether this is the case or not, the
collaboration with Wilkins and Wren was clearly important to Hooke, and both men are singled
out for generous acknowledgement  in his  Preface.  Wilkins'  involvement  is  especially  notable.
Hooke's first natural philosophical mentor, Wilkins' opinions on certainty and evidence in natural
philosophy are represented strongly in Hooke's Micrographia, a point the rest of  this chapter will
move towards. Wilkins was also the co-author of  the Baconian apologetic Vindiciae Academiarum
(1654), and the main guiding hand behind Thomas Sprat's  History of  the Royal Society (1667).51 It
seems likely the other major apologetic work of  the early days of  the institution – Micrographia's
Preface – was written partly with his guidance too.
47 Hooke to Boyle, c. 10 July 1663. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 
2:100.
48 For example, a comparison of  Hooke's letter to Boyle on 5 June 1663, in Ibid., 2:81–84., to the minutes of  the 
meeting of  the 3rd as recorded in Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:250–253., shows Hooke 
conscientiously reporting proceedings to his employer, and only breaking off  when his “long scribble” reached 
several pages.
49 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 83.
50 See Power, “Sir Christopher Wren and the Micrographia.”
51 Wood, “Methodology and Apologetics.”
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The  similarities  between  the  observations  in  Micrographia and  Power's  Experimental
Philosophy led Charles Webster to suggest that the former was essentially an “aggrandized version”
of  the latter: now with added pictures.52 Webster refused to speculate further on the influence of
the one on the other, but it is true that Hooke certainly thought there was room for improvement
on Power's efforts. He wrote in the Preface:
After I had almost completed these Pictures and Observations (having had divers of  them
ingraven,  and  was  ready  to  send  them to  the  Press)  I  was  inform'd,  that  the  Ingenious
Physician  Dr.  Henry  Power had  made  several  Microscopical Observations,  which  had  I  not
afterwards, upon our interchangably viewing each others Papers, found that they were for the
most part differing from mine, either in the Subject it self, or in the particulars taken notice of;
and that his design was only to print Observations without Pictures, I had even then suppressed
what I had so far proceeded in.53
Hooke is clearly being free with historical detail. When he reviewed Power's book for
Boyle, less than half  of  the observations that would comprise Micrographia had been presented at
Royal Society meetings, though it  is  true that some were in the process of  being engraved. 54
Power could well have inspired the choice of  subjects to look at, as almost every observation in
the earlier work is replicated by Hooke. Hooke is right that the “particulars taken notice of ” did
differ.  Sometimes  this  meant Hooke  explicitly  correcting  Power  for  inaccurate  observations,
though where he felt the Doctor did a good job he gave credit and referred to the other's book. 55
The main difference between the two books is that which Hooke points out: illustrations. Power
included three woodcuts, all small and margin-bound, and all rather schematic (Figure 4.2).
52 Webster, “Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy,” 161.
53 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. G2r.
54 See the table in Harwood, “Rhetoric and Graphics in Micrographia.”
55 Hooke corrected Power particularly on the wings of  butterflies and the eyes of  flies, but was happy with his 
observations of  the eels in vinegar: Micrographia, sig. F2r, observations 46 and 57.
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Hooke's drawings on the other hand are still notable for their number, intricacy, detail,
and sheer size.56 Much more than his words, they are what one remembers after closing the book.
He  took  great  care  in  preparing  them  and  obvious  pride  their  final  forms,  even  protecting
himself  from criticism by mentioning when the engravers had made mistakes.57 Elsewhere Hooke
emphasises the benefits of  visual over linguistic description: “there are many things that cannot
be made as plain to the Understanding, by a large Description in Words, as by the Delineation of
them in a quarter of  a Sheet of  Paper.”58 Illustration was a philosophically loaded device, not
mere expedience or decoration:
“[I]t will be often necessary to add the Pictures of  those Observables that will not otherwise
be so fully and sensibly exprest by Verbal Description: But in doing this, as a great Art and
Circumspection is to be used in the Delineation, so ought there to be very much Judgement
and Caution in the use of  it. For the Pictures of  things which only serve for Ornament or
Pleasure,  or  the  Explication  of  such  things  as  can  be  better  describ'd  by  words  is  rather
noxious than useful, and serves to divert and disturb the Mind, and sways it with a kind of
Partiality or Respect.”59
56 See Meghan Doherty for more on the method and knowledge behind Hooke's compositions that simply was not
available to Power: Doherty, “Discovering the ‘True Form.’”
57 e.g. Hooke, Micrographia, sig. F2r, 181, 204.
58 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 20.
59 Ibid., 64.
Figure 4.2: Power's illustrations. From left: spider eyes (p. 13), silk texture (p.
46), corn poppy seeds (p. 49).
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How much  does  the  addition  of  desciptions  Hooke's  original  drawings  beg  for  an
explanation? It is Dennis' view that the descriptions given in Micrographia are much as they would
have been at the meetings of  the Society. In fact he sees this as an important part of  the rhetoric
of  the finished book. In describing at once the picture and the object of  the picture, Hooke
collapsed the re-presentations of  his observations in front of  the Fellows into his own private
observations themselves, and thereby converted his audience into eyewitnesses, testifying to the
Figure 4.3: The belly and back of  a long legged spider,
Micrographia scheme 31, opposite p. 198.
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knowledge they conveyed.60
Whether or not the undeniable similarities between Hooke's and Power's books are the
result of  direct influence, the important point is their essential difference. The two authors used
the microscope to produce works of  different types. As authors of  complete, contemporaneous
works, Power and Hooke make an interesting comparison both in terms of  words and action, in
both their rhetoric and the natural philosophical stances embodied by their publications. Power
was  wildly  optimistic  about  the  instrument,  and  was  also  a  rampant  Cartesian.  Experimental
Philosophy is the result of  these things combined. Hooke, on the other hand, produced a more
visually  oriented work in which the  'sharper eye'  of  Power's  lenses  is  replaced by a kind of
pragmatic scepticism about both appearances and existing philosophy. Before turning to Hooke it
will  be  helpful  to  make  the  distinction  clearer  by  saying  a  little  more  about  the  way  the
microscope appeared in Power's writing.
The World Through a Microscope
Power was older than Hooke: born in Halifax, Yorkshire, in 1623, he belonged more to
the generation of  Hooke's employers than to Hooke's own. He was aged 45 at his death in
1668.61 While a student at Christ's College, Cambridge, he began to correspond with Sir Thomas
Browne, a friend of  his parents, who would have a lasting influence on Power. Cambridge was
also  the  home of  Francis  Glisson,  experimental  physiologist  and later  head  of  the  London
College  of  Physicians,  and the  Platonists  Ralph Cudworth  and Henry  More.  Like  Hooke  at
Oxford, Power was a member of  an active group of  natural philosophers.62
Unlike  Hooke  though,  Power  studied  an  established  profession  –  medicine  –  and
returned to Yorkshire to work as a physician while Hooke, the philosophers' apprentice, moved
60 Dennis, “Graphic Understanding,” 344.
61 For more on Power's life see Webster, “Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy.”
62 One which Webster has also suggested was connected to another institution meant to epitomise Bacon's 
'Solomon's House' – the College of  Physicians under Francis Glisson: Webster, “The College of  Physicians.”
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to London.  As I mentioned earlier,  Power did remain active in philosophy, and communicated
with the Royal Society,  who asked him to perform experiments in Yorkshire coal mines on the
effect of  altitude on gravity.  Hooke  would later repeat the experiment from atop  Westminster
Abbey.63
When he was engaged In his own philosophical work, Power had very clear aims. Just as
the title to  Micrographia gives away the most important aspect of  the book, so to does Power's
Experimental Philosophy: With some Deductions, and Probable Hypotheses, raised from them, in Avouchment
and Illustration of  the now famous Atomical Hypothesis. He had not escaped Cambridge without being
infected by Henry More's enthusiasm for Descartes' philosophy.64 A letter from Power to his
Cambridge associate Reubin Robinson suggests his work was always intended to be a complete
vindication of  Descartes:
Descartes … (the Author you know I have so long since admired) you see how every day his
Hypothesis gaines upon the world and begins now to be made out by mechanicall experiments,
his Atoms & the various figurations of  them by the Microscope, his aetherial substance by the
[mercurial] experiments, his Doctrine of  the Lodestone, by new Magneticall Demonstrations.65
Experimental  Philosophy  works  systematically  through  Cartesianism,  seeking  to  justify
different aspects of  it in turn. In fact, the only section of  the finished book not devoted to this
task  that  on  the  subterranean experiments  which  the  Royal  Society  asked  him to  carry  out.
Throughout  the  rest,  Power  aims  his  experiments  at  verifying  his  matter  theory,  and the
microscope was certainly no exception. Though the things that explain phenomena are too small
to  be  seen  with  the  naked  eye,  microscopes  would bring  knowledge  of  those  things  which
“govern Nature principally.”66
63 See Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:133–136, 163-165. If  Hooke is often characterised as the 
working man of  the Royal Society, here the architectural comparison is in his favour.
64 For which, see Hutton, Henry More.
65 Power to Robinson, 25 September 1661. Quoted in Webster, “Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy,” 168.
66 Power, Experimental Philosophy, sig. C2r.
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In 1661  Power wrote  an  ode  'In commendation of  the Microscope'  which  rings with
excitement, and echoes Bacon by relating to Democritus that he has finally been shown correct:
Of  all th' Inventions, none there is Surpasses
the Noble Florentine's Dioptrick-glasses.
For what a better, fitter, guift Could bee
in this world's Aged Luciosity.
To Helpe our Blindnesse so as to devize
a paire of  new & Artificall eyes.
By whose augmenting power wee now see more
than all the world Has ever donn Before.
Thy Atomes (Brave Democritus) are now
made to appeare in bulk & figure too.67
In a more sober mood Power admitted that  seeing such constituents of  nature was
impossible with current instruments.  When the anatomist and physician Nathaniel  Highmore
reported magnetic  particles  had been seen emanating  from a  lodestone,  Power,  believing he
possessed the best microscopes in England, was sceptical.68 But he  did not find the prospect
absurd. His self-confessedly “hyperbolic” hope was that if  lenses reached theoretical perfection,
we could view not only the fine effluvia of  the magnet, but the grosser electrical or aromatical
ones too, atoms, the light globules of  Descartes,  and the springy air particles of  Boyle.69 The
mechanical philosophy's explanations of  phenomena would be visually confirmed. This kind of
talk  was  not  uncommon.  Descartes  urged instrument  makers  to build  microscopes  so  visual
67 For the whole poem see Cowles, “Dr. Henry Power’s Poem on the Microscope.” I have silently altered some of  
the punctuation, and converted 'u' to 'v'. The last couplet's rhyme makes more sense in Power's Yorkshire 
dialect.
68 Highmore reported his observation in his Highmore, The History of  Generation, 117. Power mentions and 
dismisses Highmore's claim twice more: Power, Experimental Philosophy, 57, 155. See Webster, “Henry Power’s 
Experimental Philosophy.” for a letter from the Doctor to his associate in which he claims to be using the best 
microscopes in the land.
69 Power, Experimental Philosophy, sig. C3r-v, 57-58, 155-156.
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evidence could be gathered for his matter theory over Aristotelianism.70 Constantijn Huygens,
Theodore Mayerne, and, more ambiguously, Pierre Gassendi and Walter Charleton joined him in
relating the promise of  the instrument to corpuscularianism.71 Robert Boyle hoped microscopes
would reveal corpuscles of  various shapes and sizes, and Isaac Newton thought better and better
microscopes  might  show  us  all  the  different  sized  light  particles  that  produced colour.72
Leeuwenhoek actually  thought he had found that a remarkable number of  bodies consisted of
small round globules, before later realising they were artifacts of  his microscope,  and what he
could see of  his subjects were much more varied and irregular parts.73
The idea of  one day really seeing this sort of  texture seems to ignore the fundamental
insight for which doing so would provide evidence – that observable phenomena are explained
and composed by an unobservable  substructure.  This  substructure  is  unobservable  not  only
because  it  is  tiny,  but  also  because  it  is  precisely  due  to  composition that  it  produces  visual
phenomena through the mechanical  action of  light.  Colour is  the result  of  arrangements of
corpuscules. How a lens could magnify and isolate one of  these corpuscles and it still be visible is
somewhat mysterious.  The appearance of  an arrangement of  corpuscles is  just exactly what an
object  looks like to the naked eye!  When I see  a  brown dog in a green field, corpuscles don't
cause me to see these objects, I am just seeing corpuscles.  If  the microscope's revelation of  tiny
details provided evidence for objects being composed of  sub-visible particles, hoping to see these
particles was surely impossible.
John Locke pointed this out. If  we could see, he wrote, the “real Constitution on which
[objects'] sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different Ideas in
us.”74 What would a corpuscule look like? For instance, colours would disappear, and instead we
70 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 172.
71 See Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century Microscopy,” 15.
72 Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours, in Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 4:40. Newton, Hypothesis 
Concerning Light and Colour, in Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:303.
73 Leeuwenhoek, “Microscopical Observations from Mr. Leeuwenhoeck”; Leeuwenhoek, “More Observations 
from Mr. Leewenhook”; and for his recantation: Leeuwenhoek, “Microscopical Observations of  the Structure 
of  Teeth and Other Bones”; Leeuwenhoek, “Microscopical Observations of  the Structure of  Hair”; see also 
Phinney, “A Revisionist History of  Microscopical Sciences,” 126.
74 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 2, chapter 13 section 11, p. 139.
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would see a “Texture of  parts of  a certain Size and Figure.”75 Locke illustrated his idea with the
observation  that  things  change  colour  when  viewed  under  a  microscope:  despite  blood's
appearance  to  the  naked  eye,  magnification  shows  it  is  mostly  clear with  only  a  few  red
“Globules” mixed in.76 Unlike other authors, Locke is clear that this evidence is analogical. Red
blood globules are not corpuscules, nor are they like them. It is “uncertain,” he says, how these
red globules themselves would appear under a stronger lens. Peter Alexander has argued that the
role of  the microscope in Locke's discussion is only to show that things look different through it,
and that our human ideas are contingent on the nature of  our senses.77 He does not think a
microscope is a step on the way to seeing the “real Constitution” of  objects. Rather, when Locke
imagines  'seeing' corpuscles  directly  he  is  imagining  a  sense  wholly  different  from  that  of
eyesight.78
In fact, Locke thinks it is just as well that we do not have eyes that let us see the “real
Constitution” of  things. Our senses are attuned to the size and composition of  the human body
– by his time a fairly common idea in experimental philosophy – and more acute senses would be
totally useless in daily life,  which is after all what God designed us for.79 Our very constitution
prevents us from having visual access to the fabric of  reality.
Locke acknowledged  the  theoretical  reasons  to  think  that  corpuscles  would  remain
invisible, no matter how enlarged. It was thus limited to providing a kind of  analogical evidence
for corpuscularianism, in a sense a return to Bacon's idea of  the instrument: an measured hope
that while someone wedded to atomism might have outrageous hopes for the instrument, its
practical benefit was more likely in just giving closer views of  familiar objects. 80 As such, Locke is
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. Vanishing colour was a fairly common conceit of  early modern microscopy, but Locke is different in 
making clear the colourless globules are unlike corpuscles in that they are still visible. See also Hooke, 
Micrographia, 71; Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 4:40; Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 1:230.
77 Alexander, “Microscopes and Corpuscles.”
78 Ibid., 87ff.
79 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 2, chapter 13 section 12, p. 140. See also Hooke, 
Posthumous Works, 8–9; Power, Experimental Philosophy, sig. B1r.
80 See also Wilson, The Invisible World, 57–60.
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ultimately  pessimistic  about  the  instrument's  usefulness  in  natural  philosophy.81 He  allows
himself  an “extravagant conjecture” about a person who could adjust their senses at will, and see
at one moment “the Figure and Motion of  the minute Particles,” and at the next “the shape and
motion of  [whole] Animals themselves.” How much more knowledgeable than the average man
would this person be?82 This duality is the stuff  of  Angelic knowledge; at no point does Locke
consider that this might be exactly the experience of  the microscopist.83
The idea  the microscope might provide  direct evidence for mechanism  seems tied to
conceiving of  it as a 'sharper eye'. If  knowledge had been restricted, Power and Hooke followed
Bacon in saying, to those things we can see, then the microscope's extension of  our visual scope
also implied an extension of  truth.  There was a direct  connection between  seeing things  and
knowing about them. In a community for whom truth increasingly meant knowledge about the
fundamental  structure  that  underlay  nature  and  from which  phenomena  emerged,  the  most
obvious hope for microscopical enquiry was a view on corpuscles.
In a sense, Locke and Power represent the two extremes of  this view. Locke emphasises
the inaccessibility of  the level of  reality at which truth was to be found, and it is not too much of
a stretch to to see in  him the kind of  neoclassical restriction of  philosophy that  led Alexander
Pope to later write that the “proper study of  Man is Man.”84 If  you cannot see corpuscles, what is
the point of  magnifying  things? All you get is  a distorted picture of  mundane objects. On the
other  hand, Power's optimism is  unlimited.  There are occasional glimpses  in his work not of
Descartes' philosophy but that of  Henry More, his teacher at Cambridge who argued that  the
causal power of  matter in motion was complimented by immaterial spirits. Power hazarded that
81 Interestingly, Phinney quotes Thomas Sydenham saying that although nature acts on the body by small particles, 
they are too small to ever be seen “even by the assistance of  glasses, or any other invention.” His amanuensis, 
taking down this note, was none other than John Locke. Phinney, “A Revisionist History of  Microscopical 
Sciences,” 126.
82 See Gal and Chen-Morris' discussion of  Galileo's and Kepler's related musings about the telescope as an 
extension of  reason, and what kind of  eye reason would want if  it could have one: Gal and Chen-Morris, 
Baroque Science, 94–97.
83 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 2, chapter 13 section 13, p. 141.
84 From his Essay on Man. I will return to this idea in the following chapter, through the work of  Margaret 
Cavendish.
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microscopes  might  even  facilitate  “at  last  the  discovery  of  Spiritualities  themselves.”85 He
concluded his ode:
Nay then yow pretty sprits & fairy Elves
that hover in the aire, Looke to your selves.
For with such prying Spectacles as these
wee shall see yow in yr owne essences.
Then shall I see a soule just when tis gone
as cleere as now I doe our Will & John.86
The  poem  is  packed  full  of  the  observations  Power  would  publish  in  sober
philosophical prose a few years later in his Experimental Philosophy. To conclude it on such a note
might have been hyperbolic, but it was not facetious.
But the thing about Power which makes him a particularly illustrative comparison for
Hooke is that he did not wait for the improvements of  microscopes, he wrote a book explicitly
advocating Cartesianism based entirely on observations made with the actual microscopes of  the
1660s. Though he could not observe light globules or magnetical effluvia directly, he thought, for
instance, that the 'eels' he saw wriggling in vinegar:
very neatly illustrate the Doctrine of  the incomparable Des-Cartes, touching Fluidity: (viz.) That
the particles of  all fluid bodies are in a continual and restless motion, and therein consists the
true nature  of  fluidity: for by this ocular example, we see there may be an intestine restless
motion in a Liquor, notwithstanding that the unassisted eye can discover no such matter.87
85 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 58.
86 Cowles, “Dr. Henry Power’s Poem on the Microscope,” 73. See Cowles' notes for connections between lines of  
the poem and Power's Experimental Philosophy. This last line is apparently a reference to Henry More's 'aetherial 
genii' – a soul on its way to heaven. See More, The Immortality of  the Soul; Power, Experimental Philosophy, 156.
87 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 36. He adds Observation 13, Mites in Meal, as evidence to this same conclusion.
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What was important was the wriggling, not the wriggler. What matters for Power is the
existence of  motion not visible to the naked eye. Power had thought, theoretically,  that motion
was everywhere without us being able to observe it. Now he had evidence that this was the case.
For Power, gaps between hypothesis and evidence – between ontology and observation – could
be bridged by the understanding. Where “both our Natural and Artificial Eyes fail […] we have
another more Intrinsick Eye [...] and that is the piercing Eye of  Reason.”88 Reason allows us to
slide  from  the  visible  to  the  invisible,  and  eels  become  evidence  for  continual  corpuscular
motion.89 Likewise, having watched a snail slide along the other side of  a pane of  glass, Power
concluded the “little stream of  clouds [that] channel up her belly from her tail to her head” were
a “gale of  Animal Spirits” and “the cause of  her progressive motion.”90 He is prompted into a
digression  about  the  Animal  Spirits:  they  are  not  generated  in  the  bodies  of  animals,  but
universally distributed through all things in the world but only become visible when immersed in
“grosser matter.” They “give fermentation and concretion to Minerals; vegetation and maturation
to Plants; life, sense, and motion to Animals; And indeed, [are] the main (though invisible) Agent
in all Natures three Kingdoms Mineral, Vegetal, and Animal.”91 Seeing things that were ordinarly
invisible  gave  Power  a  license  to  reason  beyond  even these observations,  and explain  visual
phenomena with an assumed matter (and spirit) theory.
Of  course, Power's book was  predominantly a description of  magnified objects – the
speculative parts are few and far between, and for the most part there is significant overlap with
Hooke's descriptions in Micrographia. But the places they do diverge are illustrative. Hooke did not
use the microscope primarily to justify a pre-existing belief  in a particular system of  the world,
88 Ibid., 155.
89 Webster, in his account of  Power's philosophical thought, finds in it a tendency to reach quickly for such 
analogies “in searching for generalisations of  wide explanatory value, [and] in the absence of  incontrovertible 
evidence... This reduced the difficulties in moulding experimental evidence to the requirements of  [Cartesian] 
theories:” Webster, “Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy,” 167. This molding to fit hypotheses was exactly 
what someone like Boyle was cautioning against in advocating an experimental approach to philosophy, but this 
only serves to demonstrate the wide array of  stances possible in that general approach. For more on 
experiments performed with a particular matter theory in mind, see Gaukroger, Emergence of  a Scientific Culture, 
chap. 10.
90 Power, Experimental Philosophy, 38–39.
91 Ibid., 61.
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but as a messier tool of  enquiry which could generate novel and unfamiliar views.92 It is therefore
possible to identify, even between contemporary users of  the instrument, two very different ideas
about why the microscope was useful for natural philosophers.
Visual Epistemology
In both Hooke and Power,  microscopes pushed  the limits of  knowledge  beyond the
limits of  naked eyesight, and  in both  analogies are wielded as explanatory bridges to cross the
gap. But the devil is in the details. Power's observations were visual evidence for invisible things;
he used analogy and likeness to move from the observable to unobservable. The way Hooke used
analogy returns us to the  pictorial  origins  of  Hooke's microscopy.  An image is  always  of  a
particular thing: in the words of  Raz Chen-Morris, “the painted picture can create, as if  by magic,
a perfect deception, but only of  a particular accident. It cannot convey or recreate the essence of
a  physical  object.”93 For  this  reason,  the relation  between  pictorial  representation  and
philosophical knowledge in the early modern period is as fascinating as it is complex. Hooke, for
one,  emphasised the importance  of  images for  the  natural  historian,  as  I  mentioned above.
Pictures helped the historian both “express his Ideas the better to himself  [...] and also for the
better informing and instructing of  others.”94 Such informing and instructing take place precisely
by describing a particular accident – not attempting to 'recreate the essence of  a physical object,'
but by showing it from a limited perspective. What this meant through the microscope was that
Hooke's images frequently became pictures of  other objects.
Unlike  Power's,  Hooke's  analogies  are  not  between  the  observable  and  the
unobservable, but between the familiar observed and the unfamiliar observed.95 Descriptions of
92 Where he mentions Cartesian ideas in Micrographia it is more frequently to refute Descartes' specific ideas: for 
example on the production of  colours, see Chapter 3.
93 Chen-Morris, “From Emblems to Diagrams,” 135.
94 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 20.
95 Alan Gabbey has identified these two as prominent explanatory categories in early modern mechanical 
philosophy: Gabbey, “Mechanical Philosophies and Their Explanations.” See also Gaukroger, Explanatory 
Structures.
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insect eyes like rubies, or seeds like honey-comb can be found in Power, but with nothing like the
regularity or liveliness of  those comparisons Hooke makes: purslane seeds are nautilus shells, the
razor's edge is an axe blade. The power of  these analogies resides not in Hooke's descriptions but
his giant images. A picture circumvents the necessity, present in verbal description, to analyse an
object or  a  process into discrete, separate parts, each of  which can be regarded as similar  or
dissimilar  to another object or process.  The  viewer, not the reader, observes  an  object's form
holistically, and directly  understands  through the image's similarity with  what it represents.  The
power  of  this  likeness  need  not  be  directly explanatory,  but  more  broadly  suggestive  of
continuities within nature or between nature and art. Hooke's visual analogies  are 'horizontal'
within the phenomenal realm rather than 'vertical' from the observed to the unobservable.96 They
are not themselves explanans of  unobservable processes or a transcendent reality, but more often
objects of  mystery themselves, to be presented to ocular interrogation.
A quick tour of  some of  his images will be useful. The first of  the book's thirty-eight
schemes  is of  the great microscope itself. Thereafter, many  other images  appear presented on
specimen slides or enclosed by circular frames: now we have seen the impressive system, we as
readers look down through its lenses,  partaking in the experience of  the experimenter.97 Our
experience comes drawn to a scale, and labelled with letters for reference in the accompanying
text. Take note, says Hooke, of  the things hidden in an eighth of  an inch. Here is the world, but
not as you normally see it (see Figure 4.4).
96 See Gaukroger, The Collapse of  Mechanism and the Rise of  Sensibility, chap. 5.
97 See for instance schemes 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 21, 23. The parallel with the first book of  telescopic 
observations are notable: in Galileo's Sidereus Nuncius the telescope “stretches out beyond the text [and] the 
reader and the viewer's sites are aligned,” says Elizabeth Spiller: Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 
110.
96
After our first peek into the micro-world, the instrument becomes curiously transparent.
In Scheme 18, thyme seeds spill uncontained across the page, and the climactic images of  the ant,
the flea, and the louse cannot be held by the book's bindings themselves – the last of  these
images folds out to four  times the size of  the large folio book. Immersed in the image and
completely unaware of  the instrumental mechanism behind our vision, as Michael Dennis says,
Hooke's “microscopes and circumstances vanished into the page's white background.”98
The diagrammatic letters that cling to these formidable insects are small reminders that
the images are pedagogical, but the main thing we are aware of  is confronting these creatures as
98 Dennis, “Graphic Understanding,” 341.
Figure 4.4: Surfaces of  seaweed, rosemary leaf, and fine lawn, Micrographia,
scheme 14, opposite p. 141.
97
our incongruent equals. Our perspective has changed – we no longer experience them as humans
would. Hooke writes of  “the strength and beauty” of  a flea, the “great claws” of  crustaceans, the
“horns” of  a gnat “almost like the horns of  an Oxe.”99
99 Hooke, Micrographia, 210, 178, 185.
Figure 4.5: Tufted Gnat, from Micrographia, scheme 28, opposite. p. 193.
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These are the qualities of  the oversized creatures of  the images – of  giants not of  small
insects. Hooke's images, made through transformed eyes, do not reflect human sensibility.
The  point  of  the  comparison  with  Power's  work  is  not  that  the  unillustrated
Experimental Philosophy does represent things from a human perspective. It is rather that Power's
experimental approach leads him directly to objective knowledge of  things, a view from nowhere.
Hooke's extension of  his natural vision simply replaces it with a different kind of  vision.  The
objects Hooke depicts really look like – really become – other objects. Smooth silk is a woven net,
seaweed is scales. When Hooke shows us that thyme seeds look like a bowl of  lemons, we are no
closer to seeing the essence of  thyme seeds. The art that he makes through his microscope can
be seen as a kind of  anamorphosis. There is a clear discord between the armoured giants we see
and their familiar and vulgar insect names. Knowing how to view the images – knowing that they
were made through a magnifying lens – resolves the confusion, as standing to the side of  Hans
Holbein's The Ambassadors makes makes sense of  the smear across the foreground.
Lookalikes
Stuart  Clark has suggested the  popularity  of  anamorphic  images  in  the  seventeenth
century indicates an uneasiness in the period about whether visual evidence could be considered
objective, even as such objectivity was becoming formalised in mathematical rules of  perspective.
The anxiety increased as the importance of  visual evidence swelled with the rise of  empiricism. 100
Certainly the way some people read optical instruments denied that they might possibly lead to
objective knowledge. Margaret Cavendish concluded from Hooke's images that a “natural figure
may be presented in as monstrous a shape, as it may appear misshapen rather than natural.” 101 A
microscope showed things exactly as they are not.  Magnified out of  recognition, a louse looks
like a crab, appears as big as an elephant, but is after all still a louse. But what is this 'natural' state
100 Clark, Vanities of  the Eye, 91–96.
101 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 8.
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that a magnifying glass never represents?  For Cavendish it was exactly what the object  is to a
human. We can be sure of  this verity through function: a knife that is sharp to the touch looks
blunt when magnified.102 But “if  the edge of  a knife or the point of  a needle were naturally and
really so as the  microscope presents them, they would never be so useful as they are.”103 Her
words  are  of  course  directed  at  Hooke  – the  needle  and the razor's  edge are  the  first  two
observations in Micrographia.
Interestingly, Hooke agrees to a certain extent. If  the razor “had been really such as it
appear'd through the Microscope, it would scarcely have serv'd to cleave wood, much less to have
cut off  the hair of  beards.” But then he relates its new function, as a new object. “Unless,” he
continues, “it were after the manner Lucien merrily relates Charon to have made use of, when
102 This contrasts interestingly with Bacon's view of  the relationship between the senses, truth, and utility, as I will 
return to in the following chapter.
103 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 9.
Figure 4.6: Hooke's drawing of  a razor's edge, Micrographia, scheme 2, fig.
2, opposite p. 1.
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with a Carpenter's Axe he chop'd off  the beard of  a sage Philosopher, whose gravity he very
cautiously fear'd would indanger the oversetting of  his Wherry.”104
Hooke implies that as long as you are aware of  the perspective, there is little unnerving
about anamorphic images. They are merely visions occulted from the causal observer. No doubt
the razor's  normal  function is  impaired,  but it  now it  has become a different object,  with a
different use. Hooke makes  the Cavendish's worry into a joke.  Lucian's Charon stood ready to
ferry his passengers across the styx, but he warned his boat was small and leaky. The passengers
must leave all  their  baggage on the shore.  One by one  they  are dispossessed,  youths leaving
behind  their  beauty  and tyrants  their  cruelty.  Menippus  the  Cynic,  who  had  already  left  his
baggage  at  home,  takes  great  delight  in  pointing  out  the  baggage of  the  philosopher:  “ idle
questionings, prickly arguments, intricate conceptions; humbug and gammon and wishy-washy
hair-splittings without end,” to name a few, and cut his beard off  with an axe.105 Hooke's agenda
is  clear.  The microscope-enlarged  edge of  a  razor  is  not  as  it  is  to the  naked eye.  But  this
alteration itself  has a function: robbing philosophers of  their preconceived ideas, and teaching us
that things are not what they seem.  No deception is  intended,  merely a change of  perspective.
Berkeley later pointed out that an insect must see its own legs as “bodies of  some considerable
dimension.”106 The similar insight is that vision at a human-scale is not the only possible view. Or
as John Wilkins wrote in his speculative work A World in the Moon, objects might have a dual role,
one for humans and one for other beings. The same body could be “a World, and a Moon; a
World for Habitation, and a Moon for the use of  others, and the Ornament of  the whole Frame
of  Nature.”107 In a quote I gave at the beginning of  the chapter, he made a similar point about
lice: “there may be other insects that live upon them as they doe upon us.”108 Hooke's objects
104 Hooke, Micrographia, 5.
105 Lucian, Dialogues of  the Dead, 'Charon and Hermes'. In Fowler and Fowler, The Works of  Lucian of  Samosata, 1:121.
106 Berkeley, Three Dialogues, 32. Compare with the Aristotelian objection to atomism that creatures with differently 
sharp eyes would live in different worlds to one another: Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  
Seventeenth-Century Microscopy,” 11 ff.
107 Wilkins, The Discovery of  a World in the Moone, 43.
108 Wilkins, Mathematicall Magick, 115–116.
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likewise have one appearance to the human sense, and another to microscope eyes.
Through his lenses  Hooke  encountered the very same forms and figures  on different
scales. The same processes and mechanisms that we are familiar with in macroscopic processes –
the operation of  a lever for instance – exist and explain nature at the micro-scale as well. Seeing
such tiny machines suggested to him not a gap but a continuity of  nature.
[T]here  is  but  a  small  difference  between  Earth  and  strong  Concretions,  between  such
Concretions and Salt, between the crystallizing, and shooting of  Salt, and the Vegetation of
Mould,  and less  between the  Vegetation  of  Mould and Mushrooms,  and but  a  very  little
between the Vegetation of  Mushrooms and Moss, and as little between Moss and Grass, and
between Grass and the most bulky Vegetable, and no great matter between the Vegetation of
Plants  and  Zoophyts,  and  there  is  no  great  Difference  between  Maritime  Zoophyts  and
Oysters, Blubbers and the like; between those and Periwinkles, and other kinds of  Shell-fish,
between Shell-fish and crustaceous Creatures, between those and Fishes, between Fishes and
amphibious Creatures, such as Morses and Sea-Calves, and the like, between those and Aerial
Animals, &c.109
By  replacing  natural  vision  with  artificial  senses  we  can  move  seamlessly  through
different scales of  nature. By holding his eyes in his hands, by adopting the sense of  a different
creature, Hooke divorced his observations from the human scale. Here again is the anamorphosis
of  his images.
[A thyme seed] affords a very pretty Object for the  Microscope, namely, a Dish of  Lemmons
plac'd in a very little room; should a Lemmon or Nut be proportionably magnify'd to what this
seed of  Tyme  [sic.] is, it would make it appear as bigg as a large Hay-reek (haystack), and it
would be no great wonder to see Homers Iliads, and Homer and all, cramm'd into such a Nut-
shell.110
109 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 47.
110 Hooke, Micrographia, 153.
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Pictures,  the  original  purpose  of  Micrographia,  gave  Hooke  the  freedom  to
reconceptualise  minute  objects  as  larger  ones, relatable  and  understandable  by  their  visual
similarity to familiar things. Hooke's allusion to the legend of  the Iliad written so small it could be
stored  inside  a  nut,  while  not  exactly  lending  plausibility  to  the  story  itself,  recognises that
microscopical discoveries make such things credible. Size doesn't matter; a man could be the size
of  a lemon.
With the “new visible World” that the microscope reveals, familiar objects are made to
look alien, and then familiar again by analogy with a different object. 111 Interesting in connection
with this idea is the relative lack of  neologisms that Felicity Henderson has noted in Micrographia.
Hooke's contemporaries and fellows were great linguistic innovators, and it could be expected
that a book so full of  unfamiliar visions would be full of  new phrases and words to describe the
unfamiliar things he was seeing. Instead, Hooke chose to use familiar terms and similar objects to
relate them to his audience  (think of  his famous coining of  the word “cell” for its biological
use).112
The epistemological import of  all this is two-fold. One aspect is a general one about the
new accessibility of  nature to humans, and the other is more specifically about the benefits of
looking  at  tiny  things.  I  will  return  to  a  comparison  with  Henry  Power  to  bring  out  the
connection Hooke maintained between mechanical philosophy and the microscope.
The Machines of Nature
Hooke  was  much  more  ambiguous  than  Power  about  the  connection  between
instruments and a particular ontology. At his most extravagant he suggests that it is:
111 Hooke, Micrographia, sigs. A2r-v.
112 Henderson, “Door-Mats and Penumbras.”
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not  unlikely,  but  that  there  may be  yet  invented several  other  helps  for  the  eye,  as  much
exceeding those already found, as those do the bare eye, such as by which we may perhaps be
able to discover living Creatures in the Moon, or other Planets, the figures of  the compounding
Particles of  matter, and the particular Schematisms and Textures of  Bodies.113
But  this  is  a  contrast  between  such  helps  and  the  microscope.  As  in  Locke,  the
possibility  of  seeing  the  “compounding  Particles  of  matter”  would  not  come  from  merely
sharper eyesight, but from a different sense. All a lens does is reveal more detail about an object,
not a fundamental explanation. The underlying epistemological insight of  Hooke's microscope is,
as we saw in Wilkins at the beginning of  this chapter, not really about the observed things at all
but ourselves. Our senses  are not  for the direct acquisition of  knowledge but to suit our daily
business.  Hooke  and Wilkins took  seriously  Bacon's  idea  that  the  senses  were  made  to  the
“measure of  man.”
Of  course  this  was  not  completely  divorced  from  mechanical  philosophy.  Hooke
thought that microscopes helped by revealing things humans cannot naturally see:
the subtility of  the composition of  Bodies, the structure of  their parts, the various texture of
their matter, the instruments and manner of  their inward motions, and all the other possible
appearances of  things. [… A]ll which the ancient Peripateticks were content to comprehend in
two general and (unless further explain'd) useless words of  Matter and Form.114
Hooke  was unsatisfied  with  Aristotelian hylomorphic ideas of  nature, and wanted to
reduce  them  to  lower  level  explanations.  But  within  this broad  mechanistic  worldview  his
microscopical  programme is almost the reverse of  Power's.  Power sought unseen but  assumed
effluvia or particles, to add visual evidence to his warrant for believing in them. Hooke sought
different  and  surprising  ways  to  look  at  objects  he  had  already  seen: the “other  possible
113 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. B2v.
114 Ibid., sig. A2v.
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appearances of  things.” His methodology in adding “artificial Organs to the natural” is an extension
of  his  practice  with  the  instrument:  examining  an  object  many times  in  different  conditions
before beginning to think that he had “discover'd the true form.”115 The key to knowing an object
is  to  pay  attention  to  its  many  different  guises.  For  Hooke,  holding  a  microscope  was  an
opportunity to see things differently,  and not be limited by our human perspective.  From there
we could “compare the several Informations we receive of  the same thing, from the several
Impressions it makes on the Organs of  Sense and (by a Rejection of  what is not consonant) by
degrees to find out its Nature.”116 I will return to these compounded several informations, from
instruments and unassisted senses,  in Chapter 6,  after leaving the experimental community to
look more at Cavendish's criticisms in Chapter 5.  Here I will conclude with  a more particular
connection between mechanical philosophy and Hooke's microscope.
If  the main lesson is  the contingency of  human vision,  the idea  that objects are just
little or big depending on one's perspective came with an important caveat.
[I]n general […] the mechanical operations of  [...] minute bodies are quite differing from those
bodies of  greater bulk, and the want of  considering this one thing hath been the cause of  very
great absurdities in the Hypotheses of  some of  our more eminent modern Philosophers: For
he that imagines the actions of  these lesser bodies the same with those of  larger and tractable
bodies, will indeed make but Aristotle's wooden hand at best.117
Aristotle  had said that shape and colour could not be all there was to an object, there
must  be  some  inner  essence  too.118 Hooke  agreed,  but he  thought  such  essence  should  be
explained  compositionally.  Thus  it  was  important  to  remember  thyme  seeds  really  were  not
lemons, only appeared on a continuum with them. The difference between different levels on the
115 Ibid., sigs. A2r, F2v.
116 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 9.
117 Hooke, “Microscopium,” 94–95.
118 Aristotle, On the Parts of  Animals, book 1, part 1.
105
chain of  being was one of  complexity: from the “elemental kingdom” of  earth, water, and air, up
to the “smallest and most despicable fly,” there is at every step – mineral, vegetable, animal – an
increase in the complexity of  “Mechanisms and contrivances.”119 Here is  the flip side to the
limitations of  our senses.  All things are equipped with faculties to help it within the niche of
nature  it  was  designed  for.  But  if  our  eyes  produce  vision  by  reacting  to  combinations  of
corpuscules, maybe smaller things react to simpler qualities in nature, and examining them could
give us insight into these processes.
[I]t were very worth while […] to see what Information may be learn'd of  the nature, or use, or
virtues of  bodies, by their several forms and various excellencies and properties.  […]  Who
knows, but the Creator may, in those characters, have written and engraven many of  his most
mysterious designs and counsels, and given man a capacity, which, assisted with diligence and
industry, may be able to read and understand them.120
An important part  of  mechanical explanations of  phenomena is conceiving of  “the
secret workings of  Nature, almost in the same manner as we do those that are the productions of
Art, and are manag'd by Wheels, and Engines, and Springs, that were devised by humane Wit.” 121
This  quest  to  find  such  “small  Machines of  Nature”  was  more  than  mere  metaphor  for  a
mechanistic  description  of  the  world.122 Hooke  really  searched  through  the  micro-world  for
natural  machines.  Seeds of  thyme  are moved by the sun like little  “automatons or Engines;”
spider legs are “long Leavers;”  gnats are automata,  “the excellent contrivance of  their machine,
[...] excite[s] and force[s] them to act after such and such a manner.”123 The beard of  the wild oat,
Hooke relates more fully, has often been an object of  mystery and showmanship: magicians call it
an Arabian spider leg, and mutter  mystically while it unfurls  by itself  from a coil into a stiff,
119 Hooke, Micrographia, 154.
120 Ibid.
121 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. A2v.
122 Ibid., sig. G1r.
123 Ibid., 154, 199, 190.
106
straight line. In fact,  Hooke tells us,  moisture causes this motion.  Through his microscope he
could see the beard was a spongy substance which expands when it soaks up water, forcing it to
straighten.124 The natural  phenomenon is  explained by the structure and composition of  the
object's parts – cylinders and pores – just like a machine.
Once he had made this discovery, Hooke constructed an artificial machine from the
natural one (Figure 4.7).  Fixing a beard to a pointer, he could measure the moisture content of
the air. Variations in humidity cause the beard to furl or unfurl, turning the pointer against a dial
face.125 What really  illustrates the difference between Hooke and Power is that Hooke explicitly
described this hygroscope, and a barometer he also built,  as ways of  “sensibly perceiving the
effluvia of  Bodies.”126
124 Ibid., 147–149.
125 Koen Vermeir has written of, in a sense, the reversal of  this story: Athanasius Kircher's sunflower seed clock. 
This was a device which appeared to react to sunlight but in fact was operated by magnet. Vermeir, “‘Bent and 
Directed Towards Him.’”
126 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. C1r.
Figure 4.7: Hygroscope: Hooke's figures 2 and 3 are the beard of  a wild oat, and his figure 4 is the hygroscope he
built from it. Micrographia, scheme 15 detail, opposite p. 143.
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Hooke was not optimistic at one day  seeing such effluvia, as Highmore had claimed to
do. And where Power had analogised from the invisible motion of  eels in vinegar to the invisible
motion of  corpuscles, Hooke identified a need to translate phenomena through instruments so as
to make them measureable. Because a “sense” was just something that detected a certain kind of
motion in or quality of  a medium, any instrument that similarly reacted to natural qualities was “a
way of  improving some one sense.”127 Many of  Hooke's instruments –  the  thermometer,  the
barometer, air  pump or spring balance watch – can be seen as ways  of  allowing humans to
observe invisible natural qualities: the structure of  insects, air pressure, or time's passage.128 If  the
microscope could never provide such direct experience of  fundamental matter, it could help us
design things that could.
Under the Surface
In 1693, the year after Hooke lamented that everyone except Leeuwenhoek was giving
up  on  serious  microscopy,  he  gave  an  illustrative  analogy  for  the  experience  of  the
microscopist.129 Imagine a “wild Indian” was given a watch inside a leather case, and told that this
object divided each day from noon to noon into 24 hours, and would tell him at the end of  each
division  how  many  hours  had  passed.  The  Indian,  suggested Hooke,  would  surely  put  this
remarkable ability down to a “very cunning creature” living inside the case, keeping time. But as
he peels back the outer layers of  the mysterious thing in his hand, he would understand more and
more about its operation.  Being a microscopist  was like being this uneducated but inquisitive
man. As each surface is taken away, the “spirit of  the watch” gradually recedes into smaller and
smaller parts of  the device.  When  the  Indian  takes  the watch  out of  its case, the  spirit moves
beneath the dial face, and makes the hands move and the bells toll. When he opens the face to
reveal the movement, it sinks into the mechanism. But there is a limit. On seeing the wheels tick
127 Ibid., D1r.
128 See his discussion on Ibid., sig. C2v.
129 The following is from his lecture “The Uses and Advantage of  Microscopes.” See the Appendix.
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and the springs rebound, the Indian surely “would still be at a Losse what twas that made these
move,” and would conclude that the spirit resided in those tiny machines.130
The microscope  can  pierce many surfaces that are opaque to the naked eye, revealing
the operation of  things within.131 But with springs we reach the kind of  minute mechanism that
resists  further ocular  analysis.  In 1679 Hooke explained the  elasticity of  springs  in terms of
vibrating particles.132 His account here is in an entirely different mode, built  up from definitions
of  body and motion, rather than analysed down from the behaviour of  macroscopic bodies.133 As
we saw in the previous chapter, the importance for Hooke of  such ultimate, matter theoretic
explanations – as opposed to pragmatic, manipulative knowledge – is a difficult question, and one
which will continue to raise its head in the remainder of  this thesis. Whatever it was though, such
stories  owe  both  everything  and  nothing  to  his  microscope.  Everything  in  terms  of  being
suggested by the intricate bodies revealed by his  augmented senses, and nothing in terms of
being inherently disconnected from immediate visual experience.
130 Hooke, “The Uses and Advantage of  Microscopes,” f. 2–3.
131 Ibid., f. 1–2. See Hooke's famous observation of  the innards of  a louse: Hooke, Micrographia, 211. Power makes 
this same observation, but does not emphasise this aspect of  microscopy anything like as much.
132 This was his research which made him eponymous with the law of  springs: “The Power of  any Spring is in the 
same proportion with the Tension thereof ” Hooke, “Of  Spring,” 1.
133 See Hooke, “Of  Spring”, especially 6ff. He begins with a mathematical analysis of  the behaviour of  springs, 
before switching quite deliberately to matter theoretic explanation.
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Chapter 5: Inhuman Pursuits
The Philosophical Duchess
If  there  was  disagreement  about  the  role  of  the  microscope  between  experimental
philosophers, its status outside this community was even more disputed. From one extreme way
of  looking at it, the way a microscope displays things to an observer is plainly fraudulent. Objects
are altered from the way they naturally appear. Such optical tricks that bent and distorted vision
had a history as objects of  play and wonder. The idea that the microscope might therefore be in
some way be useless, if  not dangerous, perhaps strikes us as quaint, but was still a viable view in
the mid-seventeenth century. Hooke was aware of  the possible view, and wondered if  Hevelius
refused to use lenses for his astronomical observations in case they had a “hidden, un-intelligible,
and mysterious way of  representing the Object.”1 Hooke's own knowledge of  theoretical optics
perhaps made the idea seem silly, but ignorance was not the only or even the main feature of
opponents to lens use.
In this chapter I will look at how the microscope and Hooke himself  feature in the
writing  of  a  critic  of  the  instrument  and  of  experimental  philosophy  generally:  Margaret
Cavendish.
I will not say, but Art may help to mend some defects, errors, or irregularities in Nature, but
not  make better  that  which Nature  has  made perfect  already. Neither  can we say, Man is
defective, because he cannot flie as Birds: for flying is not his Natural and proper Motion; We
should rather account that Man monstrous that could flie.2
1 Hooke, “Animadversions on the First Part of  the Machina Coelestis,” 11.
2 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 32.
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This invective  was probably directed  squarely at Hooke – he  had  expressed his aerial
ambitions  in  his  Micrographia,  which  was the  main  target  of  the  lengthy  critique of  the
experimental philosophy  Cavendish published in 1666: Observations upon Experimental Philosophy.3
But while this may have been a fairly mainstream view on what was still a fairly taboo aspiration
in the seventeenth century, Cavendish's anti-instrumentalism extended also to activities that seem
less obviously inhuman.4 Hooke's late-century lament about the demise of  the microscope with
which I  began  the previous chapter  was directed at people  using the instrument but not for
natural  philosophical  purposes.  Cavendish  thought  we  should  call  a  spade  a  spade.  The
microscope would only ever produce distractions, not philosophical knowledge.
She was not naïve to microscopy. Despite claiming never to have practiced the art, her
husband William owned some and Cavendish had read Hooke closely, and probably Power too. 5
She  noted  microscopists  themselves  admitted  that  objects  appear  differently  under  different
conditions.6 But rather than wonder how they could tell which was the true view, her opinion was
that none of  them could possibly be, for “the more the Figure is by Art magnified, the more it
appears mis-shapen from the Natural.”7 Her general opinion of  the art was that:
those that invented Microscopes, and such like Dioptrical Glasses, at first, did, in my opinion,
the World more injury than benefit; for this Art has intoxicated so many Mens brains, and
wholly imployed their thoughts and bodily actions about Phaenomena, or the Exterior Figures
of  Objects, as all better Arts and Studies are laid aside. […] But though there be numerous
Books written of  the wonders of  these Glasses, yet I cannot perceive any such, and at best,
they are but superficial wonders.8
3 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D1v.
4 See Viktoria Tkaczyk's work on early modern flight: Tkaczyk, Himmels-Falten; Tkaczyk, “Ready for Takeoff.”
5 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 7, sigs. A3r-v. Ironically, in A Room of  One's Own 
Virginia Woolf  used the very same instrument as an emblem of  the scientific education that Cavendish, as a 
woman, had missed: “she should have had a microscope put in her hand.”
6 Ibid., 9.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 10.
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In a sense, as I discussed in the previous chapter, seeing the surface was exactly the aim
of  many microscopists. Cavendish was certainly no corpuscularian, as we will see below. But that
men's  minds  are  “intoxicated”  by  an  instrument  that  alters  their  bodies  from  “perfect”  to
“monstrous” suggests we need to look further than such differences to understand her concerns.
Cavendish  had her own philosophy of  nature, and she  neither rejected all artifice nor
did she advocate an uncomplicated rationalism over the experimenters' empirical bent.9 My aim in
examining her criticisms of  the Royal Society, and Hooke's microscopical work in particular, is to
give somewhat of  a  stranger's account  of  the then-as-yet-unproven experimental philosophy.10
While the early Royal Society agonised over the king's entertainments and fought to establish the
fruits of  their work as anything other than ridiculous, Cavendish looked on and saw this struggle
clearly. Inside Royal Society meetings it was accepted that the air pump or the microscope made
natural phenomena  available  for  the  Fellows to examine. But from outside  the community,  the
view was different. They were wasting their time with equipment that was known to be deceitful,
and objects that were vulgar and unimportant.11 Lenses  straightforwardly  distorted vision.  And
the experimentalists suggested that they might offer insight not in spite of  this but because of  it.
Looking  in  more  detail  at  Cavendish's complaints  will  help  enrich to  Hooke's  position  on
artificial organs and the knowledge they provide.
A very  literal  instance  of  conflict  between Cavendish  and the  Royal  Society,  which
provides  in  vivo a  peek  at  her  view of  the  experimenal  philosophy,  was  her  famous  visit  to
Arundel House on 30 May 1667. She was already their critic in print, and though Henry More
was accurate in his prediction that as a woman “she may be secure from any one giving her the
trouble of  a reply,”  demonstrating their  work to her seems to have caused the Society some
9 For Cavendish's contemporary relevance, see: Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of  the Mind; Sarasohn, 
The Natural Philosophy of  Margaret Cavendish; Clucas, A Princely Brave Woman; Dear, “A Philosophical Duchess.”
10 See Keller, “Producing Petty Gods.” On the other hand, William Newman has found in Cavendish's radical 
criticism of  art an “unwarranted extension of  a reasoned objection well beyond its sphere of  usefulness” 
(Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 288). Newman's work is valuable in placing Cavendish is the broader debate 
about the relation between nature and art, and he demonstrates the undeniable continuity of  some of  her views 
with those of  earlier anti-alchemical figures (see pp. 286-287).
11 This was of  course not a unique criticism. For example, for Hobbes' views see Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan 
and the Air Pump. I will discuss other critics below.
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anxiety.12 The  visit  was  proposed  by  a  Fellow,  Cavendish's  friend  Walter  Charleton,  but  the
Council debated hotly before allowing her visit, believing it would undermine their gravitas and
“the town [would] be full of  ballets of  it.”13 She arrived to the meeting with her friends and
attendants, and watched various experiments the Fellows had planned. Samuel Pepys did not hear
her say “any thing that was worth hearing, but that she was full of  admiration, all admiration. […]
After they had shown her many experiments, and she cried still she was full of  admiration, she
departed.”14 The  only  ballad  written  was  by  one  of  the  Society's  own,  John  Evelyn. 15 The
occasion was not mentioned again, and the whole affair has an air of  much ado about nothing.
It is fascinating to speculate on the complex dynamics of  Cavendish's visit glossed by
Pepys'  disappointed sarcasm.16 Hooke,  a  more laconic  notetaker  than Pepys,  simply  reported
“Dutchess of  newcastle intertayned,” perhaps somewhat wishfully, with “weighing the air in a
glasse.”17 This was of  course exactly the experiment Charles II had chosen to mockingly sum up
the Society's work in 1664.18 In fact, the experiments prepared for Cavendish were mostly the
same as those mooted to impress the king should he ever visit  – that list so agonised over by
Moray and Wren, conscious to show both the impressive and illuminating sides of  experimental
philosophy.19 What did it mean for these experiments to be 'admired'?
Perhaps they hoped for a little more engagement from a natural philosopher they knew
was critical of  their ideas. To agree with them would have been ideal; to criticise would at least
have been to engage. But to 'admire' was to treat them like entertainers: their greatest insecurity.
12 O’Neill, “Disappearing Ink,” 23.
13 30 May 1667: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1974, 8:243. 
14 30 May 1667: Ibid.
15 Grant, Margaret the First, 24–26.
16 He seemed to have been so looking forward to meeting her too. In March, seeking to “understand her better,” 
he had been to see a play of  hers (30 March 1667), and when she visited London the following month, intrigued 
that “all she do is romantick” (11 April 1667), he spent a good deal of  time and energy trying to run into her (26
April 1667; 1 May 1667; 10 May 1667). But when he finally did at the meeting, she did not please him. “I do not 
like her at all,” he reported, and later called her a “mad, conceited, ridiculous woman” (18 March 1668) and her 
husband William mad to put up with her.
17 Hooke, “Hooke Folio,” f. 64.
18 1 February 1663/4: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1971, 5:33.
19 Compare the two lists: the King's in Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:312;  the Dutchess’ in Birch, 
The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:177. See again the letter from Christopher Wren to Viscount Brounker, 30 
July/9 August 1663. In Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:288.
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The Dutchess arrived in her own time, she stayed for a polite while, then left without comment.
Barred from appearing as an equal or an interested observer as a male visitor to the Society
might, Cavendish in any case treated her visit to Arundel House rather like any other London
entertainment; a trip to the theatre or bear garden, accompanied by friends, surrounded by ladies
and earls, with boys playing up and down the aisles.20
What  made  Cavendish  discount  any  philosophical  importance  in  the  experimenters'
work? The new forms of  experience available through new instruments were intimately tied to a
radical  shift  in  the  early  modern understanding of  humanity's  place  in  the  world. What  the
microscope's  exact  promise  was,  as  we  saw  in  ther  previous  chapter,  was  contentious.  But
adopting  it  in  the  first  place  relied  on  a  certain  view  of  the  relationship  between  the
understanding and the world, human nature, and the aims of  a perfect natural philosophy. Within
this shifting landscape, disagreement  was  non-trivial.  Peter Harrison's contention that  the  main
preoccupation of  early modern natural philosophy was not straightforwardly methodological but
anthropological  offers  a  way to situate  their  disagreement.21 Cavendish subverted the  serious
labours of  the experimental philosophy by playing both on the experimenters' own assumptions
about what they were doing and the very idea of  what it was to be human. She was not simply a
conservative  reactionary  nor  an early modern technophobe,  but a  representative of  a different
view of  nature and the purpose and possibility of  human knowledge.
The Bear Necessities: the Form of Cavendish's Critique
A  large  part  of  the enthusiasm  of  the  likes  of  Hooke  and  Wilkins  was  for  the
microscope as an imaginative aid; what it implied about the world was often more important than
the magnified objects themselves.22 Cavendish took a similarly imaginative but radically different
20 Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1971, 5:243.
21 Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the Foundations of  Science, 8.
22 I am grateful to Megan Baumhammer for this idea. See her Masters' thesis for more on this topic: Baumhammer,
“Optical Instruments and the Early Modern Imagination.”
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approach to extra-human knowledge through a fictional journey in The Description of  a New World,
Called the Blazing World.  Published in 1666 alongside her  Observations upon Natural Philosophy,  The
Blazing World is a sort of  proto-science fiction travel narrative of  utopian invention.
The Blazing World  is a place that is  home to  Cavendish's  foundational  metaphysics,  a
dense nest of  invented realms, fictional counterparts, and  fantastic hypotheticals.  Towards the
end, the author appears  in the narrative  as a character –  imagined  into the story world by  the
protagonist  (who  it  is difficult  not to  think  is  also Cavendish's avatar),  and the two of  them
imagine an infinity of  imagined worlds of  their own to live in. The book is  easy to read as an
allegory which plainly signifies anything.23 But the disorienting narrative is anchored in evocative
imagery  which  ties  the  Blazing  World  to  our  own,  and  playfully  but  forcefully criticises the
intellectual  climate  of  Cavendish's  England.  Such  an  anchor  is  the natives  of  the  world:
philosopically  inclined animal-human hybrids. The beastial forms of  the winged,  finned, and
furry philosophers arrests the reader's attention far more than the details of  their discussions of
contemporary  natural philosophy. Particularly in the light of  Cavendish's talk of  monstrous or
perfect  nature, they provide an insight  into  Cavendish's particular beef  with the experimental
philosophy.
The story begins when the protagonist, a young Lady from a seaside town, is abducted
by a travelling merchant. He is below her in birth and wealth, but driven by his passion to snatch
her away while she's gathering shells on the beach. Out at sea, a swelling storm forces the ship
off  course, and towards the Arctic. It enters the Blazing World, a different world, connected to
the first  at  their  poles.  If  the  Lady's  world echoed Hobbesian  mechanism – the  merchant's
actions, driven by his passions, were only overpowered by the greater violence of  the storm – in
the Blazing World, qualities and nature overrule physics. The ship glides through precipices of
23 The importance of  rhetoric and imagination in Cavendish's works is well established and well discussed. Since 
Marjorie Nicolson passed over the 'ponderous tome' (Voyages to the Moon. there has been much excellent 
scholarship around the significance of  the work's structure and form. See: Keller, “Producing Petty Gods”; 
Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature; Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of  the Mind; 
Bowerbank, “The Spider’s Delight”; Lilley, The Blazing World and Other Writings.
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ice, and the merchant and crew all freeze to death, but the Lady, protected by “the Light of  her
Beauty” and 'the heat of  her Youth' survives. Her nature interrupts the mechanistic cause and
effect of  the freezing cold.24 The blazing world thus instantiates Cavendish's natural philosophy:
according to her, the ultimate causal and organising principle of  the universe is self-knowledge. 25
In hylozoic fashion, nature, as one unified, infinite whole, is all there is.26 As  The Blazing World
suggests, this matter is not inert and moved only by external forces but rather moves itself. Self-
knowledge tells things how to act, and self-motion is how they act. A ball moves not because it is
directly  propelled  by  the  throwing  hand,  but  because  it  perceives  the  hand,  and  knows the
appropriate motion to give itself.27 Without this internal defining knowledge, the world would be
chaos and “would run into Confusion: for, there could be neither Order nor Method, in Ignorant
motion; neither would there be distinct kinds or sorts of  Creatures.”28 Thus, the form of  an
object  is  both  due  to and imputes  to  it  a  form of  self-knowledge  relevant  to  it  and to  its
surroundings. Knowledge and Kinds are inseparably linked – knowledge creates kind, and kinds
have a particular domain of  knowledge. The same is as true for humans as for anything else, our
knowledge is limited to what is naturally available, as will become clear below. When the Lady's
boat is pulled to shore by a group of  “strange Creatures, in shape like Bears, only they went
upright as men,” we catch a first glimpse of  an explicit, outward manifestation of  these inner
qualities.29
24 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 2.
25 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 280.
26 While her view is entirely monistic, Cavendish describes matter in different ways: 'rational' or 'sensible' if  it is 
animate, and 'inanimate' if  it is not. Animate matter is that which is self-moving and self-knowing, though in fact
rational and sensible matter both move and know, and there is little difference between the two activities (see for 
instance Ibid., 278). The difference seems to lie in rational matter “being purer, and so more agil and free” than 
sensible. This seems intended quite literally – rational matter, existing presumably in the brain, is more separate 
from and less encumbered by inanimate matter than is the sensible matter that makes up the body. Because it 
can move more “agil and free” it can create more easily than can sensible matter (Cavendish, Grounds of  Natural 
Philosophy, 5.). Hence Cavendish's rationalism: understanding implies creating, which implies motion, and it is 
easier to create a situation in your head than it is with your hands. Hence, in part, the narrative form of  The 
Blazing World.
27 See: Michaelian, “Margaret Cavendish’s Epistemology.”
28 Cavendish, Grounds of  Natural Philosophy, 7.
29 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 4. The resonance of  the polar connection between worlds and the furry arctic 
inhabitants with the search for the north-west passage has been discussed by Cottegnies, “Utopia, 
Millenarianism, and the Baconian Programme of  Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing World.”
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All the denizens of  the Blazing World are hybrids of  human and other: sentient and
civil, yet physically suited to their environment. The Lady travels south from the bear-men's cold
home and meets bird-men on islands; satyrs in forests; worm-men, giants and people with green
or azure skin. Like Hooke looking through a microscope, the Lady is awed and bewildered by the
novelty and variety of  the new world. At last she meets the Emperor, who offers to worship her
as a goddess. When she refuses he marries her instead and vanishes from the story.30 As Empress
she gains absolute governance over the whole world,  and with political power comes epistemic
privilege: her position brings her the attention and loyalty of  the animal-men, who all turn out to
be astute students of  their various habitats, and she is able to question them at length.
Each animal-man's profession was “most proper for the nature of  their Species:”
The Bear-men were to be her Experimental Philosophers, the Bird-men her Astronomers, the
Fly- Worm- and Fish-men her Natural Philosophers, the Ape-men her Chymists, the Satyrs her
Galenick  Physicians,  the  Fox-men  her  Politicians,  the  Spider-  and  Lice-men  her
Mathematicians, the Jackdaw- Magpie and Parrot-men her Orators and Logicians, the Gyants
her Architects, &c.31
Some she receives better than others. The insectile natural philosophers are a particular
hit, offering intimate knowledge of  the air, sea, and earth their tiny bodies are built to live in. The
Empress dismisses out of  hand the ape-men's mimicry of  nature with chymistry, and while the
bird-men veer into flighty speculation too often for her liking, their observations are acceptable.32
Only her  generous  arctic  hosts,  the  unfortunate  bear-men experimenters,  she  engages  in  an
extended argument.  They “intertayn” her with  observations  lifted  straight  from  Micrographia –
surprising visions  of  lice as big as elephants,  mites like whales,  eyes  that look like pearls.  The
30 Cavendish's feminism has been a point of  contention philosophy has been discussed by, among others: 
Sarasohn, “A Science Turned Upside Down”; Boyle, “Margaret Cavendish’s Nonfeminist Natural Philosophy”; 
Keller, “Producing Petty Gods”; Dear, “A Philosophical Duchess.”
31 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 15–16.
32 See Newman for the parallel between her criticism of  chymistry and those of  earlier writers: Newman, 
Promethean Ambitions, 286–287.
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bear-men show the Empress that nothing was as it seemed.33 For them, as for Hooke, this was of
course the point of  the instrument. When the Empress baits them by suggesting that “perhaps
their Microscopes did not truly inform them?” they grow coy and “smilingly answer:” perhaps it
was the Empress who did not fully understand microscopes? The instrument does not deceive,
but  “rectifie and inform the Senses.” Echoing Hooke's preface,  they tell  her  “the World  […]
would be blind without them, as it has been in former ages.”34 Cavendish is clearly familiar with
Hooke's rhetoric as well as  his  observations,  but she  remained unmoved. The Empress  tears
apart the bear-men's ideas about charcoal, stinging nettles, fleas and lice.35
Most species-profession fits have a resonance still obvious to us now, and others come
out in their conversations.  As for the bears, mid-sized and mammalian,  they  have no  radically
different  insight into nature  from humans,  nor any particular skill in manipulating instruments.
Cavendish's audience would  have been familiar with the animal from one main form in  Tudor
and  Stuart  England:  objects  of  brutal  entertainment.  They  were  chained  to  stakes  in  bear
gardens,  where they  were made to fight  waves of  trained  dogs.36 The  bear garden, carried by
association into the Blazing World,  colours the Empress' visit  to her experimental philosophers
with a particular view of  the people of  that profession. The laboratory was a place inhabited by
unfortunate creatures,  engaged  with  mortal  seriousness in  a  pursuit  ultimately  ridiculous and
entertaining  for  others. While  they  laboured  gradually  for  the  improvement  of  the  human
condition, outsiders looked on and laughed.
Cavendish's treatment of  Hooke as a bear-man has a particular bite.  He was not naïve
about his  practices,  and the animal caricature  leans on Hooke's own self-conception of  artifice
allowing  him  to  leave  his  human  limits.  The  bear-men are  a  burlesque  subversion  of  this
33 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 29. For the corresponding observations in Hooke's work, see his Micrographia, 
211, 205, 175.
34 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 30. p. 30. See for parallels: Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D1v; Power, Experimental 
Philosophy, sigs. A4v-B1v.
35 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 31–32. See also Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 9. 
For Hooke's observations, see again his Micrographia, 100, 142, 210, 211.
36 Lisa Sarasohn makes this connection: Sarasohn, The Natural Philosophy of  Margaret Cavendish, 165–170. This was 
likely a peculiarly English resonance. In France, 'bear' was the nickname of  skilled printers operating a press, 
whereas in England they were known as 'horses.' See Johns, The Nature of  the Book, 92.
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ambition:  a  caricature of  the willful  and  deliberate  transgression  of  human  nature  that
instruments  appeared  to  allow.  The  furry  forms of  Cavendish's  story  reverse  the  expected
direction of  enquiry: instead of  the bear-men teaching the Empress about nature, we learn from
their interaction an important lesson about the experimenters and the experimental space.
The Royal Society's Early Critics, and Their Responses
Cavendish was of  course not alone in mocking the Royal Society and contrasting their
ignoble work with their rhetoric of  betterment and improvement. While the Fellows stressed that
useful knowledge was the goal of  their approach,  it was not easy to read much of  this in their
early  works.  In  1670,  Henry  Stubbe  summed  up  the  mechanical  philosophy  as  teaching
“Aphorisms of  Cider, planting of  Orchards, making of  Optick Glasses, magnetick and hortulane Curiosities.”
This is not a bad summary of  the first books written by people belonging to  the tradition  in
England: Gilbert's De Magnete, Evelyn's Sylva and the microscopical works of  Hooke and Power.
In contrast, it was “useful and requisite” Humanist learning which Stubbe thought deserved public
encouragement.37 The force of  the criticism came from the idea that the aim of  philosophy was
to understand  ourselves,  our relation  to the natural world, and thus to God. Stubbe  was fairly
acquainted  with  experimental  philosophy,  and  not  always  opposed  to  its  results,  but  Meric
Casaubon pointed at a more essential conflict  between experiment and usefulness.38 The most
useful philosophy, he argued, is that which concentrates on the eternal rather than the temporal,
and he chastised the Royal Society for not focusing on moral philosophy and theology.39
In fact,  a general  fruitlessness or misguidedness is the point of  most jibes at the early
Royal Society, from Thomas Shadwell's Virtuoso to their patron Charles II, and indeed Margaret
37 Stubbe, The “Plus Ultra” Reduced to a “Non Plus,” 13.
38 See Stubbe's mockery of  Glanvill for not understanding Hooke and Boyle's work on pneumatics (Ibid., 165), 
and Hooke's inaccurate microscopical observations compared with Niccolo Zucchio's Optica philosophia (1656) 
(175).
39 See his Casaubon, A Letter of  Meric Casaubon.
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Cavendish.40 Responses  to  this  attack  –  the  most  important  coming  from  Boyle,  Sprat,  and
Glanvill – tended to follow on from the ideas of  their figurehead Francis Bacon.41 Partly through
a particular theological anthropology which I will discuss more fully below, Bacon elided practical
and moral usefulness – what was beneficial in this life also prepares one for the next.42
A small example will illustrate this, and bring us back to microscopes more particularly.
In the late 1650s, when Hooke was in Oxford with Wilkin's Wadham College group, the political
writer James Harrington criticised their work, and Matthew Wren responded. Harrington likewise
chastised the group for being distracted by unimportant things. The “University Wits,” he wrote,
are “good at two Things, at diminishing a Commonwealth and at Multiplying a Louse.” 43 Wren
found this  particular  phrase  “a  little  less  intelligible  then  so  fine  a  piece  ought  to  be,”  and
corrected it: “What he cals Multiplying a Louse ought to have been Magnifying, for the thing is
done  by  a  Microscope  or  Magnifying  Glass.”44 What  seems  merely  pedantic  is  in  fact  quite
revealing about the opposing views on the practice. Wren spent  two pages expanding on and
clarifying Harrington's passing comment,  and  in doing so  betrays a belief  that if  people  were
more aware of  the method behind microscopy, they would accept it. The “multiplied” louse is a
dangerous prospect,  wrestling the attention of  learned men away from more important  civic
philosophy. Wren was keen to impress on his readers that this was a distortion of  the art. His
cousin Christopher carefully measured the magnifying power of  his lenses, and drew detailed
pictures of  things to scale.  This  was no unruly multiplication but a  deliberate  and measured
exercise.  Wilkins'  group's  microscopical  work was safe and methodical.  They  may have been
convinced God's wisdom was no less on display in the parts of  a louse than in an elephant or
camel, but they still knew it was, after all, a louse.  Their drawings  were  not only  delightful  and
40 Harrison, “‘The Fashioned Image of  Poetry or the Regular Instruction of  Philosophy?.’”
41 Boyle, Usefulness of  Natural Philosophy, in Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999; Sprat, The History of  the Royal 
Society; Glanvill, Plus Ultra.
42 Harrison, “‘The Fashioned Image of  Poetry or the Regular Instruction of  Philosophy?.’” See also Vickers, 
“Bacon’s so-Called ‘Utilitarianism’”; Rossi, “Bacon’s Idea of  Science.”
43 Harrington, The Prerogative of  Popular Government, sigs. A2r-v.
44 Wren, Monarchy Asserted, sig. A7v. Interestingly, in recounting the published debate, Wren's obituary silently 
corrects Harrington with Wren's phrasing too: Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:65.
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instructive,  but  politically  important,  having  been “received with applause by Foreign Princes,”
and  even  edifying:  Wren relates  Gassendi's  story  of  Nicolas  Pieresc  learning  to  master  his
passions  after watching a louse  grow distracted and tormented  through a microscope.45 Finally,
having defended microscopy, he collapses the lesson back onto Harrington himself. Harrington is
an angry and tormented author, flailing and bristling about things he does not understand, “and
yet an haire is enough to hold him.”46 With  a diminuitive  metaphor  and  an emphasis on the
mathematical rigour of  the group's method, Wren shows it is Harrington, not microscopists, who
dangerously conflate large and small issues. The story is similar to Hooke's reference of  Lucian I
discussed in the previous chapter. The value of  microscopy is exactly the recognition that it does
not produce human visions.
Casaubon had also read Gassendi's story about Pieresc, and was of  course unimpressed
by it. He had probably “made this pretty story […] to gratifie some friends, who would be glad to
hear what use can be made […] of  a  microscope.”47 Such unmitigated scepticism about the
usefulness of  the instrument is one extreme of  a range of  views. At the other end we find Hooke
or Power arguing that it would provide the foundations of  a reformed natural philosophy. As I
mentioned  above,  Cavendish  was  herself  a  natural  philosopher,  and  even  agreed  with  the
improvement  of  worldly  conditions  through  certain  artifice.  When  she  disagreed  with
microscopical work in particular it was because she and the experimenters differed on their ideas
of  nature and humanity's place within it. To see the specifics of  this I will first turn to the place
of  experimental  philosophy  generally,  and  the  microscope  specifically,  within  more  general
apologetics for the study of  nature. This will let us see precisely on what terms Cavendish and
Hooke diverged. 
45 Wren, Monarchy Asserted, sig. A8r. He references Gassendi’s Vita Piereskii, book 6.
46 Ibid., sig. A8r.
47 Casaubon, A Letter of  Meric Casaubon, 32.
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The Study of Nature: Animals and Instruments
As with Pieresc and the louse, early microscopes  became  appended to more general
apologetic themes in early modern naturalism.48 Henry Power, for instance, lifted whole phrases
of  his Experimental Philosophy almost verbatim from Thomas Browne's Religio Medici. Religio Medici
was explicitly a defense of  physicians against the charge of  atheism –  the older doctor  was  an
avowed advocate of  natural philosophy's reverent aspect. He wrote:
The world is made to be inhabited by beasts, but studied and contemplated by man: 'tis the
debt of  our reason wee owe unto God, and the homage wee pay for not being beasts; without
this the world is still as though it had not been, or as it was before the sixth day when as yet
there was not a Creature that could conceive or say there was a World.49
The  investigation  of  nature  not only leads to a greater  appreciation of  God's  great
design, but is itself  an act of  reverence  and even Creation.  This was an extension  of  an older
tradition  of  the  study  of  nature  as  reading  God's  'second  book.'  As the  thirteenth  century
theologian Thomas of  Chobham wrote:
The Lord created different creatures with different natures not only for the sustenance of  man,
but also for their instruction, so that through the same creature we may contemplate not only
what may be useful to use in the body, but also what may be useful in the soul [. … T]here is no
creature in which we may not contemplate some property belonging to it which may lead us to
imitate God, or some property which may move us to flee from the devil.50
Virtues and vices were on display in  particular  animals  –  nature  could be studied  as a
way to redemption. “Go to the ant, thou sluggard,” Solomon commanded. “Consider her ways,
48 See Harrison for the rising need for apologetics in natural philosophy as the idea that Man was a microcosm of  
the natural world gave way, and study of  nature stopped also being the study of  Man: Harrison, “‘The Fashioned
Image of  Poetry or the Regular Instruction of  Philosophy?.’”
49 Browne, “Religio Medici,” 18.
50 From his Summa de arte praedicandi, quoted in Cohen, Animals as Disguised Symbols in Renaissance Art, 46.
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and be wise.”51 Animal behaviour offered human lessons. The ant was a model of  piety, bees of
industry,  the  emergent  butterfly  was  an  allegory for  Jesus.  This  physico-theology  was  a
widespread defense  of  natural  study  throughout  the  Renaissance,  and  was  inherited  by  the
seventeenth  century  experimental  philosophers  as  a  justification  of  their  active,  investigative
approach to natural knowledge. After Bacon advocated learning about natural processes through
the  operation  of  art  and  machinery,  physico-theology reappeared  under  the  microscope.52
Suddenly, with his microscopes, Hooke could tell us that Aristotle's and Pliny's natural histories
contained only the “obvious things” in the world.53 Power wrote it was only “ruder heads” who
still stood amazed at the “Collosean pieces of  Nature, as Whales, Elephants, and Dromedaries;”
whereas  it was in the  “narrow Engines”  of  insects  where  a more “curious Mathematicks”  was
displayed.54 It was an astonishing discovery to see that such tiny bodies had mouths and stomachs
and generally  so  many  of  the  same parts  and functions  as  larger  ones. 55 Christopher  Wren
concluded that “the Perfection of  Telescopes, and Microscopes [...] seems to be the only Way to
penetrate into the most hidden Parts of  Nature, and to make the most of  the Creation.”56
The English experimenters of  the mid-seventeenth century placed emphasis on two
aspects of  this apology more specifically. One was the utility of  nature not  only  for learning
lessons in piety but for making mortal life easier.57 The other was the growing idea that artifice
replicated  natural  effects,  most  importantly those  which  were innately inaccessible to humans.
Hooke thus opened Micrographia with this instrumentalist echo of  Thomas Browne:
51 Proverbs 6:6. Casaubon was predictably unimpressed by even this venerable instruction, noting it was meant for 
sluggards who themselves are little better than ants, not learned men. Besides, the communal ant is one thing, 
the bloodsucking louse quite another. Casaubon, A Letter of  Meric Casaubon, 33.
52 Wilkins used the discoveries of  the microscope as analogical evidence for the obscurity of  the providential 
lessons we could learn from nature: Wilkins, Discourse Concerning the Beauty of  Providence, 49.
53 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 3.
54 Power, Experimental Philosophy, sigs. B3r-v.
55 For example, see Ibid., 20.
56 Wren, Parentalia, 204.
57 Especially noteable is Power's reference to Charles Butler for the civic lessons that can be learnt from bees, and 
his emphasis that Butler is “an experimental and not theoretical writer on that subject.” Power, Experimental 
Philosophy, 4.
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It is the great prerogative of  Mankind above other Creatures, that we are not only able to
behold the works of  Nature, or barely to sustein our lives by them, but we have also the power of
considering,  comparing,  altering,  assisting, and  improving them to various uses.  And as this is the
peculiar priviledge of  humane Nature in general, so is it capable of  being so far advanced by
the helps of  Art, and Experience, as to make some Men excel others in their Observations, and
Deductions, almost as much as they do Beasts.58
The responsibility that human  reason bestowed on Browne, to admire and admit of
nature's  wonders,  for Hooke  was  a  privilege  to be used for  our  benefit.  Instruments  would
benefit  those  who  used  them  as  much  as  “humane  Nature” benefited  humans  over  other
animals.59 Instruments were not distractions, and they did not produce new and unnatural effects
but natural ones.  Boyle held that the “true Naturalist” was “ennabled by his skill not barely to
understand several Wonders of  Nature,  but also partly to imitate, and partly to multiply and
improve them.”60 Natural philosophy ought not  to be a contemplative art but one that granted
imitative  skill.61 Cesare  Ripa's  Iconologia,  a  compendium of  emblematic  representations  drawn
from various traditions first published in 1593, illustrated idea of  art mimicking nature. Artifice
was illustrated with a man, the richness of  his dress reflecting the nobility of  artifice, laying his
hand on a perpetual motion machine while gesturing to its equivalent in nature – the industrious
bee (Figure 5.1).62
58 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. A1r.
59 Note also Hooke's Baconian shift of  emphasis, away from Browne's “reason” to “humane nature in general” – I
will return to the experimenters' general pessimism about the faculty of  reason below.
60 Usefulness of  Natural Philosophy, in Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 3:211–212. James Harrington defined 
'art' as “the Observation or Imitation of  Nature:” The Prerogative of  Popular Government, sig. A2r. See also Bennett, 
“Robert Hooke as Mechanic and Natural Philosopher,” 37.
61 This idea is found in Browne as well, see Browne, “Religio Medici,” 18.
62 Ripa, Nova Iconologia, 38. In fact, a motivation for the notorious early modern view, particularly attributed to 
Descartes and Hobbes, that animals were mere automata was the success – reported or actual – various people 
had had in mimicking animals with actual autonoma: Regiomontanus' fly and eagle for instance.
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Just as Bacon had elided the relevance of  natural philosophy with that of  moral, some
animal behaviour was important to study not for direct instruction in piety but because it could
be  replicated  through  artifice,  and  could  thus improve mortal  life.  In  1619,  the  clergyman
Thomas Adams wrote suggestively that each animal belonged to a “particular schoole:” a phrase
reminiscent of  Cavendish's animal-men philosophical societies.  Different animals  had different
sensory attributes and held different lessons for philosophers.
Many beasts doe excell Man in many naturall things[. ...] The Bore excels us in hearing, the
spider in touching, the Vulture in smelling, the Lynx in seeing, the Ape in tasting. Some have
observed, that the art of  curing the eyes was first taken from the Swallowes. The Eagles have
taught us architecture: we received the light of  Phlebotomie from the Hippopotamus. The
Egyptian bird Ibis first gave Physicians knowledge, how to use the Glister. The Spider taught us
Figure 5.1: 'Artifice' from Cesare Ripa's Nova Iconologia (1618 edition), p. 38.
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to Weave. Here the Serpent instructs us in Policie, the Dove in simplicitie.63
Animal attributes were commonly appropriated symbolically in a way which – like the
microscope – simultaneously acknowledged the shortcomings of  human senses and suggested a
possibility of  defying them. The lynx, in particular, appeared literature from Pliny to Chaucer as a
figure of  superhuman vision.64 According to George-Louis Buffon in the eighteenth century it
had been the folly of  “most naturalists” before him to bestow the mammal with the eyes of  her
mythic namesake  Lynceus, “of  which the antients said that his sight penetrated most opaque
bodies.”65 Thus when the Accademia dei Lincei (lynx-eyed) chose the animal as their emblem, the
creature  was  a deliberate  metonym  for  the  organisation: “with  lynx-like  eyes,”  their  studies
penetrated  the  mere  appearances  of  things  and gained  knowledge previously  inaccessible to
humans.66
Could artifice genuinely mimic what was being suggested figuratively, and replicate the
vision of  non-human animals?  Hooke certainly thought so.  “[W]ho knows,” he supposed, “but
that the Industry of  man [...]  may find out wayes of  improving this sense  (sight) to as great a
degree of  perfection as it is in any Animal, and perhaps higher[?]”67 The lynx's eyes were being
crafted in the workshop. The title page of  Micrographia even bears a couplet from Horace:
You may not be able, with your eyes, to see as far as Lynceus,
Yet you would not on that account scorn to anoint them, if  sore.68
63 Adams, The Happines of  the Church, 187–188.
64 For more on Lynceus and the lynx, see Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century 
Microscopy”; Taylor, “Chaucer’s Eye of  the Lynx and the Limits of  Vision.”
65 Smellie, Buffon’s Natural History, 5:214.
66 From the Preface to Giambattista Della Porta's Magiae Naturalis (1589) Della Porta was a hero of  the young 
Federico Cesi, the early leader of  the Linceans. Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of  Seventeenth-Century 
Microscopy,” 6–11. For a history of  this academy, see Freedberg, The Eye of  the Lynx.
67 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. C2r.
68 Ibid. title page. Hooke quotes Horace in Latin, the translation is from Lüthy, “Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate 
of  Seventeenth-Century Microscopy.”
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In Hooke's appropriation, the sore eye is just that of  a human, and the salve is the
microscope. In 1657 Christopher Wren joked:
imagine how much the ancient laborious Enquirers would envy us [...] that a Time would come,
when Men should be able to stretch out their Eyes, as Snails do, and extend them to fifty Feet in
length.69
Behind the joke was a serious point – in looking through a fifty foot telescope the eye
was really altered. Descartes had suggested in Dioptrique that looking down a tube of  liquid, sight
would  “take  place  in  the  same  way  as  if  Nature  had  made  the  eye  longer  than  it  is.”70 A
generation  later  Hooke  gave  this  axiom of  geometrical  optics  an explicitly  inhuman  –  even
animalian –  expression.  To return to the lesson of  the previous chapter,  for him  the point of
microscopy  was  to  examine  the  different  ways  the  same  body  appeared  to  differently
proportioned senses.  Bodies  of  different complexity  reacted to different  qualities in nature,  as
thyme seeds  moved in  sunlight  or the beard of  wild oat  unfurled in  humid air.  He  likewise
suggested  that  different  species  of  animal  had  different  “Sensations  of  the  same  Effluvia.”
Because of  this:
if  there were another Species of  Intelligent Creatures in the World, they might have quite
another kind of  Apprehension of  the same thing, and neither perhaps such as they ought to
be, and each of  them adapted to the peculiar Structure of  that Animal Body in which the
Sensation is made.71
That our ideas about objects “ought” to be a certain way echoes in Locke's later thought
that if  we could see the “real Constitution” of  bodies we would have “quite different  Ideas.”72
69 Wren, Parentalia, 250.
70 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 120.
71 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 8.
72 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 2, chapter 13 section 11, p. 139. See Chapter 4 above.
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Neither thinker considered directly seeing fundamental matter a realistic aim.  What  Hooke did
think was that different creatures' senses reacted to differently to the same qualities in nature.
Dogs and other Creatures have so strong a Faculty of  smellling the Scent of  Animals, or the
Flesh of  them, which are very hardly discoverable to a Man. On the other side, in probability
Man is sensible  of  many things, as the Smell of  Flowers, Herbs and Fruits, which possibly a
Dog does very little, if  at all scent.73
The senses of  other animals were sensitive in ways ours were not. The small creatures
he  examined  under  his  microscope  also  saw  differently.  “[T]hose  lesser  Creatures  that  we
discover, tho' possibly they cannot hear the Sounds which we hear, but are able to distinguish
every Turn and Return of  the Vibrations of  [a string] by the quickness and aptness of  their
Sight,”  he  suggested.  “They  may  have  as  great  variety  in  the  differences  of  Sounds  wholly
imperceptible to us, as we have within the reach of  our Ears.”74 Some animals may even have an
as yet undiscovered sense “more wonderful than that of  Sight.”75 Here is a surprising ramification
of  the  visual  epistemology  I  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter.  The  general  benefit  of  the
instrument was to alter ordinary human vision so as to collect the various guises of  a particular
object,  viewed under  as  many different  conditions  as  possible.76 But  what  if  those  different
conditions were the senses of  other species?
Through  the  lens  Hooke could  imaginatively  adopt  an  inhuman  perspective  and
investigate the microworld as an insect. When detailing the anatomy of  flies, he speculated about
what the world would look like through their compound eyes.77 When he turned to the ant, he
did so not to examine its industry or piety but its “protuberant eyes,” its “indented jaws,” and its
73 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 142.
74 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 135.
75 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 120.
76 I will return to this idea of  combining appearances to arrive at the truth about an object in the following chapter.
77 Hooke, Micrographia, 178. See also Power's discussion of  the multiple eyes of  a spider: Power, Experimental 
Philosophy, 12. Leeuwenhoek, too, frequently examined the eyes of  insects through his instruments: see Alpers, 
The Art of  Describing , 84.
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horns  that  “serve for a kind of  smelling.”78 He  sought the ant's impression of  the  world.  His
microscope figured as these animal senses and projected his reason into insect's body to grasp the
reasons  behind  its  “seemingly  rational actions.” If  he could know what it saw he would know
why it reacted as it did.
The apologetic  idea that  we could learn from the bodies and behaviour of  animals
encompassed the instrument itself. The microscope was not simply a sharper eye but combined
with  imagination became a different one altogether,  an  inhuman eye.  Though  Hooke  did not
literally conceptualise his lens use as recreating the eyesight of  a fly,  that flies perceived the same
objects in a different way  to humans lent  rhetorical weight to the idea  that in altering vision,  a
microscope was not deceiving but was –  like all artifice  –  imitating nature. Human perception
would not constrain human knowledge. By adopting his artificial organs, Hooke was becoming a
new species of  knower. This was what Cavendish found “monstrous.”
Inhuman Knowledge
When Cavendish echoed Hooke on the “narrowness and wandring of  our Senses,” she
was agreeing that we are finite creatures inhabiting a small nook of  creation.79 Different parts of
nature  were  disclosed  to  those  creatures  that  lived  there.  But while  seventeenth  century
philosophers  generally  are  infamous for denying beasts  had reason or knowledge, Cavendish
differed. She wrote in an earlier work:
[W]hat Man knows, whether Fish do not Know more of  the nature of  Water, and ebbing and
flowing, and the saltness of  the Sea? or whether Birds do not know more of  the nature and
degrees of  Air, or the cause of  Tempests? or whether Worms do not know more of  the nature
of  Earth, and how Plants are produced? or Bees of  the several sorts of  juices of  Flowers, then
Men? And whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes by their manner of
78 Hooke, Micrographia, 204.
79 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 5.
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Intelligence? For, though they have not the speech of  Man, yet thence doth not follow, that
they have no Intelligence at all.80
The imaginative aspect of  her animal-philosophers was thus not their animal knowledge
itself  but this translation of  their “aphorisms and theorems” into human language: in one of  the
plainest  imaginings of  The Blazing  World,  animals  are  given the  “speech of  Man.”  When the
Empress talks to her insect-men natural philosophers, she queries inhuman nature directly, and is
“very well satisfied” and “wonderfully taken” with what she hears.81 This is the kind of  privilege
Hooke dreamt of  – direct access to the “secret workings of  Nature.”82 But Cavendish disagreed
that  artifice  could extend our  limited  domain. Neither “natural causes nor effects can be over-
powred” by artifice,  she wrote.83 Her hylozoic, self-knowing nature could not be escaped: our
animal bodies restricted the kind of  natural knowledge that we were privy to.
Cavendish  deliberately  subverts  the  microscopist's  work.  Hooke's method  was  a
meticulous,  collaborative  labour  which  artificially  amplified natural  qualities  so  they  were
perceptible to humans. Hers was a fanciful and invented absolute reign over a menagerie whose
snouts, gills, and beaks naturally gave them extra-human knowledge. Anna Battigelli has suggested
that the radical invention of  Cavendish's narrative as a whole is an indirect rebuttal to Hooke's
“sincere hand and faithful eye;” the methodical, automated empiricism of  the Royal Society. If
whole worlds of  difference  could be  created  by the flippant and eccentric mind, how could a
method of  collaboration between different observers produce reliable, unified knowledge?84 The
contrast  displays  the important  epistemic  concern  of  this  chapter.  Hooke's  experimental
ambition was to push himself  beyond the limits of  his  species  for new natural knowledge. For
Cavendish  the  only  way  to  do this  was  the  imagination.  The  nature  of  a  creature  and  the
knowledge it could attain are inalienable, and the experimental ambition was futile.
80 Cavendish, Philosophical Letters, 40–41.
81 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 36, 43.
82 Hooke, Micrographia, A2v.
83 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 6.
84 Battigelli, “Between the Glass and Hand.”
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This is also the rhetorical force of  hybridising experimentalists with bears. Erica Fudge
has interpreted the bear garden as a place of  direct contradictions,  where  both difference and
sameness between humans and bears  is revealed.  On display amongst the blood and flying fur
was a lesson in  the character of  the animal combatants.  As bears, bulls,  dogs and apes were
brutalised  figuratively and literally  – blinded and tortured and whipped, their animal status  was
emphasised in opposition to that of  their human captors. It was a carnal assertion of  the ability
of  human  reason  to  overcome  the  body,  even  bodies  as  physically  powerful  as  bears.  But
significant though the triumph of  will over flesh was, it was spectacle steeped in ambiguity.85 The
dehumanisation of  animals suggests likewise a sense of  the inner brute of  the former, and the
entertainment  relies  on  the  captivity  of  the  the  baying,  bloodthirsty  audience  themselves.86
Simultaneously,  the  animals  were  frequently  watched  with  a  not-wholly-demeaning
anthropomorphism. The report of  a spectator in 1575 describes a discourse of  queries and clever
responses, the animals made to “argu the pointz cum face to face. They had learn'd counsel also
a'both  partis.  Very  feers  both  t'one  and  t'other,  and  eager  in  argument.” 87 Bears  were  the
protagonists in a scripted narrative, and many gained fame and popularity, their names – human
names like George Stone and Harry Hunks – appeared often on flyers, adverts and in reports.88
Particular bears were regular combatants – the  premise of  the  violence was not the Manichean
contrast of  life with death, but the revelation of  the qualities which characterised that life.89 What
these  qualities  were seems to have been quite well  established  in early  modern England.  The
Parable  of  the  Bear-Baiting ,  an  anonymous  pamphlet  from 1691  damned English  bureaucracy
during the Nine Years War, and delivered its message entirely through animal characters. Many of
the associations are still familiar – the jackals are cunning but cowardly, the ape slow and naïve.
85 See Erica Fudge's work on the construction of  the animal as other in early modern England: Fudge, Perceiving 
Animals. Many of  the nuanced interpretations of  the bear garden come from the connection between those 
entertainments and Tudor and Stuart theatre. I draw heavily on Jason Scott-Warren's work for a sense of  the 
development of  the literature in this field: Scott-Warren, “When Theaters Were Bear-Gardens.”
86 Fudge, Perceiving Animals, 19 and chap. 1 generally.
87 From an eyewitness report from 1575 reproduced in Smith and Woodworth, Festivals, Games and Amusements, 108.
88 Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage, 2:457.
89 This is also Scott-Warren's contention: Scott-Warren, “When Theaters Were Bear-Gardens,” 71–74.
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The bear in this case was “a great overgrown French Bear, the greatest in the World” – the
French navy. While he was the enemy, and overcome by English and Dutch mastiffs, he was
nonetheless respected as a threat.90 Several of  Shakespeare's scenes feature baiting, and this idea
of  bears as “overgrown.” Most notably, Malvolio story in Twelfth Night. Sir Toby vows: “we'll have
the bear again, and we will fool him black and blue, shall we not, Sir Andrew?” Malvolio is  a
conceited  and bumbling but not unsympathetic character, as the uneasy feeling with which his
unjust treatment leaves the viewer is testament. “I'll be reveng'd on the pack of  you,” he tells the
snapping taunters. In The Merry Wives of  Windsor, Master Slender's brag to the unimpressed Anne
Page that he had seen Sackerson, the most famous bear of  all, “loose twenty times” captures
something of  the futile bluster of  the bear garden.91 The role of  the bear was a particular one –
slightly  bumbling;  certainly self-important; forceful;  naïve;  and,  crucially,  preoccupied with an
immediate task, unaware of  their place in a larger context.
To assume Cavendish intended her bear-men to evoke very particular associations in her
readers is  speculation.  On the  other  hand,  the  character  of  the  bear  seems  fairly  precisely
established in Cavendish's time, and not to see it through the mere cruelty and mockery of  the
bear garden borders on Whiggish. The safe middle ground is that the experimental philosophers
of  the Blazing World are a synecdoche for nature constrained and made entertaining for a human
audience.
Hooke followed Bacon in talking about constraining “Protean nature” with instruments,
and so forcing it to confess its true essence.92 In the bear garden it was those creatures Cavendish
associates with the Curator who were constrained by artifice – by chains, gates, and turnstiles –
and have their inner essence revealed.  While Cavendish's specific criticisms of  his observations
have their  point,  the very forms of  the animalian philosophers make a more general  one:  a
burlesque  transformation  of  the  experimental  ambition. Jacques  Rancière  has  written  that
90 The Parable of  the Bear-Baiting.
91 See Scott-Warren, “When Theaters Were Bear-Gardens,” 65 ff.
92 Hooke, Micrographia, 8; “Preparative Towards a Natural and Experimental History,” in Bacon, The Works of  
Francis Bacon, 1858, 8:363.
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burlesque in cinema has been “the instrument that derailed every fable.”93 Cavendish uses it to
the same effect, moving pictures notwithstanding. Fable here is meant in the Aristotelian sense:
“the arrangement of  necessary and verisimilar actions that lead the characters from fortune to
misfortune, or vice versa.”94 We are surprised by the very form of  the Blazing World's characters,
and any assumptions about how the narrative should progress are disrupted. The chain of  action
(artifice) and effect (knowledge) veers away from the experimenters' aims.
Hooke would have thought it ridiculous to place a microscope in the hand of  a bear-
man:  a  creature  who  is  already a  hybrid  of  human  reason  and  animal  sense.  Quite  so,  but
Cavendish's imagery  has  subverted this logic and introduced a new one;  one  in line with her
hylozoic metaphysics. By association with the bear garden,  Hooke's activities are situated in a
larger context, his skilled mimickry of  nature transformed into a Promethean task both endless
and fruitless.  Far from trapping nature in his instruments, Hooke himself  is trapped by forces
beyond  his  control  – human nature. The bear-men's  microscopical  observations  are doomed
from the start to fail to impress the Empress, seeing as she does this broader view.
His bear form was not a mockery of  Hooke's person, but a caution against aggrandising
his actions beyond their actual standing. Objects of  miserable fun, the bears teach us about the
nature of  the experimental  space. The early modern  bear  garden limited  the brutish power of
animals until it became entertaining. Cavendish's experimenters are likewise potentially damaging,
but acceptable within confines. The Empress is concerned by their arguing, and orders them to
break their instruments  to end dispute.  The  bear-men,  horrified,  kneel down “in the humblest
manner” and  admit  their real objective: they  “take more delight in Artificial delusions, then in
Natural truths,” and use lenses to amplify disagreement.95 Far from harmonious conclusions on
useful  matters of  fact,  they seek the joy of  argument and quarrel within their little community.
The Empress relents: as long as they would agree to keep their disputes inside their school and
93 Rancière, Film Fables, 12.
94 Ibid., 1.
95 Cavendish, “The Blazing World,” 28.
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not disturb polite society, they are entertaining enough. Only when they overstep their constraints
– by talking about truth – do they become worthy of  reproach. Bumbling, humble, “full of  joy,”
the bear-men thank her. The price is to confess their disinterest in providing knowledge useful in
improving the human condition. If  what they saw on stinging nettles were indeed poison sacks, it
was the physicians' worry why this should not make them dangerous to eat . The goal of  looking
at a louse was not preventing its bite: that worry was “below that noble study of  Microscopical
observations.”96 The Royal Society had become the thing they professed to be united against: an
exclusive membership of  disputation and debate, unconcerned with either the truth of  their ideas
or their application to the world outside the laboratory.
Philosophy for Humans
At best experimenters were child-like entertainers: “Boys that play with watry Bubbles,”
their instruments “pretty toys to employ idle time.”97 What were they at worst, when they refused
to accept their proper place? What kind of  danger do unchained bears imply?98 It is important to
recall that in the first encounter the Empress has with bear-men, they carry her across the ice,
shelter her in  their  dwellings, and feed her. She leaves because her constitution is not suited to
their home. They are noble and gentle, it is their instruments which distract them and make them
act out of  character.
Cavendish differed from many critics of  the Royal Society in that she was amenable to a
large part of  their ambition. Her bear-men differ from Shadwell's characterisation of  Hooke as a
frivolous virtuoso who, though generally lost in his own world, angered London's ribbon-makers
with his machine inventions.99 Nick Wilding has  briefly traced this sort of  disgruntlement with
96 Ibid., 31–32.
97 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 11, 102–103.
98 Lisa Sarasohn's evocative phrase for Cavendish's view of  the productions of  art is “unnatural nature.” Sarasohn, 
The Natural Philosophy of  Margaret Cavendish, 163.
99 See Shadwell, The Virtuoso. Hooke was sure the character of  Sir Nicholas Gimcrack was based on him. “Damned
Doggs,” he recorded in his diary. “Vindica me Deus. People almost pointed.” Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 
1672-1680, 1935, 1:235.
134
technologically-minded philosophy to a culmination in Marx.100 Cavendish on the other hand was
supportive of  inventions to ease labour and improve life. The problem with experimentalism was
it did not do this.
[B]efore the Vulgar sort  would learn to understand [experimental  philosophers],  the World
would want Bread to eat,  and Houses to dwell in, as also Clothes to keep them from the
inconveniences of  the inconstant weather. But truly, although Spinsters were most experienced
in their Art, yet they will  never be able to spin Silk, Thred, or Wool, &c. from loose Atoms;
neither will Weavers weave a Web of  Light from the Sun's Rays; nor an Architect build an
House of  the  Bubbles  of  Water and Air,  (unless  they  be Poetical  Spinsters,  Weavers,  and
Architects.)101
Aside from its intrinsic interest and invention, Cavendish's hybridisation is illustrative
for the way it inverted Hooke's own story about what he was doing. The 'fable' reversal I referred
to  above  can  be thought  of  as  a  difference  in  their  anthropological  views,  a  dislocation  of
humans from one natural and historical narrative and into another. What is at stake for Hooke is
not only the reliability or universalisability  of  particular  experiences,  which the experimenters
strove to construct through  the plain reporting of  experiment and the disinterested assent of
gentlemen witnesses.102 There was also a broader concern about the  aim of  natural philosophy.
To  pinpoint  the  disagreement  between  Cavendish  and  Hooke,  Peter  Harrison's  notion  of
theological anthropology is useful. The approriate methods and aims of  philosophy depend on
an assumed, constructed, and learned relationship between humans and nature.
At the centre of  this is the narrative of  Genesis: the creation of  man, Adam's naming
of  the animals, the fall of  man, and the flood.103 Views of  the Fall varied widely over centuries
100 Wilding, “Graphic Technologies,” 133.
101 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 11.
102 See Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump; Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance”; Dear, “Totius in Verba.”
103 Charles Webster is particularly important for demonstrating the importance of  the Fall of  Man to early modern 
natural philosophy: Webster, The Great Instauration, especially chap. 5. Joanna Picciotto and Peter Harrison have 
also written extensively and interestingly on the subject; see Picciotto, Labors of  Innocence; Harrison, The Fall of  
Man and the Foundations of  Science. For some figures with more divergent views, see also Poole, “The Genesis 
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and cultures. In the early modern period it was a widely accepted explanation for the possibility
of  error in a providential Creation.104 A general idea with which to begin is that of  the Garden of
Eden as  both a natural and  an  “epistemological paradise,” where  the ideal philosopher,  Adam,
had lived with dominion over nature and knowledge of  the essences of  everything in Creation.105
With the Fall came ignorance. As Abraham Cowley wrote in his ode prefacing Sprat's History of
the Royal Society, early modern philosophy was a relic of  Adamic knowledge:
the great and only Heir
Of  all that Human Knowledge which has bin
Unforfeited by Mans rebellious Sin.106
The  Fall  had  made  humans  more  like  beasts:  ignorant,  overcome  by  passions,
floundering in an unknown and hostile world.  The particular view of  the Fall displayed by the
experimenters  in  their  first  official  apologetic  work  was  particularly  suggestive  of
experimentalism, and largely inherited from Bacon.107 The Royal Society's figurehead had written:
[B]y  his  fall  man lost  both  his  state  of  innocence  and his  command over  created things.
However, both of  these losses can to some extent be made good even in this life, the former
by religion and faith, the latter by the arts and sciences. For the curse did not quite put creation
into a state of  unremitting rebellion, but by virtue of  that injunction 'In the sweat of  thy face
shalt thou eat thy bread,' it is now by various labours (not for sure by disputations and the idle
ceremonies of  magic) at length and to some degree mitigated to allow man his bread or, in
other words, for the use of  human life.108
Narrative in the Circle of  Robert Hooke and Francis Lodwick”; Schaffer, “Halley’s Atheism.”
104 See especially chapters 1 – 3 of  Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the Foundations of  Science.
105 Picciotto, Labors of  Innocence, 34, and chapter 1 more generally.
106 Abraham Cowley, 'To the Royal Society', in Sprat, The History of  the Royal Society, sig. B1r.
107 See Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the Foundations of  Science, for more on the distinction between, roughly, 
optimistic Catholic and pessimistic Calvinist views on the Fall and their consequences for the restitution of  
knowledge. Descartes is the usual point of  comparison with the the English empiricists. The Catholics had a 
more optimistic view of  the Fall, whereby reason was little altered, and could still innately lead an inquirer to the 
truth.
108 Bacon, Novum Organum, book 2, aphorism 52. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:447.
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Bacon's Great Instauration slotted into a specific Puritan eschatology in which the end
of  days would be preceded by invested work and activity.109 This was a development tied to a time
and a place: millenarianism was on the rise in England. In the 1650s, Bishop James Ussher dated
the creation of  the world to 4004BC, and the widespread death, crisis, and misery of  the Thirty
Years  War  and  English  Civil  wars  combined  with  the  tradition  that  the  world  had  a  life-
expectancy  of  six  thousand  years  to  lend  an  urgency  to proceedings. Bacon  quoted  and
interpreted  the  apocalyptic prophecy  from the Book of  Daniel: “'Many shall pass to and fro, and
science  shall  be increased;' as if  the opening of  the world by navigation and commerce and the
further discovery of  knowledge should meet in one time or age.”110 That age was his age, and the
increase of  science was a prerequisite for the second coming and salvation.
Restoration  of  the human condition  was  thus  to come through the improvement of
philosophy: it was our capacity for knowledge that was our species' the defining feature – not the
faculty of  reason itself. Bacon's most famous metaphor, that of  the mind as a mirror, “capable of
the image of  the universal world, joying to receive the signature thereof  as the eye is of  light,”
hints at the appropriate method of  post-lapsarian philosophy.111 With the inner light dimmed by
the Fall,  the mind was to receive the  image of  Creation  by observation, not illuminate  it with
reason. Only, now we needed some assistance. Humans were “deficient, amputated creatures in
need of  prosthetic  support,” as  Joanna Picciotto  has  eloquently  put  it.112 The experimenters
sought to reconstruct the ideal human via instruments and experiments.  The kind of  inhuman
experience found in Micrographia would make humans more human.
109 Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the Foundations of  Science, chap. 5.
110 Bacon, Novum Organum, book 1, aphorism 93. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:32.
111 Valerius Terminus of  the Interpretation of  Nature, in Bacon, The Works of  Francis Bacon, 1858, 6:32.
112 Picciotto, Labors of  Innocence, 11. For a related point see Erica Fudge's discussion of  a 'paradox in Bacon's 
methodology': in the maturation of  the human from child-like ignorance to adult understanding, humanity is 
both defined by its formative, childlike state, and inadequately distinguished from animals by it. Fudge, “Calling 
Creatures by Their True Names.”
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At least, this is the view, largely inherited from Bacon, found in Sprat. In the middle of
the century, details differed between Royal Society members. For instance, had Adam really had
such  encyclopaedic knowledge?  Joseph Glanvill felt sure  he had, and had obtained it through
observation. “Adam needed no Spectacles;” he could see by looking whether or not the magnet
attracted by “Atomical  effluviums” and,  somewhat queasily, feel the earth's motion as we do its
stillness.113 Henry Power, on the other hand, was certain that “the Constitution of  Adam's Organs
was not divers from ours, nor different from those of  his Fallen Self.” 114 Those things he could
not see he might guess at by analogy, but “doubtless the Minute Atoms and Particles of  matter,
were as unknown to him, as they are yet unseen by us.” We had already surpassed his theoretical
knowledge, and optical instruments promised to move us “beyond the reach of  [Adam's] natural
Opticks,” to confirm the existence of  things unknown to the first human.115
Boyle was likewise unsure that Adam's knowledge was so considerable. He studied the
animal names mentioned in the Hebrew bible and found no great insight into nature.116 Besides,
even if  Adam had known about everything about his time, there was more to the world now than
nature: art had added so much to the world that he would be lost in the early modern age.  “If
Adam were now alive,” Boyle wrote:
and should Survey that great Variety of  Man's Productions, that is to be found in the shops of
Artificers, the Laboratories of  Chymists, and other well-furnished Magazines of  Art, he would
admire to see what a new world, as it were, or set of  Things has been added to the Primitive
Creatures by the Industry of  His Posterity.117
113 Glanvill, Plus Ultra, 5–6. See also his disclaimer in his preface: if  his eyes were restricted by physical optics, at 
least his rational faculty behind them was so powerful he could make do with less ocular evidence than we can. 
For more on early church opinions about Adam's physical constitution, see Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the 
Foundations of  Science, chap. 1.
114 Power, Experimental Philosophy, sig. A4r.
115 Ibid., sig. A4r.
116 Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the Foundations of  Science, 218.
117 Usefulness of  Natural Philosophy. In Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 3:212.
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Philosophy was not about recreating Adam. In fact, Boyle reversed the order of  Bacon's
method. Where the Lord Chancellor thought we must advance the sciences before the End of
Days, Boyle thought the study of  theology would bring salvation, and only afterwards would we
learn the secrets of  Creation.
Hooke's view is different again. In the preface to Micrographia he suggested:
as at first, mankind fell by tasting of  the forbidden Tree of  Knowledge, so we, their Posterity,
may be in part restor'd by the same way, not only by beholding and contemplating, but by tasting too
those fruits of  Natural knowledge, that were never yet forbidden.118
This is not only an explicit reference to the the Fall, but a call for a sense-based study of
nature which would 'restore' mankind to an implied former perfection.119 But what Hooke's view
of  the Fall was in particular, and therefore what being “restor'd” to a pre-lapsed state would
entail, is unclear.  He had a long running interest in chronologies  other than that given in the
Hebrew tradition and interpreted by Ussher. He  considered  Chinese writing to be older than
Hebrew, denying biblical universalism and the applicability of  its chronology to all humanity, and
thought that natural evidence told a different story again.120 He lectured about the extinction of
species  and  a  shifting,  unstable  nature  in  which  earthquakes  turned seas  to  mountains;  and
interpreted biblical events like the flood, Sodom and Gomorrah, and the longevity of  biblical
patriarchs naturalistically.121 Unlike Glanvill and Power,  Hooke did not compare the microscope
to Adam's eyesight, but rather to the “vast  Plains, high Towers, and clear Air” of  the Babylonians
and Egyptians: these never gave them “so great advantages over us, as we have over them by our
Glasses.122 Instruments  were compared to  instruments and  other conditions of  observation.  In
fact, in Micrographia he wondered if  Adam named the animals after similar close scrutiny, with the
118 Hooke, Micrographia, sigs. B2v-r.
119 Not necessarily, it should be noted, of  knowledge.
120 Poole, “The Genesis Narrative in the Circle of  Robert Hooke and Francis Lodwick.”
121 Drake, Restless Genius; “A Discourse on Earthquakes,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 279–450.
122 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D1v.
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Boylean caveat: “if  at least his names had any significancy in them of  the creature's nature on
which he impos'd it; as many (upon what grounds I know not) have suppos'd.”123
Hooke considered the “great prerogative of  Mankind above other Creatures” not to be
contemplative knowledge but “that we are not only able to behold the works of  Nature, or barely
to sustein our lives by them, but we have also the power of  considering ,  comparing,  altering ,  assisting ,
and improving them to various uses.”124 Hooke's optimism for philosophy was for knowledge that
would assist in practical and temporal things, “inabling a Man to understand how [...] he may be
able to produce and bring to pass such Effects, as may very much conduce to his well being in
this World.”125 If  there was any question of  restoring humanity to a pre-lapsarian state, it was
according to the letter of  the quotation from Bacon above: that nature might be tamed again, and
we might not toil as much for our food.126 Adam may not have been the perfect philosopher but
in a sense the perfect artisan.  Though, as  I will return to in  Chapter  7,  for Hooke the two are
parhaps not so different.
In any case, we have gone past the point at which Cavendish disagreed. She found this
restorative rhetoric paradoxical.  She was concerned that philosophy ought to reflect humanity's
relationship with nature, not in a past and inaccessible state but in its current. For her, error was
not the fault of  the human limits caused by the Fall but of  the human ambition that had itself
caused the Fall:
[Man] would fain be supreme, and above all other Creatures, as more towards a Divine Nature:
he would be a God, […] at least God-like, as is evident by his Fall, which came meerly from an
ambitious Mind of  being like God.127
123 Ibid., 154. The brackets are Hooke's but I have added the emphasis).
124 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. A1r.
125 Hooke, Posthumous Works, 3.
126 See Genesis 3:17-19
127 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 280.
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The experimenters' actions were continuing not Adam's innocent labour in the Garden,
but his arrogant desire  to have more than  that which was his.  Extending our limited faculties
beyond their natural limits had nothing to do with natural philosophy, and everything to do with
vain ambition. Addressing Boyle directly, she wrote:
'Tis true, if  Adam were alive now, he might see more variety, but not more Truth; for there are
no more kinds and sorts of  natural Creatures, then there were at his time, though never more
metamorphosed, or rather I may say disfigured, unnaturally and hermaphroditical issues then
there are now.128
If  there was a growing tradition eliding art and nature, there was a continuing one which
held the one was  largely  irrelevant to the other.  William Newman has written of  Cavendish's
opposition to artifice as a caricature of  earlier anti-alchemical arguments.129 But it is also possible
to read her in a more contemporary – even forward looking – light,  concerned with themes
common in Augustan literature like human historicity and and self-conscious authorship.130 The
place of  humans in nature was not an issue which died with the foundation of  the Royal Society.
Such an authorial stance reacted against the desire for objectivity, and emphasised an awareness
of  one's limits as a producer of  works and knowledge. As Alexander Pope wrote in 1734:
Why has not Man a microscopic eye?
For this plain reason, Man is not a Fly.131
As we have seen, Cavendish's idea of  nature restricted beings to their natural place, their
knowledge and right behaviour limited to a particular domain.
128 Ibid., 271.
129 Newman, Promethean Ambitions, 284–288.
130 See for instance Zwicker, Cambridge Companion to English Literature 1650-1740, especially John Mullan’s 
contribution, “Swift, Defoe, and Narrative Forms.”
131 From his Essay on Man, Epistle 1, VI, line 21.
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Tis proper for a lively Horse to neigh,
And for a slow, dull foolish Asse to bray.
For Dogs to bark, Bulls roare, Wolves houle, Pigs squeak,
For Men to frowne, to weep, to laugh, to speake.132
These lines, from her 1653 verse 'A Morall Discourse betwixt Man, and Beast', have the
air of  imperative about them, but the 'proper' of  the first line has a tone as much metaphysical as
fastidious. The horse neighs because it is lively, and the poor ass, crippled with adjectives, has no
choice but to bray.  Their  right actions are expressions of  their natures.  The Great Chain of
Being, clearly visible in Pope's Essay on Man,  is not out of  place in Cavendish either. We saw in
the previous chapter how the continuities between links of  the chain licenced Hooke to reason
analogously across  different  scales  and domains.  In  Cavendish  it  was  a  restrictive  force.  To
acquire knowledge was to acknowledge the nature of  humans, not attempt to defy it.
It is worth noting the similarity of  her thought with that of  John Locke, Hooke's friend
and  Fellow  of  the  Royal  Society.  Locke  did  not  say  that  a  microscope  produced  error,  as
Cavendish  did. In fact he  wrote that a man with “Microscopical Eyes” may “come nearer the
Discovery of  the Texture and Motion of  the minute Parts of  corporeal things; and in many of
them, probably get  Ideas of  their internal Constitutions.” But both questioned the instrument's
relevance. What use is this information,  when such a person would live in “a quite different
World from other  People[?]”133 Inhuman senses only lead to inhuman  thought,  whereas true
knowledge,  the aim of  philosophy, ought to be calibrated to our position in nature.  Cavendish
asked:
[I]f  a Painter should draw a Lowse as big as a Crab, and of  that shape as the Microscope
presents, can any body imagine that a Beggar would believe it to be true? but if  he did, what
advantage would it be to the Beggar? for it doth neither instruct him how to avoid breeding
132 'A Morall Discourse betwixt Man, and Beast' in Cavendish, Poems and Fancies, 102.
133 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 2, chapter 13 section 12, p. 140.
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them, or how to catch them, or to hinder them from biting.134
The  painter  is  not  wrong  to  do  this,  but  what  of  the  knowledge  in  the  image?
Cavendish's emphasis on utility is notable, particularly as it appears the reverse of  Bacon. For him
it was the thing as it was in itself  which was both true and useful; for Cavendish usefulness and
truth come from a thing as it is known to a human.135 An image of  a louse is not to be judged by
other microscopists, naturalists, or learned philosophers, but by beggars. Beggars were the real
lice experts, the people who as people were the most intimately familiar with the creatures, through
unaided  human experience.  Which  was  certainly  imperfect,  and  may  not  have  revealled  the
hidden workings of  nature, but was good enough to know that a louse is not the size of  a crab.
Other Worlds
Cavendish's criticisms of  Hooke emphasise how contingent, localised, and exclusive the
'community'  of  experimental  philosophers  was.  She  advocated  the  study  of  nature,  and
knowledge that was useful for our temporal lives. What she denied was that the experimenters'
techniques were teaching us anything that was useful. Surprisingly, her criticisms reveal that it is
Hooke who was speculating imaginatively about distant, unattainable dreamlands. “The truth is,
My  Lord,” Cavendish  wrote  to  her  husband, “That  most  Men  in  these  latter  times,  busie
themselves more with other Worlds,  than with this  they live in.”136 This  may seem a strange
criticism  from  the  author  of  such  extravagance  as  The  Blazing  World. But  exactly  by
acknowledging her work as deliberately fanciful she was able to ridicule the ambitions of  others –
Hooke's  delving into the microworld was more problematic by far than the Empress' fanciful
travel. Her playful narrative shows that just as she imagines a world where she can overhear the
134 Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental Philosophy,” 11.
135 For Bacon, see Rossi, “Bacon’s Idea of  Science.” For more on Cavendish's utilitarianism, see Smith, “Margaret 
Cavendish and the Microscope as Play.”
136 From the dedication 'To His Grace the Duke of  Newcastle', Cavendish, “Observations upon Experimental 
Philosophy”, sig. A3r.
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animals, Hooke likewise only imagined a world of  philosophical knowledge visible through a lens.
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Chapter 6: Eyesight and Ideas
Building an Eye
The past four chapters have focused on Hooke's microscope, both materially in terms
of  its form, and epistemically in terms of  the knowledge that he sought through its lenses. In this
chapter and the next I will take a broader view, and situate the  epistemology embodied by his
instrument in  a wider context.  We have seen something of  the craft and ingenuity it took to
operate the instrument, the knowledge it brought him of  the behaviour of  light, the place it held
in his methodology, and the broad hidden assumptions that underwrote this approach. In this
chapter  I  will  discuss the  connection  between  eyesight  and  ideas.  His observations  and  his
instrument use are only the external part of  a natural philosophical endeavour which also relied
on the operation of  the eye, the memory, and reason. Hooke was not naïve about these things.
Rather than moving away from materials, I will continue to approach Hooke through his
instruments, as he did his work. The focal point for this chapter are two remarkable objects of
public philosophy which Hooke used to demonstrate the operation of  vision to an audience: two
artificial eyes he constructed in his workshop and displayed at a lecture in Gresham College. The
lecture was part of  a series Hooke delivered in the late 1670s and early 80s about “the first and
most obvious, though yet the most abstruse” of  all subjects: light.1 He was speaking as Geometry
Professor of  the College, but likely intended some or all of  the lectures to be read to the Royal
Society too: several times the records mention a discourse on a similar topic at or around the
same time.2 Occasionally, and rarely for the Royal Society records, a reaction is noted. Hooke was
1 The series has been collected together and published as the “Lectures of  Light” by Richard Waller: Hooke, 
Posthumous Works, 71–148.
2 E.g. Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 4:84, 90. See also Taylor-Pearce, “Time, Soul, Memory.”
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requested to repeat one of  the last lectures, on the topic of  memory, in front of  a larger audience
the following week. Word had spread about what Evelyn called Hooke's “ingenious Hypothesis
of  Memorie.”3 This particular lecture has received some attention from historians, and the ideas
on  memory  and  cognition  in  it  will  be  important  to  me  later  in  this  chapter.  Hooke's
demonstration of  eyesight is harder to pin down. The only possible mention of  it in his diary is
typically  laconic:  “Sund  5  [June  1681].  Still  better.  very  Diuretick.  Lecture.  Haak.” 4 Did  his
audience nod in satisfaction at his explanation of  light's nature, and flock around the devices he
brought in to represent the human eye? Did he in fact bring the devices, or simply describe them?
Did anyone even attend the lecture, or did he arrive to an empty room?5
Still, we have the texts of  the lectures. After explaining some basic eye anatomy, Hooke
described “a large artificial Eye made with Glass, Water, and Jelly.” With the glass 'cornea' pointed
toward a bright object, a picture of  the outside world would appear against the 'retina', and vision
could be seen at work.
In this Picture are remarkable not only all the Lines and Proportions, but the Lights, Shadows,
Colours, Motions of  the Objects themselves. So that from a clear Understanding of  this, the
Reason, Cause, and Manner of  Vision will be clearly understood.6
It may have been useful in a smaller setting,  but Hooke had mixed feelings about this
curious object as a public demonstration. It required a good understanding of  theoretical optics
to make, and was tricky to manipulate. He mentioned it more so “that such as have a Mind to be
curious in it, may, if  they please, prepare the like.”7 Homework for dilligent listeners assigned, he
moved on to a further demonstration. This was a “darkened Room, or Perspective Box, in which
3 20 June 1682: Evelyn, The Diary of  John Evelyn, 4:284.
4 Henderson, “Unpublished Material from the Memorandum Book of  Robert Hooke,” 149.
5 Hooke did often note in his diary when he delivered a lecture, and noted who was in the audience, if  anyone. 
E.g. Thursday 17 June 1680: “Attended morning Lecture, none came, not one.” Hooke, The Diary of  Robert 
Hooke, 1672-1680, 1935, 2:446.
6 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 127.
7 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
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all the Appearances that are made in the Eye are in some manner represented.”8 The perspective
box was a tube, four or five feet long, with a concave screen at one end and the other tapering
towards a convex lens (Figure 6.1).
Through the lens, A, light would refract and cast an image on the screen at BC. The
tube was mounted to swivel around G for easy orientation towards a light source, and the image
could  be  focused  by  sliding  the  section  BDCE in  and  out  of  the  main  tube.  Hooke  even
recommended cutting various holes of  various sizes and shapes out of  pasteboard to hold over
the lens, to replicate a pupil's dilation. The glaring disanalogy with a natural eye is of  course H – a
hole in the side, swathed in leather or wool. From here, face pressed against the hole, a viewer
could watch the eye in action,  and see “what Light is  in the Eye,  and what Effects it  there
produces.”9
Neither of  these  objects  were novel with Hooke.  Following Kepler's optical work,  by
the middle of  the seventeenth century the eye was often connected to the camera obscura, and even
8 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
9 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 128.
Figure 6.1: Hooke's 'perspective box'. From 'Lectures of  Light,' Posthumous Works,
plate 1, fig. 7, p. 127.
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such  custom-built  apparatus  were  not  uncommon.10 Christoph  Scheiner  similarly described  a
glass eye, and Jacques Rohault made one in the form of  the one in Figure 6.1  from paper and
vellum.
Understanding vision had importance beyond intrinsic interest. If  knowledge was to be
gained from the senses, then  its reliability is contingent on an understanding of  this process.
Rohault  wrote  in  1671  that  it  was  worth  studying  the  eye  because  observational  natural
philosophy “depends in some measure, upon Observations made by the Help thereof, so that it is
necessary to know all the Circumstances of  this Sort of  Sensation, which is the most wonderful
of  any that we are possessed of.”11 The preceding chapters have shown that an important aspect
of  Hooke's information gathering was to all the while remain aware of  his own activity in doing
so – what the effect of  the external world was on the eye of  an observer.
When  he  turned explicitly  to  this  topic,  the  eyes  Hooke  showed his  audience  self-
consciously placed him in a particular visual paradigm which gives us more epistemic background
to  his  instrument  use  and his  aims for  a  completed  natural  philosophy.  Svetlana  Alpers  has
discussed the kind of  vision implied by equating a  camera obscura with an eye,  and associated it
with the emergent naturalism of  northern European art.12 Hooke features in the story as a figure
central to this “observational craft,” his Micrographia typifying the idea of  knowledge captured in
carefully crafted but lifelike or 'natural' pictures –  intended to reproduce the  experience of  the
naked eye.13 More recently, Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris' idea of  the “disappearing observer”
has emphasised the essentially mediated nature of  vision that such naturalistic images imply.14 If  a
canvas can reproduce the perspective of  an observer, then it does so because the naked eye has
10 Della Porta, Kepler, Scheiner, Galileo, Descartes, Rohault, Huygens, Zahn, and Molyneux all used them, for 
instance. See Lefèvre, Inside the Camera Obscura; Alpers, The Art of  Describing; Wettlaufer, In the Mind’s Eye.
11 Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 1:233. Rohault features regularly in this chapter as a successor to 
Descartes, as opposed to Malebranche or Arnauld, who is a foil for Hooke – less an epistemologist and more of
a causal physicist.
12 Alpers, The Art of  Describing. See also Crary, Techniques of  the Observer, for more on the construction of  the 
observer with various optical technologies.for more on the construction of  the observer and comparison with 
various optical technologies.
13 Alpers, The Art of  Describing , 72.
14 Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, chap. 1.
148
likewise become a screen onto with the world is painted. Rather than an immediate connection
with the world, viewing happens from behind a barrier, and we must interpret visual information
rather than directly absorbing it.
This general idea is of  central importance to this chapter, with one major caveat. Hooke
did not think of  knowledge itself  as pictorial. What exactly he did think knowledge was is a tricky
question which is perhaps the largest issue behind these next two chapters. But still, the tropes of
a naturalistic  picture  correspond  in an important way  to  the information  Hooke thought we
gained directly from the senses,  even if  they do not describe  the resulting conception of  the
world.  In fact,  the  objects  that  Hooke used to  teach his  audience about  eyesight  themselves
reflect  this  –  they  are  three-dimensional,  interactive  objects  which  make pictures,  but  they
themselves are not pictures.15
To pick apart the implication of  Hooke's artificial eyes it is important to see something
of  the  background of  the  devices  themselves.  There  are  two main threads  to this  historical
context. The first is the use of  similar devices as metaphors for the eye before Hooke, and what
they tell us about optics and instruments. And second is the history of  the particular instruments
that Hooke used, and their  associations with different  visual  contexts.  These two threads of
making and learning merge to inform the more internal part of  the experimental philosophical
enterprise which lay behind the retinal screen.16
The Tradition of the Camera Obscura
When he explained an eye “by the Similitude of  it to a dark Room,” Hooke was  self-
consciously following  a  growing  tradition  in  optical  writing.17 He  names  Descartes,  Kepler,
15 For more on Hooke's model demonstrations: Hunter, “Experiment, Theory, Representation.”
16 Though the main source I draw on here is a series of  lectures Hooke gave 15 years after he wrote Micrographia, I 
still take the lessons we can learn from them about Hooke's epistemology to relate to his earlier career. As we 
will see below, he draws on the works of  other writers from a generation before him, and likely his daily work 
and more theoretical speculations informed one another.
17 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 98.
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Scheiner,  Della  Porta  and Galileo.  Though  Giambattista  Della  Porta  is  the  earliest  of  these
writers, it was Kepler who was first considered that it was the impact of  light on the surface of
the retina at the back of  the eye that is the cause of  vision, as implied by the  analogy with a
camera.18 Della Porta held the more traditional view that the 'crystalline humour' – the lens of  the
eye – was the seat of  vision, and received not light but 'species' – the formal likenesses of  objects
which emanated outwards in all directions from them.19 From the crystalline humour the forms
would be directly present to the soul.
For Della Porta it was the inwardness of  a camera obscura which suggested the analogy with
an eye. What he meant was the death of  the extramission theory of  vision, whereby visual rays
left the eye and species  travelled back  to the observer along them. Instead, he thought,  “the
Image is let in by the pupil, as by the hole of  a window.”20 It was a remarkable comparison for the
Neapolitan  to  have  made.  Gal  and  Chen-Morris  point  out  that  Della  Porta was  original  in
thinking of  light as the vehicle by which the forms of  objects arrive in the eye, but light was not
the “causal agency” of  vision itself.21 In his analogy,  light carries forms to the eye's  crystalline
humour, which “stands in stead of  a Crystal Table” in a dark room.22 The objects of  our vision
were three-dimensional forms of  the objects in the world outside.
When Kepler  adopted  from him this general  model,  he  modified  it  in  light  of  the
anatomical work of  Felix Platter, who had argued the the retina was the sensitive part of  the eye,
and shown the optic nerves behind it were solid rather than hollow.23 For Kepler, the front of  an
eye was a pinhole, and the back really was a screen onto which the world outside was optically
18 Vision “occurs when an image (idolum) […] is set up at the […] concave surface of  the retina.” Kepler, Optics, 
180. Elsewhere Kepler is more particular about vision 'occuring' through pictura – pictures, rather than images. 
See footnote 33 below.
19 See particularly David Lindberg's work, his collected essays are a good overview of  medieval optics: Lindberg, 
Studies in the History of  Medieval Optics.
20 Della Porta, Natural Magick, 365 (book 17, chapter 6).
21 Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 27.
22 Della Porta, Natural Magick, 365 (book 17, chapter 6).
23 For Kepler’s critique of  Della Porta, see Dupré, “Inside the Camera Obscura,” 237–243. Della Porta wrote that 
this his eye mechanism was “declared more at large in our Opticks,” though Kepler probably did not see this 
other work. Robert Goulding has noted that recent scholarship suggests Kepler likely saw not only Magia 
Naturalis but also perhaps a precis of  his later De Refractione: Goulding, “Thomas Harriot’s Optics,” 145, 
footnote. 24. For Kepler's reference to Platter, see Kepler, Optics, 171–179.
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projected.
According to Gal and Chen-Morris,  Kepler equated the eye with the camera obscura out
of  a desire to legitimate the instrument, rather than explain the organ of  sight.24 Projected images
were useful  for  making  astronomical  observations, as  Kepler,  Galileo,  and Scheiner  all  did to
monitor sunspots, protecting their eyes from blinding sunlight. But while such projected images
were, to follow Sven Dupré's terminology, “empirically familiar,” they were “conceptually alien.” 25
The perspectivist tradition of  optics before Kepler could make no sense of  them. Kepler sought
to understand projected images – whether in the eye or on a tabletop – as material entities caused
by light.
This was an important departure from his predecessors, for whom seeing was always the
action of  the  object itself  on the eye,  via species.  Because images were not  objects  they  did not
emanate species – as Dupré points out, images were made of  “all kinds of  spirits” rather than of
light.26 Perceiving  them  always  involved  deception  –  “they  were  misapprehensions  only,”  as
Antoni Malet says.27 For instance, in the thirteenth century, John Pecham wrote that images were
“the appearance of  an object outside its place. [… I]t is the object that is really seen in a mirror,
although it is misapprehended in position.”28 The eye still received the form of  an object, but the
mind was tricked into thinking the object was somewhere other than it really was. Gal and Chen-
Morris argue it was Kepler's commitment to physical (rather than mathematical) astronomy, and a
concomitant  concern  to  show  that  observing  images could  reveal  material  truths  about  the
24 Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 24 and chap. 1 generally. The status of  the analogy in Kepler's work is the 
subject of  earlier debate. Stephen Straker argued Kepler's comparison between the camera and the eye was what 
led him to the revolutionary insight that vision operated when an image was projected onto the retina (Straker, 
“Kepler, Tycho, and the ‘Optical Part of  Astronomy.’” David Lindberg's Kepler, on the other hand, is the 
culmination of  the perspectivist tradition, and his main concern was how to understand the course of  light 
through the variety of  fluids and lenses of  the eye. How to guarantee a one-to-one correlation between points in
the world and points in the eye was a problem that had plagued previous intromission theories, an issue “had no 
analogue at all in the theory of  the camera” (Lindberg, Theories of  Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler, 206 See 178-208 
for his views on Kepler.)
25 Dupré, “Inside the Camera Obscura,” 222.
26 Ibid., 223.
27 Malet, “Keplerian Illusions,” 2.
28 Quoted by Ibid. See also Roger Bacon's similar views in Lindberg, Roger Bacon and the Origins of  Perspectiva in the 
Middle Ages.
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heavens,  that  led  him  to  consider  light  as  the  mechanistic  cause  of  vision.  This  process
guaranteed that “all celestial observation takes place through the mediation of  light and shadow,”
whether with instruments or without.29 The eye and the camera obscura were alike in being passive
receivers of  light.30
How or why does a retinal  image create vision? Kepler,  in reinventing vision as the
action of  light, distinguished between a 'projected image' (pictura) and a 'perceived image' (imago).31
The imago was subjective, a product of  the imagination. The pictura was a material entity, existing
at the point where light rays focus. Though vision “occurs” when a pictura is projected on a retina,
Malet has pointed out that its 'existence' as a picture – its capacity to be seen if  a screen is placed
at the right point in space – is not the causally relevant part of  Kepler's story. 32 The important
thing is that the retina is in the way of  incoming light rays, and in clear vision it is at the focal
point of  the eye's lens.33 Kepler denied that there is really a 'picture' which travels from the retina
up the optic nerve to present itself  directly to the soul as species did in older theories. He knew
the eye received light, but he also knew from Platter that the optic nerve was a dark and twisted
tunnel. The eye's retina was like the  camera's screen in being the end of  an optical story, after
which  the  process  must  change  radically.34 Kepler  famously  left  it  to  “natural  philosophers
(physici)” to debate how the mind received impressions from the eyes.35
Kepler thus bequeathed subsequent philosophy a mechanically reworked version of  an
old Aristotelian problem. The disembodied eye could never explain vision, Aristotle said, because
29 Quoted in Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 24.
30 The story is similar for Christoph Scheiner, who described the “wonderful concordance of  nature and art” in his
Rosa Ursina (1626) (quoted in Gorman, “Projecting Nature in Early-Modern Europe,” 38.) Like Kepler he 
arrived at the comparison of  retinal and camera images from a background in observational astronomy, and 
considered the 'tubes' and 'eyes' both as simply systems of  lenses. See also Gorman, “A Matter of  Faith?”
31 See Malet, “Keplerian Illusions”; Dupré, “Inside the Camera Obscura”; Chen-Morris, “From Emblems to 
Diagrams.”
32 As Kepler's noncommital verb choice of  “occurs” implies. “Visionem fieri dico, cum totus hemisphaeri 
mundani, quod est ante oculum, & amplius paulo, idolum statuitur ad album subrufum retinae cauae superficiei 
parietem.” Relatedly, Kepler simply writes of  light as light propogating by a “local egress” (Optics, 20.) It is later, 
with Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Huygens, and Hooke that it explicitly becomes local motion of  matter.
33 Malet, “Keplerian Illusions,” 13–21.
34 Kepler, Optics, 180.
35 Ibid.
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“when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name – it is no more a real eye
than the eye of  a statue or a painted figure.”36 After Kepler, Rohault agreed that nothing could be
learnt about an eye “inclosed in the Head of  any Animal.” When he recommended removing it
to sketch its figure, the lesson he sought was one of  optics rather than eyesight.37 But now the eye
was always disembodied, pending the “philosophers'” story about the connection between it and
the mind. The retina was always a screen between the mind and the world. The image that has
become  emblematic  of  the  divorce is  Descartes'  drawing  of  his  ox-eye  experiment –  also
essentially a camera obscura (Figure 6.2).38
This image, and the experiment it illustrates, appear in the Fifth Discourse of  Descartes'
La Dioptrique, 'On the Images That Form on the Back Of  the Eye'.  Here Descartes  mentions
several possible ways of  exhibiting the eye's mechanism, including a dark room with a pinhole for
light, or an artificial eye made from glass. But  he spends  most of  the discourse describing  an
experiment with the eye of  an ox, which would make “more certain” of  the operation of  the eye.
Cut the outer membrane off  the back of  the eye of  a dead animal,  and replace it  a translucent
material like thin paper or eggshell. Then if  the eye is placed in a hole in a screened off  window,
the experimenter will see, “not perhaps without admiration and pleasure, a picture which will
represent  in  natural  perspective  all  the  objects  which  will  be  outside.”39 Numerous  writers
reported on the satisfaction of  carrying out this observation. Gaspar Schott repeated it in 1657,
Rohault described it in 1671, Hooke found kittens' eyes well suited, and Scheiner claimed to have
used “many animal eyes.”40
36 Quoted in Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 49.
37 Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 1:233.
38 See Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 42–51; Alpers, The Art of  Describing , 34.
39 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 93.
40 For Schott see Wenczel, “The Optical Camera Obscura II,” 24; Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 
1:243; “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 127; and for Scheiner see Daxecker, “Christoph 
Scheiner’s Eye Studies,” 34.
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The gap between the eggshell  retina and the bearded observer at the bottom of  the
image is  exactly  that  which Kepler  left  open.  Objects' images  are projected onto an opaque
screen,  at which point  any neat pictorial, optical  story has to end.41 The  epistemic  anxiety  of
41 For Descartes on the vision not working by resemblances, see Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and 
Meteorology, 89–90.
Figure 6.2: Descartes' observation of  an ox eye. From Descartes,
The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, 1:171.
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mediated vision is the climax of  Gal and Chen-Morris' narrative about the disappearing observer:
[Descartes] invents the eye of  the mind, modeled on but completely independent from the eye
of  the flesh. It is an invention that reverses the epistemological role of  vision: from being the
vouchsafe of  our knowledge and a paradigm of  direct acquaintance, it becomes a metaphor
for mediation.42
The point is not the absurdity or redundancy of  pushing the explanation of  the visual
process back into a point in the mind, it is  the impossibility of  doing so. The “eye” appears
figuratively  in  the  mind  as  an  emblem  of  the  apparently representational  nature  of  our
knowledge. Descartes of  course denied its literal existence: it was not “as if  there were yet other
eyes in our brain with which we could apprehend” pictures from our eyes.43 His contribution was
to reduce representation to a causal mechanism:
[I]t is only a question of  knowing how [images] can enable the mind to perceive all the diverse
qualities  of  the  objects  to  which  they  refer;  not  of  knowing  how the  images  themselves
resemble their objects; just as when the blind man […] touches some object with his cane, it is
certain that these objects do not transmit anything to him except that,  by making his cane
move in different ways according to their different inherent qualities, they likewise and in the
same way move the nerves of  his hand, and then the places in the brain where these nerves
originate.44
For  Descartes, picturae reduced  in  any  case  to  the  motive  tendency of  microscopic
particles, which motion the animal spirits would carry up the dark, twisted passage of  the optic
nerve. But while mechanical philosophy could guarantee visual experience by this mechanism, the
42 Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 51.
43 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 101.
44 Ibid., 90.
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implication was that what we see is not what we know, or at least not why we know it.45
Two things emerge from this quick look at the optical writers Hooke mentions. The first
is this fundamental insight that perception does not happen because objects are directly present
to the mind through an uninterrupted channel.
Secondly,  the  comparison  between  the  natural  eye  and  artificial  instruments  was
generally motivated by the need to justify observations made through artifice. It is important that
Descartes' simile of  eye and camera obscura appears in La Dioptrique rather than Le Monde ou Traité
de la Lumiere.  Descartes' discussion of  light in  Le Monde was  a triumphant application of  his
mechanical  philosophy.46 Following Galileo's  condemnation  though, the more circumspect  La
Dioptrique detailed the unobservable facts about light more for predictive rather than explanatory
reasons – to show how optical instruments could be improved rather than as part of  an holistic
system of  the world.47 Descartes wanted to show how different optical instruments would affect
the  sight;  the explanation of  light was secondary.48 He was also  clear about his aim  to  “make
[himself] intelligible to everyone,” to reach an uneducated audience: “the execution of  the things
of  which I shall speak must depend on the skill of  artisans, who ordinarily have not studied.”49 In
other  words,  his  aim  in  La  Dioptrique  was  not  to  directly  convince  Scholastics of  his  new
philosophy, but rather to provide a way to gain evidence for it – La Dioptrique was an apologia for
45 See also Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 1:243ff. The disagreement between Malebranche and 
Arnauld is the locus classicus for the subsequent debate on the nature of  our ideas and their relation to the 
world, while the 'British Empiricist' tradition moves through Locke, Berkeley and Hume. For more 
contemporary treatments, see especially Richard Rorty's influential Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature; as well as 
John Yolton: Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid; Perception and Reality. Gal and Chen-Morris conclude by 
suggesting there is something right about Rorty philosophically, despite “all his historiographical inaccuracies.” 
Baroque Science, 49.
46 Gaukroger suggests Descartes theory of  matter was directly motivated by his theory of  light, see Gaukroger, 
Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 256.
47 See his letter to Mersenne from November 1633, quoted in Ibid., 290–291.: “if  this view (heliocentrism) is false, 
then so too are the entire foundations of  my philosophy.”
48 When he replied to Morin he implied that instruments were a test of  the truth of  a theory of  light. “If  light can 
be imagined some other way by which one can explain all of  its properties that are known by experience, one 
will see that everything that I have demonstrated about refractions, vision, etc. can be deduced from it as well as 
from the way that I proposed.” Descartes to Morin, July 1638. Quoted in Clarke, Descartes, 165. Following the 
same form a generation later, Rohault likewise wrote that “to prove the Truth of  some of  those Suppositions 
which we have made about Vision; we ought now to consider, whether or no all those Things, which upon these 
Suppositions ought to come to pass, when we look through different Sorts of  Perspective-Glasses or upon 
Looking-Glasses, be agreeable to Experience.” Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 1:258.
49 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 66.
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optical instruments and an instruction manual for telescope makers.50 The purpose of  the ox-eye
experiment, however symbolic it became of  its context, was to show that modifying vision with
instruments did not involve a subversion of  the true visual process, as it had for perspectivists.
Like Kepler, Descartes was invested in establishing the veracity of  mediated observations.
In the process of  examining instrumental observation, the eye came to be recognised as
little other than an optical instrument itself. In Hooke a generation later, we find the logic shifted
slightly. If  Descartes or Kepler justified instrument use by looking at the eye, Hooke wanted to
teach his audience about natural, unassisted vision by looking at instruments. Before coming to
this  lesson,  I  will  return  the  story  to  Hooke  himself,  and  introduce  the  artificial  eyes  he
constructed.
The Genealogy of Hooke's Instrument
By the time Hooke delivered his  lectures  on vision,  the  instruments  with which  he
represented the eye were several years old.  They were  again  the results of  an order from the
Royal Society to prepare entertainments for the king. When the Royal Society Council met on 12
October 1663 to  delegate experiments of  royal entertainment to different Fellows,  and among
those that fell to Hooke were:
To make an artificial eye.
To try the casting of  a picture on a wall in a light room; and to bespeak a concave glass for it.51
Christopher Wren, an experienced optician himself, suggested at least the first of  these.
He had dissected a horse's eye to learn its structure. Such anatomy, he confessed to Brouncker,
was very  enlightening,  but  it  did  tend  to  be  “sordid  and  noisome.”52 Instead,  he  followed
50 See: Dijksterhuis, “Constructive Thinking,” 66ff.
51 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:313.
52 Ibid., 1:289.
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Descartes' suggestion, that if  an eye could be made of  glass, in  human proportions but larger,
“the images formed [on the retina...] would be to that extent more visible,”  and the eye's work
clear  to  behold.53 Wren  ultimately  suggested  gifting  the  king  a  compass  and  a  way-wiser
(odometer)  to entertain  him  on his  jaunts  around London,  but  among other  possibilities  he
touched on such an “artificial eye [...] at least three inches in diameter,” made of  glass and water,
to “represent the picture as nature points it.”54
What  ought  to  be  shown off  to  Charles,  felt  Christopher  Wren,  was something
“luciferous in philosophy, and yet whose use and advantage is obvious without a lecture; and
besides, that may surprise with some unexpected effect, and be commensurable for the ingenuity
of  the  contrivance.”55 Many of  these desiderata translate  naturally  to the  setting of  a  public
lecture.  From their very  inception,  Hooke's eyes were intended as impressive objects, “obvious
without a lecture:” intuitive spectacles that would not so much explain anything to their audience
in  a  rigorous  sense as  prompt  imagination  and  delight.  Though  they  were  initially  separate
requests, through  Hooke's  tinkering  and rebuilding,  they  grew together.  The  eye  just  became
nothing more than the instrument for casting pictures.
On 9 March 1664 John Wilkins reported to the Council on  Hooke's  progress.  Hooke
had worked out how to project images onto the wall of  a light room, and the artificial eye had
been “dispatched.”56 Whether this meant it was completed, the design had been given to a glass
blower, or the idea had been dropped, the object  disappears until Hooke's  Gresham lecture  17
years later.
The  light room image projector  was published  in the  Philosophical Transactions  in 1668,
though the publisher (presumably Oldenburg) noted that he had had the pleasure of  attending
the device's debut “some years” before.57 Hooke describes a something of  a mixture between a
53 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology, 99.
54 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:290.
55 Ibid., 1:288.
56 Ibid., 1:391.
57 Hooke, “A Contrivance,” 743.
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camera obscura and a magic lantern – a  popular  seventeenth century entertainment  device  which
projected shapes  that  originated within  the device,  created by  translucent paint on a mirror or
shapes cut out of  a sheet.58 The problem was to make a pinhole image visible in a lit chamber,
and Hooke's solution was just to illuminate the object to be projected more strongly. This object
is placed just on the other side of  the pinhole, and so much the better if  it can be inverted in its
place  so the image will be  the right way up. If  it cannot be, “as 'tis pretty difficult to do with
Living Animals,” then a further lens  should be used to  right  the  image.  He then surrounded it
with mirrors and lenses which amplified the sunlight shining on it.  The method is “easy and
obvious,” he acknowledged, but “hath not, that I know, been ever made by any other person this
way.”59 Like the magic lantern, such a device is a poor analogue of  the eye: they throw images out
into the world,  as in the old extramission theory of  vision.  Only  the  camera obscura  brings the
world inside.
There is a coincidental but not insignificant similarity between Hooke's description of
his method and Della Porta's use of  a camera obscura a century earlier which is worth pausing on.
Both devices were intended as entertainment sources of  wonder, making objects  that were not
actually present  flicker into view. In  Della Porta's  Magia Naturalis,  the magician and dramatist
wrote about what he could perform for his amazed audiences with the camera obscura. “One may
see as clearly and perspicuously, as if  they were before his eyes, Huntings, Banquets, Armies of
Enemies, Plays, and all things else that one desireth,” he proclaimed. Hooke's audience, too, could
see “Apparitions  of  Angels,  or  Devils,  Inscriptions  and  Oracles  on  Walls;  the  Prospect  of
Countryes, Cities, Houses, Navies, Armies; the Actions and Motions of  Men, Beasts, Birds, &c.
the vanishing of  them in a cloud, and their appearing no more after the cloud is vanisht.” 60
Through  presenting experiments so often  at the Royal Society,  Hooke was clearly  practiced at
entertaining an audience and and capturing their attention.
58 For more about this instrument, see Vermeir, “The Magic of  the Magic Lantern.”
59 Hooke, “A Contrivance,” 741.
60 Ibid., 742.
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But  there  was  an  important  difference,  already  hinted  at  above.  When  Della  Porta
“shewed this kind of  Spectacle to  my friends, who much admired it, and took pleasure to see
such a deceit,” a deceit it surely was. The audience experiencing the visions “cannot tell whether
they be true or delusions,” and  Della Porta “could hardly by natural reasons, and reasons of
Opticks  remove  them from their  opinion.”61 His  audience  felt  they  were  seeing  the  objects
themselves,  displaced  by trickery,  and could not  understand how this  could not be the case.
Hooke's description, on the other hand, contrasts the success of  his instrument with deceptions
and magic of  earlier ages:
[H]ad the Heathen Priests of  old been acquainted with it, their Oracles and Temples would have
been much more famous for the Miracles of  their Imaginary Deities. For by such an Art as
this, what could they not have represented in their Temples?62
Hooke intimates that by his time the opportunity for deception was a thing of  the past.
It was only those “Spectators, not well versed in Opticks” who might be tricked into feeling “all
those  passions  of  Love,  Fear,  Reverence  Honour,  and Astonishment,”  that  are  the  “natural
consequences”  seeing something miraculous or supernatural.63 To the modern reader,  Hooke's
prosaic description belies the myth about the audience's reaction to the Lumière brothers' moving
picture L'Arrivé d'un train.64 Already, by the mid-seventeenth century, image projection lacked the
ability to make spectators truly react to the projected objects as if  they were visible but not there.
Hooke's audience saw what was in front of  them – an image, while Della Porta's saw what really
was not – the objects, “as if  they were before [their] eyes.”65
61 Della Porta, Natural Magick, 365 (book 17, chapter 6).
62 Hooke, “A Contrivance,” 742.
63 Ibid.
64 See Loiperdinger and Elzer, “Lumière’s Arrival of  the Train: Cinema’s Founding Myth.” I do not mean to make 
much of  the comparision – I agree completely with Gorman's well-placed caution that image projection had its 
own status in early modern Europe, with understood meaning and import, and is undervalued when discussed 
merely as cinematic pre-history. Gorman, “Projecting Nature in Early-Modern Europe.”
65 Della Porta, Natural Magick, 364 (book 17, chapter 6).
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Hooke's secular and unproblematic display confirms Michael Gorman's conclusion that
“from being a wonder in the 16th century, the projected image became in the seventeenth century,
a philosophical demonstration of  central importance.”66 Image projection devices were not the
objects of  mistrust and wonder they had been a century earlier.  They were  products of  skilled
craftsmanship  which  began  to  bring trust  and assurity  to  a  topic  that  was  characterised  by
mistrust and anxiety in early modern Europe – human vision.67 The images inside cameras obscura
were no longer “conceptually alien,” to return to Dupré's description of  them before Kepler's
time. They were stabilised as a predictable and explicable part of  a causal mechanical process.
By the  end of  the  1660s,  even  the  specific  form of  the perspective box that Hooke
would later  use as an eye  was fairly standard equipment.  Two years  apart, Rohault  and Boyle
described almost exactly  the  same device.68 This  was a “portable  darkned Roome,”  in  which
images would form on  “a fine sheet of  Paper stretch'd like the Leather of  a Drum-head at a
convenient distance from the remoter end;  where there is  to be left an hole covered with a
Lenticular Glasse.” As with Hooke's, the screen could be moved in and out to focus the image.69
Boyle's interest in the instrument was what it showed about geometric optics rather than
vision. Everywhere an image was visible, the air must have been full of  “visible Species, which
cannot be intelligibly explicated without the Locall motions, of  some minute Corpuscles, which,
whilst the Air  is  enlightened,  are alwaies passing thorow it.”70 Boyle's  apparent innocence of
Kepler's and Descartes' optics highlights the centrality and importance of  Hooke's work in the
English context. None of  the writers Hooke mentioned and I discussed above were English: he
was following a tradition he likely read about himself  rather than one he was taught at Oxford or
Westminster.71 Of  course the continent was not far away. The likes of  Boyle went on tours, and
66 Gorman, “Projecting Nature in Early-Modern Europe.” Dupré also discusses perspectivist opticians who used 
their knowledge of  image creation to dispell the impression that such were created by demonic magic, and 
Kepler's own admission that his audiences enjoyed his projections “all the more for realizing that they were 
games.” Dupré, “Inside the Camera Obscura,” 235.
67 See Clark, Vanities of  the Eye.
68 Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, 1:243–244.
69 Of  the Systematicall or Cosmicall Qualities of  Things. In Boyle, The Works of  Robert Boyle, 1999, 6:295.
70 Of  the Systematicall or Cosmicall Qualities of  Things. In Ibid.
71 Thomas Harriot was probably the foremost early seventeenth-century English optician, but was not a prolific 
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the likes of  Henry Oldenburg were in constant communication with European philosophers.
Nevertheless, Hooke was an important conduit of  learning into England. His mechanical skill in
the workshop was complimented by scholarly learning which went well beyond the walls of  his
room. His lectures brought new ideas not just to the public of  London but the philosophers of
the Royal Society too.72
 In fact, Hooke was working on the instrument around this time as well, and Boyle's
note that he had “caused” it to be made “severall years agoe,” since when several people had
copied it, implies they were perhaps collaborating on instruments again. Hooke's interest in it was
as a portable drawing aid. He brought it to meetings several times, adapting it more and more for
this purpose,  until  finally  someone could stand inside it  and trace the images projected on a
screen in front of  them.73
The engraving in Figure 6.3 appears in the collection of  Hooke's papers posthumously
published by William Derham  in  1726.  Hooke apparently showed the device depicted  to the
Royal Society on 19 December 1694,  though  he  completed  it many years before that.74 In the
accompanying text Hooke never actually describes the form of  the 'Instrument of  Use to take
the Draught, or Picture of  any Thing,'  and the  drawing is  not  his  hand.75 But the  picture  does
match the operation of  the “small Picture-box” which Hooke was particularly keen to promote
for illustrators of  travel books.76 Hooke, like  Kepler,  like  Vermeer, knew all about the  camera
obscura's usefulness in drawing. In 1666 he told Pepys it was a better aid for drawing than Alberti's
publisher. For more on him see Goulding, “Thomas Harriot’s Optics.”
72 Hooke certainly often corrected them in meetings. For example, in 1679 Dr. Croune suggested the dilation of  
the pupil caused objects to look larger or smaller. Hooke gently corrected him, saying the iris was to protect the 
eye against light too strong for the eye, and does not affect the size of  objects perceived. Birch, The History of  the
Royal Society, 1757, 3:502. See also Hooke's tutoring Boyle on the principles of  Cartesianism: Davis, “‘Parcere 
Nominibus.’”
73 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:436, 440, 442. It is reminiscent of  a portable camera of  Kepler's 
which Constantijn Huygens wrote glowingly about, as well as earlier devices described by Barbaro and Kircher. 
See Wenczel, “The Optical Camera Obscura II.”
74 He says it is “not a new Design” and notes its similarity to something he “long since” showed the Royal Society. 
Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations of  the Late Eminent Dr. Robert Hooke, 293–296.
75 Though I have been unable to find this particular image in manuscript form, where I have been able to compare 
two versions of  the same figure in Hooke's manuscripts and Derham's publication, the latter are more idealised 
and somewhat starker, redone for printing.
76 Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations of  the Late Eminent Dr. Robert Hooke, 296.
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grid technique, and in 1675 he dropped by the studio of  his old master Peter Lely to talk about
“helping  the  sight  and  of  picture  box.”77 Hooke's  image  projector  began  as  a  delightful
entertainment, became an picturing tool, then finally appeared as an eye in his lectures about
light.
77 21 February 1665/6: Pepys, The Diary of  Samuel Pepys, 1972, 7:51; Hooke, The Diary of  Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, 
1935, 1:204. For a comparison of  these two techniques and the versions of  'seeing' they engendered, see Alpers, 
The Art of  Describing , 41ff. Hooke also told Pepys about the perspectographs of  Wren and Prince Rupert – the 
idea of  mobile drawing aids must have been attractive to Wren and Hooke once they were employed surveying 
London following the Great Fire. Rupert's perspectograph was 'perfected' by Hooke (Birch, The History of  the 
Royal Society, 1756, 1:329, 333, 334, 337, 348). and Wren's appeared in the Philosophical Transactions in 1669 (Wren, 
“The Description of  an Instrument”).
Figure 6.3: Picture-box, from Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations,
295.
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Hooke's Demonstration of Eyesight
This  lecture  series  began with  the  nature  of  luminous  bodies  and  ended with  a
decription of  memory and the perception of  time. The  editor of  Hooke's  Posthumous Works,
Richard Waller, notes that Hooke apparently never completed his planned discussion of  light and
apologises for the apparent change of  subject of  the last section. But it is easy to read the topics
successive: as Jack MacIntosh has suggested, Hooke's model of  memory is “the final move in the
process of  making the explanation of  light in terms of  touch an interior one.”78 “To find the
Nature of  Light,” supposed Hooke, “we must examine first, what it is in the Luminous Body that
is the Fountain, and emits or causes it; Secondly, what it is in the Medium that propagates and
conveys it; and Thirdly, what it is in the Eye, or the subject that receives it, and is affected or
acted by it.”79 This last step, how the subject is affected, turns his topic from strictly optical into
visual – from the behaviour of  light as Kepler considered it into an epistemological story.
Hooke's lectures thus form a narrative which pivots around the reception of  light by the
eye.  This  was how he  could  sidestep  the old problem of  observing eyesight itself  – vision  was
visible,  if  not in  description  alone then through  performance.  As with metaphors in text, the
demonstration  of  an analogous  mechanism  could  allow  the  audience  to  imagine  and  thus
conceive  how something could  operate.  Koen Vermeir  has  shown  that  in  the  salons  of  the
French  philosophes,  inventing analogies to bring mechanistic explanations of  phenomena to life
became a sort of  game for the entertainment of  the  gentry,  and this  tradition was sometimes
adopted  as  an  explanatory  model  by  philosophers.  Making  an  occult  or  unfamiliar  process
imaginable by referencing to a more familiar mechanism was a way to explain it – what Vermeir
calls “analogical demonstration.”80 Similarly, so much of  Hooke's natural philosophical work was
a live performance that  a  kind of  semi-theatrical  display was  a common feature  of  it.  He  used
models constructed in the workshop to test ideas about the operation of  distant or inaccessible
78 MacIntosh, “Perception and Imagination in Descartes, Boyle and Hooke,” 328.
79 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 85.
80 Vermeir, “The Magic of  the Magic Lantern,” 151–154.
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objects, and he read metaphysical lessons off  the behaviour of  his instruments.81 In his lectures
about light, the perspective box  stood for something  inaccessible,  the seeing eye. It made the
“invisible visible.”82
Hooke explained that as the pulses of  light disperse through the surrounding medium,
its power dimishes according to the inverse square law. The first thing the eye must do is collect
and concentrate the rays back to (almost) a point, as with a burning glass.83 In doing so, “the Eye
may not improperly be called a Microcosm,  or a little World[. … W]hen a Hemisphere of  the
Heavens is open to its view, it has a Hemisphere within it self.”84 Hooke told his audience that the
world was visible on the retinas of  eyes removed from their sockets. But then he showed them it
with  the perspective  box.85 This  performative  aspect  allowed  the  lesson  to  extend  beyond
geometric optics and encompass the whole process of  vision. With their faces pressed to the hole
in metal and glass cylinder, his audience saw the operation of  the eye. A picture was cast on the
screen,  and suddenly it was not the objects  that they were looking at that were present to their
minds, but those that the eye was facing. The observer was corporeally excluded from the box.
Separated from their own body and unaware of  their own perspective, they adopt instead that of
the artificial eye they were inside. If  the problem with understanding vision post-Kepler was the
separation  of  inner  representation  and  external  reality,  acting  with  a  perspective  box  could
collapse everything to inner representation.86 The audience became Descartes' 'eye of  the mind',
perceiving what a dislocated eye was seeing.
Later, Locke explicitly drew the analogy between the understanding and a camera obscura
which “let[s] in external resemblances, or  Ideas of  things without.”87 That he did so when fully
81 See Bennett, “Robert Hooke as Mechanic and Natural Philosopher,” 41–43.
82 Vermeir, “The Magic of  the Magic Lantern,” 153. Recall Gorman's note on the authoritative status of  the 
projected image as “a key instrument of  persuasion in public demonstration lectures.” Gorman, “Projecting 
Nature in Early-Modern Europe,” 50.
83 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 122–123.
84 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 121.
85 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 127.
86 See Crary, Techniques of  the Observer, especially “The Camera Obscura and its Subject,” for more on the experience 
of  using a camera obscura and the visual paradigm it implied. 
87 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Book 2, chapter 11 section 17, p. 72.
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aware of  the more usual analogy with vision prompted John Yolton to wonder if  Locke was not
“transferring Hooke's microcosmic notion to the understanding? Was there some temptation to
think of  our awareness being like the face at the perspective box?”88 I would suggest that yes, not
only was it tempting, this is  exactly the power of  such a demonstration with a perspective box.
That the mind worked visually  as Locke suggested  was a recognisable trope in early  modern
literature and philosophy.89 It was evocative and persuasive then as it is now.
It is time to turn to Hooke's epistemology, and draw the threads traced above together
into  a  lesson  about  his  observation,  instrument-based  approach  to  natural  philosophy.
Straightforwardly representational vision could be recreated by an artificial eye, but it is important
to be careful about the manner in which Hooke's idea of  vision was pictorial. Strictly speaking it
is not that pictures cause us to see, but rather that pictures and vision are produced in the same
way,  through the mechanical operation of  light.  As long as we are careful about the distinction
between the pictorial  story  and the  causal  mechanical  one,  the  language we  use  to  describe
pictures allows us to say interesting things  about the epistemic implications of  this equivalence
for how Hooke and others in the same tradition conceived of  visual information.
The Eye as Instrument
If  Kepler's optics and Descartes' scepticism created “the fundamental epistemological
problem of  the Baroque,” then Hooke reveals  himself  to be something of  a modern and a
constructivist in response.90 For Hooke, a worker in Francis Bacon's Great Instauration, the new,
light-based,  indirect theory of  vision  which bequeathed philosophy such subsequent  epistemic
unease was good news.
88 Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid, 127.
89 The phrase 'the mind's eye' was famously used by Hamlet (1.2.185). See also the frontispiece to Robert Fludd's 
1617 Ars memoriae, featuring the Oculus imaginationis.
90 Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science, 51.
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Though [philosophy] has always made a fair shew of  flourishing; yet upon Examination, it has
been found to  yield  Leaves instead of  solid  Fruit,  to  be  a  Knowledge  very  confus'd  and
imperfect, and very insignificant as to the inabling of  Man to practise or operate by it.91
This was no wonder, if  perception had been so routinely misunderstood. Approaches to
studying the natural world had laboured under the misconception that  the eye  marked a direct
channel from the world to the soul. But vision was not governed by species. For Hooke this was
a moderate sceptical realisation which licenced moving away from the “Worm-eaten Volumes of
Antiquity” and beginning a “new Inquiry into the Nature of  Things;” one of  careful and patient
reasoning from collected observations.92
In his  lecture,  before describing  the  eye's anatomy and demonstrating  its  operation,
Hooke betrayed what he took to be of  the greatest philosophical import about the eye: how clever
it was. He wondered aloud:
How could it have entred into the Imagination of  Man to conceive, how it should be possible
for such an Atom of  the Universe as Man is, to be informed at the Instant that a thing is done,
how and where it is done, though Million of  Millions of  Miles distant? Certainly no more than
we now imagine it should be possible for any Man here in  London to know the particular
Thoughts or Inclinations of  any one single Man in  China or  Japan or of  all  the  Chinese or
Japanese together, at the same Instant they are thought there.93
This  curious  admiration  is  for  an  organ  which  connects  us  somewhat  to  the  vast
expanse of  nature, despite our limits and insignificance.  The eye is the most transporting and
immediate sense, and lets us know what is taking place outside our heads. But there are others,
which all have a particular benefit. Hooke's epistemology of  the senses is one of  instrumental
91 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 3.
92 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 105. The idea is similar to Daniel Garber's take on Descartes' scepticism: it is an 
attack on previous philosophies which clears the way for a new system of  the universe. See Garber, Descartes 
Embodied, especially “Semel in Vita.”
93 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 121.
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design: some parts of  our bodies are sensitive to certain qualities that exist in the world, and
when they get in the way of  that quality it creates “such an Impression as becomes sensible to the
Animal Faculty.”94 Perception does not happen because the eye connects the world to the soul, it
happens because the eye is sensitive to light. The purpose of  the sense-instruments is to allow us
to navigate the world.
The Sight [is] for discovering Conveniences and Inconveniences at a greater Distance as well as
near at hand: The Ear, for receiving Warning or Information from Sound, where the Eye could
not  assist:  The  Nose,  for  distinguishing  by  the  Effluvia  of  Bodies,  of  wholsome  or
unwholsome Nourishment: The Taste for the same purpose, by the Dissolution of  them in the
Mouth, and for the determining of  the Quantity requisite to be taken at a time: The Feeling,
for the Sensation of  External Textures or Motions.95
Crucially, in terms of  philosophical knowledge, the senses by themselves “afford little as
to what we are looking after.”96 For all its ingenuity, the eye was a severely deficient instrument.
But this brought it within the scope of  the mortal, as well as divine, craftsman. We could copy
the original plan. The optical instruments of  the seventeenth century showed we could extend or
alter the eye, but the perspective box showed we could simply make one. Hooke's picture box was
also an object designed to get in the way of  light.  It not only demonstrated the working of  the
eye, it let people share their experiences.97 People could make artificial eyes, give them to others,
and see what they had seen.
A facetious  comparison of  Hooke's  picture  box  with  Descartes'  ox-eye  experiment
(Figures 6.3 and 6.2 respectively) reveals something surprisingly telling about the connection of
Hooke's ideas about vision and natural philosophy. The bearded observer of  Descartes' drawing
94 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 120.
95 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 8.
96 “General Scheme,” in ibid.
97 For the importance of  shared visuality in the modern scientific project, with some interesting historical insights 
about the instrumental origins of  much shared vision, see Latour, “Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things
Together.”
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(is he wearing a toga?) gazes distantly up at the retinal screen, separated from it by void. The well-
dressed  Georgian traveller  in  Hooke's  (or  Derham's)  image is  thoroughly  situated inside  the
experimentum. The gap between retinal screen and his own eyes is bridged by his arm and hand in
the act of  drawing. The mystery persists about how an image represents the world to the mind,
but the strong implication is that the reductive mechanisation of  vision guarantees at least its
reproduceability.  The problem with previous philosophy in the Baconian project was that the
world had been ignored and abstract claims made too hastily.  But the world was so vast and
complex that no one person could hope to observe it all. The project rests on exactly this ability
to share experience, which the instrumentalised eye provides.
Hooke wrote in the  preface to his friend Robert Knox's  An Historical  Relation of  the
Island of  Ceylon (1681) that the book would no doubt be entertaining and interesting to people of
all sorts of  professions, but was invaluable to the “Philosopher and Historian.” This was ideally
true of  all travel books which recounted the flora, fauna, and customs of  foreign lands,  just as
long  as  the  author  took  note  of  those  things  that  were  “pertinent  and considerable,  to  be
observ'd  in  their  Voyages  and  Abodes,”  and,  crucially,  made  good  accounts  of  their
observations.98 Hooke's suggestions for how to do this were twofold.  First are administrative
issues: travellers should be taught which aspects of  foreign places to focus on – a concern which
emphasises the importance Hooke placed on the public sponsorship of  knowledge  collection.
Second, people must record observations accurately. Pictures give us far more information than
words, he thought, and his description of  the picture box  published by Derham was explicitly
aimed at promoting it for use by travellers (Figure 6.3 above). The device ought to be promoted
by “all such, as desire to be rightly and truly informed” about other people's experiences.99 Hooke
railed against fanciful images he had seen in travellers' accounts: the extravagant height of  hills,
the sudden descents of  valleys, mountains over-hanging for “half  a Mile, or a Mile, which, tho'
98 Knox, An Historical Relation of  the Island Ceylon, sigs. A3r, A2r.
99 Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 294.
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the Mountain were made of  cast Iron, were impossible to be sustain'd.”100 The true author of
such drawings was invariably “some Picture-drawer, or Engraver, here at Home, who knows no
more the Truth of  the Things to be represented, than any other Person.”101 Any draughter using
a picture-box, on the other hand, could “but use his Pen, and trace the Profile of  that what he
sees ready drawn for him.” As with so much of  Hooke's instrumental rhetoric, little rests on the
human  operator,  the  result  is  the  effect  of  natural  processes  given  artificial  direction.  The
observer has disappeared. “Mr. Engraver's Fancy,” was no longer needed, the picture is “[al]ready
drawn.” It would take a willful act for the the operator to produce anything  other  than a “true
Draught of  whatever he sees before him.”102
'Truth' itself  was thus built into the operation of  the instrument –  the same sort of
truth  one  feels  about  one's  own  personal  perceptions.  Hooke's  mentor  Wilkins  wrote  that
“nothing can be more manifest and plain to me, than that I now see somewhat which hath the
appearance of  such a colour or figure.”103 Though Wilkins freely admitted he did not know how
sensory experience happens, in terms of  light-based vision this was exactly because the light that
forms a picture of  such a colour or figure is  really there, regardless of  whether it is an eye or a
sheet of  paper which gets in its way. Alpers finds this Keplerian visual idea expressed in the art
of  Jan Vermeer and the northern naturalists generally: “the world compressed onto a bit of  paper
with no prior viewer to establish a position or a human scale.”104 In the case of  the artist standing
inside a camera obscura and tracing a lens projection, the splashes of  colour and darkness appear
prior to cognition, created simply by the mechanical action of  light. This is the same information
one gets from the natural eye before it is synthesised into a conception of  the world. As Alpers
has written of  what  has become the paradigmatic  case  of  depiction  by a  camera obscura,  Jan
100 Ibid., 293.
101 Ibid. He even singles out the “Books of  Theodore de Brie concerning the East and West Indies[, ...] Sir Thomas 
Herbert's Travels; and those of  Mr. Ogylby's Asia, Africa, and America; which are copies of  the Dutch 
Originals.” In light of  this, Lisa Jardine's suggestion that Hooke may have helped Knox's brother with the 
engravings seems odd. Jardine, The Curious Life of  Robert Hooke, 273.
102 Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 295.
103 Wilkins, Of  the Principles and Duties of  Natural Religion, 5.
104 Alpers, The Art of  Describing , 41.
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Vermeer's  View of  Delft,  the  scene  is  “hardly  grasped,  or  taken in  – it  is  just  there  for  the
looking.”105
Earlier, Lawrence Gowing noted that Vermeer “seems almost not to care, or not even to
know, what it is that he is painting. What do men call this wedge of  light? A nose? A finger?” 106
The artificial eye is ignorant of  the learnt meanings of  objects and blind to natural qualities other
than that which it is attuned to. It  enacts Bacon's metaphorical recommendation that to gain
knowledge one must be appropriately situated:  one must withdraw the intellect from the messy
105 Ibid., 27. For more on lens use in art, see also Hockney, Secret Knowledge.
106 Quoted in Alpers, The Art of  Describing , 37.
Figure 6.4: Jan Vermeer, View of  Delft, 1662
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world far enough that “the images and rays of  natural objects meet in a point, as they do in the
sense of  vision; whence it follows that the strength and excellency of  the wit has but little to do
in the matter.”107 Vermeer, and Hooke, could position the eye a certain distance from an object,
select the appropriately dilated pupil,  and the outside world would be immediately known to
whoever was inside.
Certainty
Understanding  the  senses  as  instruments  did  not  only  imply  the  possibility  of
manipulating them, but of  trusting them. For Descartes, sight was analogous with that of  a blind
man feeling his way with a  cane,  an image which Hooke also repeats.  “[T]he eye becomes,”  he
said in his lecture, “as it were a Hand, by which the Brain feels, and touches the Objects, by
creating a Motion in the Retina, the same, and at the same Instant, with the Motion of  the lucid
Object it self.”108 The pseudo-Aristotelian text De Sensu had ridiculed the atomists for reducing all
perception to the motion of  atoms and therefore to touch. In Aristotelian thought, touch was the
“primary  form  of  sense,”  meaning  it  was  the  most  entangled  and  bodily,  and  the  least
intellectual.109 To see,  by  comparison,  was  to receive  the essence of  an object.  After  Kepler
though, in the absence of  a visual theory which gave us direct access to objects' forms, it was this
physico-mechanical causal story  which  allowed seventeenth century  epistemologists  to  depend
visual information.
Directness and reliability goes hand in hand with grossness and insensitivity. If  a hand is
too large to feel the texture of  a fine weave, or too warm to feel the heat of  water, the mind will
not be informed about these qualities. The eye likewise only sees things it is attuned to. Ideas are
of  things,  but  from  a  perspective.  When  Wilkins  wrote  of  the  assuredness  with  which  he
107 From the preface to the Instauratio Magna, quoted in Desroches, Francis Bacon and the Limits of  Scientific Knowledge, 
100. See also Desroches' discussion of  the metaphor.
108 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 124. The analogy is repeated throughout Descartes' Dioptrique.
109 Wolfe, “Early Modern Epistemologies of  the Senses,” 3.
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experienced the colours and figures in front of  him, it was the kind of  indubitableness of  private
phenomenology,  rather than of  the blind man's cane.110 Understanding the former in terms of
the latter  – phenomenology as  the turning dial  of  an instrument,  Hooke departed from the
epistemology of  Wilkins. Wilkins held that “there is an universal agreement in the sensation of
outward  Objects;  The  Eye  and  the  Ear  of  all  sensitive  Creatures,  having  the  same  kind  of
perception of  visible  and audible  things. Those things which appear Green, Blew, or Red to one,
having the same appearance to all others.”111 As we saw in the previous chapter,  Hooke  went
further  in  thinking  that  not  only  was  the  perspective  of  a  particular  person  was  arbitrary,
depending on where they stood, but the perspective  of  humans also,  depending on their natural
optical instruments. A dog may be able to smell flesh where a human cannot, or an insect watch a
string  vibrate  when we can only hear it.112 The senses that a creature has,  and therefore which
natural qualities were available to that creature, were dependent on its body. 
This, finally, is the real importance of  using instruments as well as natural senses.  The
camera obscura,  which allowed a visual  artist  like Vermeer to mark his  paper with whatever is
'there', rather than whatever he perceives, replaced the confident human apprehension of  forms
with a view 'hardly grasped' diminished the power of  vision. But it increased the power of  vision-
like senses. The artistic tradition which Alpers discusses considered the memory as a storehouse
of  images – visual ideas which could be brought out later and painted. This idea persisted in later
philosophy, but for Hooke, on the other hand, this was not enough.113 The kind of  visuality of
the eye as  represented by the  camera obscura gives an objective 'view from nowhere' only in a
limited sense, as recent sociologists of  science have pointed out.114 If  this universal perspective is
at all the object of  philosophical enquiry, it would have to be supplemented. If  a sense, natural or
110 Wilkins, Of  the Principles and Duties of  Natural Religion, 5.
111 Ibid., 56–57. See also Rohault, who suggests that perceptions are caused by the shape and size of  the incoming 
corpuscles, not their relation with the organs of  sense: Clarke, Rohault’s System of  Natural Philosophy, vol. 1, chap. 
27.
112 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 142, 135.
113 See Yolton, Perception and Reality, 49ff.
114 See e.g. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges.”
173
artificial, presents an  object  not  as  a  complete  re-presentation,  but  insofar  as  it  has  certain
qualities,  which  move  through  a  certain  medium,  to a  creature  with  a  particular  sensitive
constitution,  then the phenomena available  through such  instruments might rightly be called a
view from 'anywhere'. Their power was in their new multiplicity.
After the Eye
The senses give us ideas. This is the topic of  Hooke's last two Gresham lectures on
light. What happens after light hits the retina? Descartes appropriated a metaphor from Aristotle
and explained that in perception the “external shape of  the sentient body [is] really changed by
the object in exactly the same way that the shape of  the surface of  the wax is altered by the
seal.”115 Hooke used the same metaphor. “It has pleased the al wise [sic.] contriver of  the Universe
to send man into the world almost ready tempered, like a piece of  soft wax to receive those
impressions and stamps, which he has thought it most convenient to receive.”116
 For Hooke, ideas are likewise caused directly by the motion the senses receive, and are
composed materially  of  something internal.  The motion of  light  continues  up the optic nerve
and into the brain, where it helps to form an 'idea,' which was a piece of  the brain.117 A material
part of  the brain is formed, by the power of  “attention,” into a shape, which is then animated
with the motion incoming from the senses. Ideas are “inserted into and inclosed in the common
Repository” of  the memory.118 The memory lies coiled like a rattlesnake around a central point in
the brain where the soul sits. The outer reaches are the earliest memories of  a person's life, and
115 Regulae Rule 12, in Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, 1:40.
116 From a lecture transcribed in Oldroyd, “Some ‘Philosophicall Scribbles’ Attributed to Robert Hooke,” 17. I have
changed 'u' to 'v' and thorns to 'th'.
117 Though he concentrates on light and therefore vision, the story is essentially the same for the other senses. See 
John Yolton's table of  the various descriptions of  'idea' in seventeenth and eighteenth century England: Yolton, 
Perception and Reality, 46.
118 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 140. B. R. Singer has discussed the English context of  similar 
ideas, particular those of  Henry More and John Locke: Singer, “Robert Hooke on Memory, Association and 
Time Perception,” 124ff. To this list Oldroyd adds Thomas Willis: Oldroyd, “Some ‘Philosophicall Scribbles’ 
Attributed to Robert Hooke,” 25. The similarity with Descartes' model from his Regulae is striking, though this 
last was only published after Hooke's lecture.
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the central point the latest idea they have had. Ideas' motion have a causal power too: the motion
of  a strongly excited idea can resonate throughout the memory and cause similar ideas to become
excited too, attracting the attention of  the soul and forming conscious links between ideas.119
Hooke acknowledges that neither he nor anyone else “does further or more intelligibly explain”
what exactly this 'attention' is, but he does give a striking analogy.120 The soul is like the sun at the
centre of  the universe, and radiates attention like light towards all the objects that surround it. An
idea can even 'eclipse' more distant ideas by blocking the attention of  the soul. And l ike the light
of  the sun, the power of  the soul diminishes as it travels further into the memory – even, Hooke
suggests, according to the same inverse square law.121 Disanalogously, we can choose to  focus
attention on particular parts of  the  repository so  we are not  in constant confusion from the
variety around our souls. When focused on an idea, the soul both receives and renews that idea's
motion, noting its details and rewriting it in the memory.  Left ignored, ideas move further and
further from the soul, and may be forgotten. Sensory impressions are motions in the mechanistic
world to which our senses are sensitive. But without the activity of  the soul they would not give
us ideas about things – sensing is not just a passive reception but a mental activity.
After the senses and memory comes reason, and an individualisting reprisal of  the entire
Baconian project.  If  the memory  only contained things available to  unaided,  natural eyesight,
philosophy would be restricted to knowledge of  these things. This is why Hooke wrote that the
best remedy for this “prejudice” was to:
119 How the immaterial soul and the material ideas interact Hooke simply says he “cannot conceive,” but that they 
do is plain from our ability to sense, think, and remember. “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 147.
The materiality of  the model has attracted the attention of  historians and contemporaries alike. Waller in his 
editorial notes felt the need to clarify that Hooke did not claim there was no such thing as immaterial objects. 
See MacIntosh, “Perception and Imagination in Descartes, Boyle and Hooke”; Wilding, “Graphic 
Technologies”; Yeo, “Before Memex.”
120 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 140. 
121 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 144. The thought seems motivated by geometry: light obeys this geometric law of  
the surface area of  an expanding sphere because it is so subtle a matter, so surely the power of  the soul must 
also. Diminish though it does, he does not rule out the possibility that the influence of  the soul can be felt 
beyond the body, possibly explaining some kinds of  bewitching and lupus in fabula ('the wolf  in the conversation' 
– roughly the English idiom 'speak of  the devil and the devil appears'). “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 147.
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compare the several Informations we receive of  the same thing, from the several Impressions
it makes on the several Organs of  Sense, and (by a Rejection of  what is not consonant) by
degrees to find out its Nature, and thereby to inform the Intellect with a Notion of  the thing;
which is not according to this or that Idea, rais'd from the Impression of  this or that Sense, but
by a comparative Act of  the Understanding from all the various Informations 'tis capable of
receiving,  more  immediately  by  any  of  the  Senses,  or  more  mediately  by  various  other
Observations or Experiments.122
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, this was the philosophical importance of  microscope use
– creating different impressions on the senses. The wholesale use of  instruments Hooke which
advocated was motivated not so much by an optimism that they would make our senses better
but from this causal story of  how it is that ideas of  things arise from even the naked senses. In
his Gresham lectures on light, he cashed out the story in psychological terms. Thinking was the
action of  the soul on ideas,  either  creating new  ones  or perfecting  those already existing by
comparing and adding together various sensory impressions.
And thence I conceive the Body of  one Idea [...] may have many and various Impressions and
Motions  annexed to it,  possibly  of  100,  nay  of  1000  Moments,  whence  that  Idea  maybe
supposed to be more compleat and perfect in it self.
[…]
And this I conceive to be that Action of  the Soul which is commonly called Reasoning; and
the Conclusion is the new Impression made upon the Idea informing from the comparison of
other Ideas which may be contain'd in the major and minor Propositions.123
This is not two simple ideas being combined to form one complex one – the process of
reasoning really alters the existing ideas.124 Knowledge consists of  real material proxies in the brain
122 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 9.
123 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 145.
124 Unlike many contemporary accounts of  ideas: again see Yolton, Perception and Reality..
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which come to more and more closely resemble objects outside the brain. In this way the soul
“forms to it self  a Microcosm, or Picture of  the Macrocosm, in which it radiates, and is sensible
of  everything contain'd therein.”125 But when a person's ideas become more like their object, they
will less and less resemble what that object  looks like  to that person. Not only are objects not
directly present to the mind through their forms, they are not even known by how they appear.
This process is Hooke's microscope use writ large. At the beginning of  Chapter 2, I
mentioned the differences between Hooke's draft of  an creature and how that same crab-like
insect finally appeared in Micrographia. The image not only increased in size and clarity, the insect
itself  grew two more legs. If, as Neri supposes, these limbs are the result of  Hooke's erstwhile
study of  other authors' natural historical observations, then the finalised image is the result of
“many and various Impressions” compounded into an idea.  The same can be said of  all  of
Hooke's  micrographs,  insofar as  they tread the line  between particular  observation and ideal
specimen. But the “true forms” depicted in Hooke's engravings are not meant as the final word.
Here is how these objects look, the book says, through this microscope, to Robert Hooke. The
value of  a book like Micrographia, or like Knox's Ceylon or Piso's Historia Naturalis Brasiliae, was as a
way to share perpectival knowledge with others.
Perhaps an indication that Hooke was aware of  how far he was moving from older
species-based  theories  of  vision,  and  the  knowledge  of  essences  that  it  conferred, is  his
recognition that there is a sense in which images projected on the retina or in the camera obscura
are nothing like  our real  experience,  let alone accurate knowledge. Retinal images are of  course
inverted; a fact that caused great worry for many people who wondered if  the retina could be the
sensitive part of  the eye.126 Gassendi and Pieresc eventually hypothesised that the retina must be a
concave mirror, reflecting light onto the back of  the lens and reverting the images in the process,
presenting the mind with “the object in its natural position.”127 In August 1679 the Fellows of  the
125 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 147.
126 And, according to David Hockney, is the reason why so many painter's models in Dutch naturalistic art are left-
handed: Hockney, Secret Knowledge, 118.
127 Quoted in Fisher, Pierre Gassendi’s Philosophy and Science, 36. See also Alpers' note that Van Beverwyck “puzzled 
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Royal Sociery debated exactly this issue. William Croune asked why it was that objects are seen
the right way up, and Nehemiah Grew suggested that the optic  nerve corkscrewed around  to
stand perceptions back on their feet.128 Hooke, though, noted the lack of  anatomical evidence for
this. His view was that the mind, not the eye or the optic nerve, reverts objects after the optical
process has ended – just as it interprets whether a certain wedge of  light is a nose or a finger. A
week earlier he had  delivered a lecture  to the Royal Society  on  corrective  convex (rather than
concave) eyeglasses.129 To read a book the wearer would have to hold it upside down, but Hooke
thought little of  the inconvenience – in time they would grow used to it. What he meant was not
merely they would get accustomed to turning pages right to left, or even that they would learn a
skill  like that of  astronomers who made observations with  cameras obscura and had to interpret
projected images of  the sun inverted by the instrument. Hooke went further, and suggested that
if  a person wore the glasses from birth so that their retinal image had always been upright, they
would see things as inverted should they ever take them off.130 William Molyneux's later criticism
of  this  idea is  illustrative.  With  a  variation  of  Molyneux's  'Problem',  he  argued  that surely
someone who had been blind from birth and suddenly given sight,  and who was therefore not
“prejudiced by custom,” would see things the right way up, “as is usual.” 131 The  difference for
Hooke is that he implies that even if  we do have such an innate, unprejudiced interpretation of
visual experience, it can be altered over time. Sensory impressions are always interpreted in the
light of  impressions from the other senses, and given previous knowledge,  to form a coherent
picture of  the world. “[W]e see by use, that we have an Idea of  [an object], as if  it were erected;
and by much use of  seeing things inverted,  the same  Idea will  be formed as by seeing them
erected.”132 Our  overall  impression  of  the  world  is  coherent,  regardless  of  the  limited  or
about how the inverted scene is righted:” Alpers, The Art of  Describing , 41.
128 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:502.
129 Hooke, “Myopibus Juvamen.” For the minutes of  the meeting see Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 
3:500.
130 Hooke, “Myopibus Juvamen.”
131 Molyneux, Dioptrica Nova, 212.
132 Hooke, “Myopibus Juvamen,” 60. Hooke left it to future self-experimenters to report on the success of  his 
theory. As far as I know no one did, but I am grateful to Maria Kon for telling me about George M. Stratton's 
experiments in the 1890s on exactly this sort of  perceptual apparatus, which apparently bear out Hooke's idea.
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potentially conflicting nature of  the experiences that make it up.  The view is more similar to
Berkeley's later radical empiricism than many of  Hooke's contemporaries. For instance, Berkeley
thought the sight cannot  tell us  about distance directly,  it is only by learning to associate visual
ideas  with  what  we have  learnt  about  the  size  of  objects  from  touch that  we  can interpret
appearances as distant.133
Relativity
Everywhere  Hooke recommends instrumental aids to  vision, he  sketches  aids for the
other senses too, or machines like his hygroscope which reveal unseen nature in a way that gives
us no real visual idea of  the process they measure. Importantly, the representations of  the world
he created – and thought reformed natural philosophy would later create – were not merely visual
but multi-sensory material constructions. The microcosm of  the soul, reflecting the macrocosm,
was not visual or pictorial but compounded from all of  the various impressions one has of  the
thing 'itself'.  The senses each provide different material to build the microcosm, like so many
tradesmen working on a building. While I will return to the epistemic aims of  natural philosophy
in the following chapter, here I will conclude with a little more discussion of  the implications of
Hooke's understanding of  eyesight.
Just as Hooke was sensitive to the worry Cavendish had about Micrographia – that objects
seem to morph into different things – because he is aware that his images are views through an
instrument, he is aware that every act of  perception is a limited view. Instruments represent not
objective  but  situated,  embodied  knowledge.134 Even  as  the  eye  was  disembodied  by the
demonstrations of  its operation in the new optics of  Kepler and Descartes, Hooke's instrument
use implies a distinctly embodied, causal idea of  perception. The instrument itself  – the eye or the
133 Berkeley, A New Theory of  Vision. Compare with Kepler's explanation of  distance perception: Kepler, Optics, 62–
63.
134 See Lorraine Daston's and Peter Galison's recent work on this philosophical issue, particularly their co-authored 
tome: Daston and Galison, Objectivity.
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camera –  showed  off  an idealised,  uninterpreted,  capturing  of  the  light  which  bounced off
objects. But the  use of  the instrument involved adopting that point of  view as one's own, the
observer taking on the impressions of  an organ. Hooke's demonstration of  eyesight was, as were
the images  in  Micrographia,  an exhibition of  difference,  which emphasised the  embodied and
limited perspective of  ordinary naked sense.
The lesson  to be learned from  optical instruments was partly  about the things seen
through them, and partly about the eye which did the looking. Through the microscope Hooke
saw that  tiny  creatures  have  the  same,  or  equivalent,  body  parts  as  larger  mammals  –  eyes,
mouths,  stomachs,  hairy  legs.  He  knew  his  eye  anatomy  and  his  geometrical  optics,  and
consequently he marvelled at the obviously tiny size of  “the Picture of  an Object that is painted
at the bottom of  one of  those Eyes which by a Microscope we discover in […] small Insects.”
Hooke had measured the limit of  human vision resolution at thirty seconds of  a degree.135 But in
an insect,  everything was proportionately smaller: the optic nerve and the faculty for processing
vision.  Surely  through such small  eyes  they  could “distinguish as  many single Parts  in  those
Pictures, as a Man can in a proportionate Picture at the bottom of  his Eye.”136 Because every eye
operated according to the geometrical optics he displayed in his  perspective box, insects  saw
phenomena that were literally invisible for humans.
In fact, because the material memory was how we experience duration, the lesson was
temporal  as  well  as  spatial. Time is  a  puzzle  for  the  empiricist,  Hooke  notes,  if  indeed  all
knowledge comes from the senses.137 We do not  directly  perceive  time with any of  the  five
external senses, so how do we come to have the impression of  its passing? The phenomenon is
made visible through instruments – clocks – and the movement of  the sun and stars. But what
about the other, more innate impression that we have that time is passing,  even  absent visible
phenomena? Hooke's answer is an internal sense. The soul senses time via memory, given the
135 Hooke, “Animadversions on the First Part of  the Machina Coelestis,” 7.
136 “Lectures of  Light,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 135.
137 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 139.
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order of  and distance between the ideas therein. The moment experienced as the present is the
time at which  the idea  at the centre of  the brain, closest to the soul,  is  formed.  Duration is
measured by an awareness of  the number of  ideas between any two.  Time's apparent speed is
therefore the speed at which the soul acts on ideas. This Hooke calculates. By the time someone
reaches 100 years of  age, assuming a solid 8 hours of  sleep a night (dreams notwithstanding), and
two thirds of  the rest of  their life discounted for “Infancy, Old Age, Sickness and Inadvertency,”
they may end up with a repository of  one million separate ideas. 138 The numbers, though faintly
absurd, give us an insight into Hooke's commitment to the material mind (and more loosely his
estimate of  his own level of  mental activity).  They also give us an  important insight into how
deep the sensitivity to relation and scale that runs through his discussion of  perception and ideas
goes. Time is a relationship between ideas, and a moment is the time it takes to create a new idea.
But ideas are bulky and material, and exist on the scale of  a human. Hooke says he could list one
hundred instances to make it clear that natural processes happen faster than we can form ideas,
and that  the “Phaenomena thereof  proceed only from the length of  time there is in the shortest
Moment of  a Man.”139 But other creatures have different limits:
I do not at all doubt but that the sensible Moments of  Creatures are somewhat proportion'd to
their Bulk, and that the less a Creature is, the shorter are its sensible Moments. [...] For when I
hear a Fly moving his Wings to and fro so many times, with such Swiftness as to make a
Sound, I  cannot  but  imagine,  that that  Fly must  be sensible  of  and distinguish at  least  3
Moments in time that it makes one of  those Strokes with his Wings, for that it is able to
regulate and guide it self  by the Motion of  them.140
Hooke was quite in agreement with Cavendish that different creatures have different
experiences of  the world. A fly, he supposes, quite likely experiences as many individual moments
138 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 143.
139 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 134.
140 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
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in its short life as a human does in their much longer one – in subjective time it really lives for as
long as a human. Phenomena emerge from the action of  qualities on senses, but no phenomena
can  reflect what the world is 'really'  like: the complete relativity of  perceptions  vanishes into
infinity. We call the length of  time captured by an idea a 'moment,' but “every sensible Moment
of  time is composed of  infinite Instants.”141 To return to the spatial case,  Hooke evinces  the
same insight with the microscope. By this instrument, we can (literally) see “that the least visible
Space [...] may be actually distinguished into a thousand sensible Spaces: And could we yet further
improve Microscopes, 'tis possible we might distinguish even a thousand more Spaces in every
one of  those.”142
What becomes finally clear from Hooke's instrumental approach to eyesight is that there
is no possibility of  just seeing what things are really like. We can and should trust the senses to tell
us things relevant to our survival, and if  we work carefully, with instruments and reasoning, we
can compound ideas to approach  a more comprehensive knowledge of  the qualities an object
has. But observations are always relational: all phenomena, for Hooke, arise from the interaction
of  the world with a particular size and sensitivity of  sense.  Considered on its own the world is
strictly invisible. Space and time reduce to an insensible infinity.  This is apparently the idea that
underlies  Locke's  and  Margaret  Cavendish's  criticisms  of  the  microscope.  The  instrument
conceived  –  as  it  popularly  was  –  as  a  sharper  eye  that  would  bring  an  empirically  minded
philosopher  closer  to  the  nature  of  things,  implied  an  old  connection  between  sight  and
knowledge that was unravelling in Hooke's time. In fact, in certain passages of  Hooke it is not at
all  clear  that  he  is  in  fact  a  realist  about  the  mechanisms  by  which  he  proposes  to  explain
phenomena. His  explanation  of  light,  he  says,  will  make  the  “manner  of  its  Operations
mechanically  and  sensibly  intelligible.”143 The  local  motion  that  underwrites  Hooke's  natural
philosophy may become, as it  was for Huygens, a model of  nature valuable for its intelligibility
141 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
142 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
143 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 135.
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and imaginative prompt, rather than its objective reality.144
The broadest lesson to emerge from Hooke's series of  lectures on light, vision, and
cognition, is his place in the various epistemological traditions historians have traced back to and
through the  early  modern  period.  He  was  an  experimenter  and a  worker  and a  pioneer  of
instrument  use  and  craft  knowledge.  But  he  was  also  a  rare  representative  in  mid-century
England of  the epistemological shift that was taking place in Europe generally. Edmund Husserl
suggested that with Descartes begins a “new manner of  philosophizing which seeks its ultimate
foundations  in  the  subjective,”  yet  still  claims “an  objectively  'true' and  metaphysically
transcendent validity.”145 This needed a kind of  psychological vindication of  absolute knowledge
unknown to the “ancients.” Later, in Locke and Hume, there is a recognition that natural truth,
considered absolutely, was out of  reach. What happened between was not only a shift in the way
the world  itself  was thought of  but  consequent rethinking of  the relation between people and
nature: how the senes and internal faculties functioned, and what could underwrite knowledge as
traditionally conceived. Hooke's ambition for optical instruments is part of  this shift.
By the means of  Telescopes, there is nothing so far distant but may be represented to our
view; and by the help of  Microscopes, there is nothing so small, as to escape our inquiry; hence
there is a new visible World discovered to the understanding. By this means the Heavens are
open'd, and a vast number of  new Stars, and new Motions, and new Productions appear in
them, to which all the antient Astronomers were utterly Strangers. By this the Earth it self,
which lyes so neer us, under our feet, shews quite a new thing to us, and in every little particle
of  its matter, we now behold almost as great a variety of  Creatures, as we were able before to
reckon up in the whole Universe it self.146
144 See for instance “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 131–135. For Huygens see Dear, The Intelligibility of  Nature, 25.
145 Husserl, The Crisis of  European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pt. 2, 81.
146 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. A2r.
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Hooke is not only talking about Galilean evidence against the Aristotelian cosmos, or
even the more general point that previous philosophers can not possibly have had a complete
knowledge  of  nature.  More  important,  I  take  it,  than  the  particulars  that  we  can  now  pay
attention to – the new evidence of  what the world is actually like – is the new evidence of  what we
are like:  utterly  unfit  to proclaim about the nature of  things merely from our perspective as
medium-sized land mammals.  Knowledge was not 'given' or guaranteed by the structure of  the
eye, but  produced by fallible, mediated,  very human means.  But in the right hands, this  was  a
powerful,  optimistic realisation  rather than  hopelessly  sceptical:  the mechanism  of  vision  was
adjustable  and  reproduceable.  The  eye  no  longer  directly  received  knowledge,  it  was  an
instrument of  natural history.
Hooke's  individual  philosopher turns out to be remarkably similar to the ideal of  the
corporate Royal Society. In the equivalence of  one's own visual experience and the engravings in
a travel book we can see the importance the Royal Society placed on listening to the accounts of
others as well as observing things for themselves. Wilkins wrote that the testimony of  others and
the direct experience of  the senses both gave rise to certain  knowledge – different types of
certainty  appropriate  for  different  sources  and subject  matters,  but  still  certainty.147 Hooke's
anthropology of  limited senses and a material storehouse memory, combined with the imitative
capacity of  artifice, almost necessitates a collaborative approach to natural philosophy. His ideas
on the corporate structure of  the enterprise are the topic of  the next chapter.
147 Wilkins, Of  the Principles and Duties of  Natural Religion, 5–9.
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Chapter 7: Roles and Causes
Method as Performance
After the more philosophical message of  the previous chapter, in this chapter I will
return  to  the  historical  context  of  Hooke's  work,  to  demonstrate  how  his  instrumental
epistemology fitted the institutionalised natural philosophy of  the Royal Society. The main focus
of  this final chapter is not so much on Hooke's works of  philosophy themselves but those places
in which he deals with more methodological ideas – particularly his General Scheme.1 Many of  the
epistemic and methodological ideas of  the previous chapters find some sort of  expression in this,
by far Hooke's most thoughtful and detailed presentation of  his ideas on the nature of  natural
philosophy.  Like  so  many  other  early  modern  methodological  pieces,  though,  Hooke's  is
unfinished.  He  wrote  the  first  two  of  three  projected  parts:  the  'Present  State  of  Natural
Philosophy' and the first half  of  the 'Method of  Building a Solid Philosophy': the “manner of
Preparing the Mind, and furnishing it with fit Materials to work on.” 2 This is essentially Hooke's
recommendations for compiling a natural history. The unwritten third part was then to describe
the work of  the philosopher: “the Rules and Methods of  proceeding or operating with this so
collected and qualify'd Supellex (history).”3 Hooke made great claims about the ease and success
of  this method, which he called the 'Philosophical Algebra' on  the  account that, as he said in
Micrographia,  “it is possible to do as much by this method in  Mechanicks,  as by  Algebra can be
perform'd in Geometry.”4 Hooke's optimism has meant the incompleteness of  the General Scheme
1 Full title: A General Scheme, or Idea of  the Present State of  Natural Philosophy, and How its Defects may be Remedied by a 
Methodical Proceeding in the making Experiments and Collecting Observations. Whereby to Compile a Natural History, as the 
Solid Basis for the Superstructure of  True Philosophy. Included by Waller in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 1–70.
2 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 7.
3 “General Scheme,” in ibid.
4 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D2v.
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has been lamented, and a lot of  what has been written on it has attempted to reconstruct what
Hooke's method of  raising axioms with geometrical certainty may have been.5
The general agreement is that Hooke meant nothing more than a systematic tabulation
of  the various possible explanations for a phenomenon, and then eliminating them one by one
until only one option remained.6 It is possible, Pugliese has argued, that this general idea became
explictly tied to John Wilkins' artificial language project, which Hooke worked on – and wrote the
design for a spring-balanced watch in – later in his career.7 Rather than the details – and there are
many in the intricate close readings of  Hooke given by Hesse, Oldroyd, and Pugliese – what I will
focus on in this chapter is the general impression one gets of  the tasks of  history and philosophy.
Hooke's label 'Philosophical Algebra' appears to refer to both to compiling histories and raising
axioms, and in various places it seems clear which he finds the more important role. It is not hard
to see some irony in Hooke's “hope,” from Micrographia's preface, that his
Labours will be no more comparable to the Productions of  many other Natural Philosophers,
who are now every where busie about greater things; then my little Objects are to be compar'd
to the greater and more beautiful  Works of  Nature, A Flea, a Mite, a Gnat, to an Horse, an
Elephant, or a Lyon.8
Micrographia exactly placed gnats on the same level as lions. They were as important as
large animals, if  not more so, in the project of  gathering natural knowledge – just as the historian
appears to be compared to the philosopher. In Hooke's work it is difficult sometimes to see what
is left for the philosopher besides book-keeping after the historian has finished their important
5 Patterson, “Hooke’s Gravitation Theory and Its Influence on Newton I: Hooke’s Gravitation Theory”; Hesse, 
“Hooke’s Philosophical Algebra”; Hesse, “Hooke’s Vibration Theory and the Isochrony of  Springs”; Oldroyd, 
“Robert Hooke’s Methodology of  Science”; Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke”; Pugliese, “The 
Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke: Method and Mechanics,” pp. 50-128. See also Michael Hunter's 
contribution to Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo. for a brief  summary (117-124).
6 See especially Hesse, “Hooke’s Philosophical Algebra”; Oldroyd, “Robert Hooke’s Methodology of  Science.”
7 Pugliese, “The Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke” especially 69ff. For Wilkins' universal character, see 
Maat, Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century; Hequembourg, “The Dream of  a Literal World”; Wilkins, 
An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language.
8 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. G2v.
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work.
Accordingly, this chapter follows the  current trend in historical scholarship in  giving a
broadly  sociological  grounding  of  much  seventeenth  century  method  talk.  The  changing
relationship between humans and nature, and the relations among people in new settings and
places of  knowledge reshaped the personas and roles of  those people involved in philosophy.9 A
guiding  assumption  for  what  follows  is  that  paying  attention  to  the  context  in  which
methodological works were written allows us to reduce talk of  ideal methods to the job or role
of  the person they describe – usually the author. This is, I think, particularly noticeable in the
case of  Hooke. Stephen Pumfrey and Michael Hunter in particular have illustrated Hooke's role
in defining his ambit within the early Royal Society, and, in compliment, how his reflections on
the prosecution of  natural philosophy grew from specific tasks.10 Indeed, this assumption has
underwritten much of  this thesis thus far,  as  with the project of  drawing insects for the king
blossoming into the vindication of  collaborative mechanical philosophy that is Micrographia. In
what follows I will show how Hooke used his position within the experimental and philosophical
community  as  a  stage  to  present  a  specific  idea  not  just  of  the  correct  method of  natural
philosophy,  but  of  his own work and abilities. I do not mean that Hooke's  General Scheme is
entirely a self-serving advertisement; only that  it  ought to  be read as an indication of  Hooke's
active  role  in  shaping  the  expectations  placed  on  Curators  of  the  Royal  Society  and,  more
broadly,  natural  historians  and  philosophers.  Hooke  learned  from  his  practice  performing
experiments,  and  his  experience  in  a  collaborative  organisation  gave  him  ideas  about
institutionalising experimental philosophy.
9 See for example Corneanu, Regimens of  the Mind; Harrison, The Fall of  Man and the Foundations of  Science; 
Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of  Early-Modern Philosophy. For Hooke and his milieu more 
particularly, see Wood, “Methodology and Apologetics”; Shapin, “Who Was Robert Hooke?”; Shapin, A Social 
History of  Truth; Shapin, The Scientific Life. On method more generally: Schuster and Yeo, The Politics and Rhetoric of
Scientific Method, especially John Schuster’s contribution.
10 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station”; Hunter, Establishing the New Science.
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It is  certainly not enough to call  Hooke 'Baconian'.11 P. B. Wood has written  of  the
“subtle misrespresentation and selective exposition”  of  details which allowed  Thomas  Sprat to
present a certain view of  the new institution in his History of  the Royal Society.12 The Fellows of  the
Royal Society  were  presented as collaborating on the collection of  particular facts,  evaluating
them, and disentangling them from general theories. The 'Baconianism' they publicly adhered to
was one of  naïve fact-gathering, and a deliberately random procedure of  conducting experiments
so as to make raising axioms from them more difficult.13 This was a disingenuous, or at least
selective, reading of  Bacon.  Wood fingered John Wilkins,  a man sensitive to possible  criticisms
the Royal Society may face, as the force behind Sprat's  history. Under his guidance,  the picture
the Society presented of  itself  was not  strictly accurate, but claimed its method was useful not
just for the acquisition of  knowledge but for the stability and productiveness of  Restoration
England. Looking at Hooke's concerns gives us a different angle on the situation.  If  he was to
provide  the  demonstrations  and  the  gentlemen  members  the  disinterested  assent  and  social
credibility, it is likely he not only saw more clearly the corporate structures that facilitated or
frustrated his work more clearly than they, but was influential in shaping them. My claim is not
that Hooke is interesting because he must have conformed to the methodology of  the Royal
Society and therefore offers a way to look at  it. He is interesting because his methodology was
the  method  that  arose  from  the  founding  of  the  institution  and  the  professionalisation  of
experimental natural philosophy.
There are two main narratives in what follows. First is Hooke's early curatorship and a
brief  methodological tract he wrote in 1663, and second is his other employment as a Gresham
College  lecturer  and  his  composition  of  the  General  Scheme.  As  Hooke  developed  the
instruments and epistemology we have seen in previous chapters, and will continue to see here,
11 Though such broad labels have a useful function in larger-scale histories. Recent scholarship has shown it is 
scarcely enough to call Bacon 'Baconian': Jalobeanu, “Bacon’s Natural History and the Senecan Natural Histories 
of  Early Modern Europe”; Giglioni, “From the Woods of  Experience to the Open Fields of  Metaphysics.” 
12 Wood, “Methodology and Apologetics,” 1.
13 Ibid., 7.
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he  importantly crafted a persona for himself,  by emphasising the importance of  his work to
natural philosophy and, from there, society and England.
Early Employment
Nothing  was  smooth about  the  early  days  of  Hooke's  employment  with  the  Royal
Society.  The  initial  idea  for  the  institution  did  not  involve  the  paid  position  of  Curator  of
Experiments that he would come to occupy, and the process of  creating one, defining its remit,
and sourcing the money to support it was one of  constant negotiation. Stephen Pumfrey begins
his  excellent history of  Hooke's curatorship by noting that in 1660 “neither Hooke,  nor the
Society's founders knew what a curator did.”14 The creation of  a paid curatorship was not simply
the creation of  a job, but also of  a new kind of  person involved in collaborative philosophical
enterprise. The first charter of  the Society, from August 1662, had no hint of  paid curators.15 In
its first years, the Royal Society worked on a system of  'virtuoso curators' – one Fellow or other
would curate,  'take care of', a particular experiment,  and  three other members,  appointed  on a
rotating basis,  would take notes on it and the following debate.16 The only stable offices were
those of  President, Treasurer, and Register,  this last in charge of  recording experiments. The
holders of  these offices were to change monthly, in the case of  the President, and annually in the
case of  the other two. The only people paid, in this early manifestation, were an amanuensis on a
salary  of  40s  per  year,  and  an  operator  on  £4,  both  plus  incidentals.17 Curators  could  be
recompensed by the treasurer for the expenses of  their experiments but not for their time.18
14 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 2.
15 The charters are included in The Record of  the Royal Society, 215ff. They are also available on the Royal Society 
website. For more on the founding of  the Royal Society see Sprat, The History of  the Royal Society; Webster, The 
Great Instauration; Hunter, Establishing the New Science.
16 Pumfrey notes the novelty of  the Society's use of  the word for this purpose: the Oxford English Dictionary 
references John Evelyn's diary entry about an experiment: Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 2.
17 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:6–7.
18 Ibid., 1:6.
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Most of  this changed fairly quickly. As regards Hooke, the details of  first year or so are
difficult  to fill  in.  He  was of  course well  known to many of  the important founders of  the
Society,  and at  a meeting on 10 April  1661  the Fellows  decided to discuss Hooke's  tract  on
capillary action, which had emerged from his work with Boyle and the air pump.19 Lisa Jardine
has plausibly suggested that he was present to carry out demonstration for them, even though his
name does not appear in the record books. In these days he was an invisible operator rather than
recognised philosopher.20 He was in contact with Robert Moray, who in August 1661 reported to
Wren the good news that Boyle's assistant would be taking over the task of  drawing insects for
the king.21 Through such involvement, Hooke's appetite was whetted.
On 5 November 1662, Hooke volunteered his services more substantially to the Society.
Apparently without mentioning the name of  Hooke, Moray “proposed a person willing to be
employed  as  a  curator  by  the  society.”22 Hooke,  at  25,  was  a  practiced  experimenter,  and
confident in his creative and mechanical abilities. His offer was “to furnish [the Society] every day,
on which they met, with three or four considerable experiments.” Crucially, he would begin the
work for free, “expecting no recompence till the society should get stock enabling them to give
it.” When the proposal was unanimously approved of, Hooke was named, and the Royal Society
had a regular, reliable source of  experiments.  Unpaid by the institution,  Hooke was still in the
service of  Boyle, who received “the thanks of  the society for dispensing with [Hooke],” a gesture
which no doubt  reflects the importance of  the arrangement for the Society,  and indicates how
much they expected of  their new curator.23
This was  important moment for the Society  and Hooke both. Pumfrey has suggested
that a position in London may have been created for Hooke in part because of  the Society's early
nervousness. Hooke was the only person capable of  operating the air pump successfully, and they
19 Ibid., 1:21.
20 Jardine, The Curious Life of  Robert Hooke, 94.
21 Wren, Parentalia, 211.
22 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:123.
23 Ibid., 1:124. Shapin notes that Hooke continued to refer to himself  as Boyle's employee: Shapin, “Who Was 
Robert Hooke?,” 264, footnote 34.
190
wanted him on hand to perform in front of  visitors with the emblematic instrument.24 He also
had the task that would become  Micrographia to get on with, and the Fellows soon began to
request to see his drawings.25 That both of  these projects were related to winning royal favour
might also explain somewhat why Boyle was willing to let his valuable assistant spend so much
time away. There were two important effects of  the new arrangement: Hooke came to dominate
the experimental aspect of  the meetings, and the role of  curator became enshrined in statute as a
paid office.
The Meaning of Experiment
Hooke's name first appears beside an experiment on 19 November 1662, and thereafter
with a regularity that implies at least part time residence in London, though he continued to
spend  time  in  Oxford.26 He  gradually  became  the  omnipresent  experimenter.  Pumfrey  has
charted the declining number of  assignments given at the weekly meetings to people other than
him: 18 out of  26 in 1663 fell to 17 in 1664, 7 in 1665, 6 in 1666, and 0 in 1667. 27 Typically in
these early years, the virtuoso curators were assigned experiments by the Society, and they would
have little control over the topics of  their investigations. Hooke was not only asked for those
delegated by the Society, but also “experiments of  his own.”28 Especially after the recess caused
by the plague in 1666, Hooke's interests and experiments began to determine the direction of  the
whole Society's work. Whether this was due more to his enthusiasm for the role or to the other
Fellows' willingness to sit back and be entertained by him – or more likely both – he grew to be
24 Hooke wrote to Boyle on 5 June 1663 apologising that he was late returning to Oxford because he had been 
asked to prepare the air pump the following week: Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert 
Boyle, 2001, 2:81. He was given lodgings at Gresham College later that year to work with the operator setting up 
devices, and an allowance of  20 shillings a week while he was preparing the royal entertainments: Birch, The 
History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:315, 340.
25 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 26.
26 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:125. When he was away from Boyle for extended periods he would 
write letters recounting what went on in the meetings, as I mentioned in chapter 3. See Hunter, Clericuzio, and 
Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, especially June and July 1663.
27 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 6.
28 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:124.
191
indispensable. Christopher Wren was not exaggerating when he wrote to Hooke in April 1665: “I
know you are full of  employment for the Society wch. you all-most wholy preserve together by
your constant paines.”29 On 3 June 1663, Hooke was elected Fellow of  the Royal Society, his un-
gentlemanly  status  reflected  in  a  waiver  of  subscription  fees.30 But  any  suggestion  that  his
Fellowship was reward for his continuing hard work is belied by the details  – he clearly was as
important to them as they were to him.
Even at  this  early  stage,  Hooke recognised that  the  value  of  experiments was  as  a
collective endeavour. In a short tract, undated but which R. T. Gunther supposes to have been
written in 1663, Hooke outlined the purpose of  experiments and the best way to go about them
in  Royal Society meetings.31 Hooke is  very clear that  experiments should not be aimless,  but
directed at the “confirming or destroying of  any preconceived Notion,” or at least a part thereof,
and he gives a five step plan for how to do this.32 The Curator should make clear why they are
doing the experiment,  carefully  conduct it,  and point out which aspects of  it  are particularly
relevant to “his Theory.” Afterwards, the people present should discuss what the trial showed and
propose  variations  on  it,  and  “raise  such  Axioms  and  Propositions,  as  are  thereby  plainly
demonstrated  and  proved.”  Then,  everything  “material  and  circumstantial  in  the  whole
Entertainment of  the […] Society” should be recorded and read at the next meeting for further
discussion, before the account was signed off  by witnesses.33
Such  tracts,  as  well  as  the  experimental  demonstrations  they  describe  and therefore
Hooke's experimental persona, should be read as a performance.  I mean this not simply in the
entertaining way the Fellows often seemed to hope for, but in the broader sociological sense of
achieving meaning by being enacted in a social setting replete with expectations, rules, and rituals.
29 Quoted in Bennett, “Robert Hooke as Mechanic and Natural Philosopher,” 33.
30 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:240.
31 Gunther supplies no reason for this dating, though it is lent credibility by its place in Derham's collection 
immediately after a tract from February 1662/3, and before a letter from Oldenburg dated August 1665. Also 
notable is the fact that Hooke does not appear to conceive of  himself  as the only curator, and the role appears 
to be an abbreviation for “Whosoever...doth rightly make Experiments,” rather than an office as such. Hooke, 
Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 26–28; Gunther, Early Science in Oxford, 6:111–112.
32 Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 26.
33 Ibid., 27.
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Experimental  success  or  failure  was  not  only  a  matter  of  mechanical  manipulation  of
instruments,  it  was  assessed  according  to  a  demonstration's  adherence  to  an  idealised
experimental protocol. That Hooke had ideas about what this ideal was which sometimes differed
from  those  that  were  followed  or  argued  for  by  other  Fellows  has  had  some  important
consequences for his career and reputation.
Hooke's short tract echoes much of  the general outline of  how meetings would run
when the Society was founded, as recorded by Birch. But the lack of  details of  the Society's
meeting records themselves shows a different picture.34 These records are generally tersely written
and  undetailed.  The  early  Society  did  not  always  seem  to  recognise  the  importance  of
comprehensive records of  their demonstrations. Relatedly, Michael Cooper and Steven Shapin
have both pointed out the excessive expectations placed on Hooke and the other curators, which
often took the form of  impatience with failed demonstrations.35 Hooke may have been uniquely
able to manipulate the air pump, but the Fellows seemed to want to watch it do what they knew it
would.  Or,  in  January  1662/3:  “Mr.  Hooke  made  the  experiment  of  condensing  air  by  the
pressure of  water; but the trial not agreeing with the hypothesis, it was ordered to be repeated at
the next meeting.”36 At the same meeting he tried an experiment with falling bodies but was told
to practice it in private before showing it to the Society. The Fellows, drunk on instruments,
wanted to witness the remarkable and immediate confirmations of  hypotheses, not the slow and
careful process of  limiting ideas, or even the necessary preliminary of  determining how a device
related to a particular theory. As Ludwik Fleck famously said, and as Hooke's recognition that an
experiment can destroy preconceived notions suggests, 'failed' experiments can be as illustrative
and important  as  successes.37 But  it  was  not  just  the  public  face  of  the  Society  which  was
designed to exhibit their successes; their private records were often no less glossy.
34 “[E]verything of  importance” should be recorded, debated, and brought back at the next meeting in case 
anything else had been thought of  in the meantime. Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:7.
35 Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 15; Shapin, “Who Was Robert Hooke?,” 282–285.
36 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:177.
37 Fleck, The Genesis and Development of  a Scientific Fact.
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To  take  this  point  further,  Hooke  has  been  chastised  by  historians  and  his
contemporaries alike for the piecemeal and unsystematic nature of  a lot of  his writing. But as
Frédérique Aït-Touati  has pointed out,  Hooke's  ideal  mode of  philosophical  publication was
exactly unfinished and sporadic tracts – contributions to a storehouse of  knowledge rather than
attempts  towards  comprehensive  treatises.38 The  nature  of  experimental  investigation  was
expressly collaborative: each member of  the community would build on the work of  the others. 39
In fact, the early modern experimental experience often resulted in detailed first-person reports
about,  in  Peter Dear's  words,  “how,  in one instance,  the world had behaved .”40 But whereas
Boyle, for instance, marshalled these narratives into sprawling tracts on a single topic, Hooke's
works  show,  as  Aït-Touati  says,  the  “refusal  of  any  preconceived  order,  the  voluntary
incompleteness of  findings, and their variety.”41
It is important to recognise this difference within the community. Hooke was, if  not
influential, then at least active in negotiating the meaning and value of  experiments in his early
days as a curator. The influence of  these negotiations on Hooke's life and career are poignant,
even a little tragic. They form part of  a narrative about professionalisation and class in early
modern England, and have been discussed by Shapin and Pumfrey among others. 42 During the
early years of  the Society, with Hooke as curator, it was Oldenburg's task to maintain the records
of  meetings. The resentment Hooke had for Oldenburg is famous – following the latter's support
of  Huygens  over  Hooke  as  the  inventor  of  the  spring-balance  watch  it  was  Hooke's
interpretation that the Secretary had deliberately left  details  out of  the Journal  Book to hide
Hooke's invention.43 It must also have been frustrating for him to say the least when in August
38 Aït-Touati, “‘The Spirit of  Invention,’” 112ff; see also Hunter’s contribution to Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 
especially the section “The Reluctant Author.”
39 Aït-Touati, “‘The Spirit of  Invention,’” 113; see also Hooke’s own words in his preface to Micrographia.
40 Dear, “Totius in Verba,” 152.
41 Aït-Touati, “‘The Spirit of  Invention,’” 112.
42 Shapin, “Who Was Robert Hooke?”; Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station.” For a broader context, see also the 
likes of   Hill, The World Turned Upside Down; Thompson, The Making of  the English Working Class.
43 An interpretation apparently borne out by an entry (or lack-thereof) in Oldenburg's draft minutes for the 
meeting of  23 June 1670. Oldenburg had left room for Hooke to pencil in a description of  his watch, and the 
latter had done so. Oldenburg then apparently began to ink over Hooke's words, before stopping and deleting 
the entry. There is no mention of  the demonstration in the Royal Society Journal Book. See Adams and Jardine, 
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1679  the  Council  ordered  Hooke  to  “print  a  relation  of  all  experiments,  observations,  and
relations made and brought to the Society by himself  since his first coming into it.” 44 But by then
Hooke was not blameless. At this time he was Secretary, and the task of  keeping records was his
responsibility,  as  well  as  printing  the  Philosophical  Transactions and  maintaining  the  Society's
correspondence. His neglect of  these jobs saw him shunted out of  office and back to the role
solely of  curator. There, he fell foul of  the 'Williamson Orders,' new regulations, named for the
new president of  the Society Joseph Williamson, which made curators more responsible for the
recording of  their own experiments, and which Hooke himself  likely helped to draw up and
instigate.45 Hooke's outrage at Oldenburg and frustration when his discoveries were not properly
recorded gave way in later life to resignation and snide remarks that the Society was wasting their
money asking him to demonstrate things he did years ago.46 As Dear notes, the institution “in
reality failed even to act as a successful coordinator of  the projects of  individuals.”47
Relatedly,  these  are  the  sorts  of  contextual  standards  we  as  historians  need  to  pay
attention to in discussing the work of  a character like Hooke. Evaluating his work against the
criteria of  his peers ignores the extent to which Hooke succeeded in prosecuting his own design,
and the Royal Society failed to institutionalise experimental philosophy according to him. His idea
of  the value of  experimental philosophy was intimately  concerned with experiments as public
'trials',  in a  literal  sense.  Their  results  need not  be expected or obvious,  the value  of  public
demonstration was rather a crowdsourcing of  opinion and insight.  Rather than only share the
completed and determinate results of  people's experience, Hooke thought the messy beginnings
of  experiment ought to be distributed. Hooke was conscious of  (and sometimes complicit in) the
“The Return of  the Hooke Folio”; Hooke, “Hooke Folio”; Hall, Henry Oldenburg: Shaping the Royal Society.
44 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:501.
45 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 8; Hunter, Establishing the New Science, chap. 6. While his minutes as 
Secretary begin well, within months they deteriorate and become full of  gaps and promisory notes, and he 
completely neglected the Record Book for the first three years of  his Secretaryship. See Adams and Jardine, 
“The Return of  the Hooke Folio.”
46 For example, in a lecture given on 24 May 1699, Hooke refers to the Society's request for an investigation into 
the effect of  atmospheric refraction on astronomical observations, which he had discussed in Observation 58 of
Micrographia and lectured on in the 1660s. The lecture is preserved as Royal Society Classified Papers 20/93: 
Hooke, “Of  the Refraction of  the Atmosphere.”
47 Dear, “Totius in Verba,” 147.
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shortcomings  in  the  Society's  supposedly  collaborative  and  gradual  approach  to  natural
philosophy almost from their founding.
Professional Natural Philosophy
The other important effect of  Hooke's sustained curatorship was the eventual creation
of  the office of  'curator'. The second charter of  the Royal Society, which listed 'curator' among
the offices of  the Society, was drawn up in April 1663, five months after  the Fellows invited
Hooke  to  “sit  amongst  them.”48 Statutes  were  likewise  created  for  “Curators  by  Office”,
predicting that curators would become full-time employees of  the Society, but still  allowing for
occasional payments to people who were engaged with other positions.49
It was a while before anything came of  this, and the source of  Hooke's money was a
continuing  problem. Around this time  the council  were growing concerned about  the Society's
subscription fees. In May 1663 President Brouncker ordered all the Fellows to “pay their whole
arrears unto this day.”50 The concern was well founded – the members paid their fees so rarely
that  the Society was almost £1,500 in arrears  ten years after its founding.51 That Hooke was
exempt from subscription fees perhaps recognised the importance of  his work for the Society,
but in reality  he was not the only one to escape paying.  That “the farr greater Number [of
Fellows were]  Gentlemen, free, and unconfin'd” may have made the Royal Society a model of
early modern credibility and trust, but lacking royal patronage and reliant on these gentlemen for
money, they failed as an institution to provide for their one really necessary member.52
48 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:124.
49 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 6, footnote 18. For the statutes see The Record of  the Royal Society, 287ff.
50 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:237.
51 Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 8.
52 Sprat, The History of  the Royal Society, 67. Boyle, by way of  comparison, was the son of  the first Earl of  Cork, his 
father made rich through aggressive land grabs in Ireland. Since the mid-1630s Boyle had received at least 
£2,000 of  his father's rents, and his fortune only grew as he inherited more estates. Sir Robert Moray was the 
son of  a Scottish laird, a Privy Councillor and Lord of  Session. Such titles can be found throughout the 
founding members of  the Royal Society. See Shapin, A Social History of  Truth, chap. 4, for a brief  history of  
Boyle’s lineage and its influence on his subsequent philosophical persona. A more comprehensive view of  Boyle 
Senior can be found in Canny, The Upstart Earl.
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I do not mean to rehash the idea of  Hooke as a philosophical servant, excluded from
the world of  those around him.53 The point is rather that despite the decision that he ought to be
rewarded by the Society for his work, institutionalisation of  Hooke's role never really happened.
This was not a problem unique to Hooke – Michael Hunter has written of  Nehemiah Grew's
similar situation reliant on a member of  the Royal Society rather than the organisation itself. In
1672 John Wilkins canvassed the Fellows for donations to pay Grew, a practicing physician in
Coventry, to move to London and continue his research into plant anatomy. The Society agreed
on a salary £50, with Wilkins in charge of  collecting subscriptions.54 Grew moved to London, but
just a few months later Wilkins died, and Grew never received even one full year's salary.55 Grew's
subsequent letter to Oldenburg emphasises his disappointment and the uncertainty he felt about
being able to continue in London without the influence of  Wilkins, and sure enough he soon
moved back to Coventry to resume his practice.56 Richard Lower seems to have rejected the
Society's request that he become anatomical curator in 1667 for much the same reasons – he
could earn a much better living as a practicing physician than as a curator. 57 Eventually it was
Hooke who managed to secure Grew employment back in London by recommending him as
deputy to Jonathan Goddard, Professor of  Physic at Gresham College. Once established there at
the end of  1673, Grew found means to stay in the capital to become joint Secretary for the Royal
Society with Hooke in 1677.
Hooke's role is interesting in both of  these other situations. 1667 was a busy time for
Hooke with work for the Society and as a Surveyor for the City of  London in the aftermath of
the Great Fire.58 His curatorial services were flagging, particularly in the area of  anatomy, where
he was increasingly unhappy at requests to vivisect dogs. He performed such a vivisection in
53 For the original argument, see Shapin, “Who Was Robert Hooke?” And for an important response, see Feingold,
“Robert Hooke: Gentleman of  Science.” For more on Hooke's inclusive world see Iliffe, “Material Doubts.”
54 Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 264. The agreement is noted in Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 
3:47.
55 Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 266.
56 The letter is reproduced in ibid., 266–268.
57 Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 16–17.
58 For more on Hooke's rebuilding work, see Cooper, “A More Beautiful City.”
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1664, cutting open the chest and keeping the dog alive with bellows, but found the cruelty too
much and resolved never to do it again.59 In 1667,  Society interest  in the experiment renewed,
and Hooke  quickly  pointed to  his “friend”  who  had done many such experiments  – perhaps
Lower.  Throughout the second half  of  the year Hooke and Lower were asked to follow up on
different aspects of  dissection, and Lower performed various experiments about circulation in
dogs and transfusing blood from a sheep to a human.60 Hooke meanwhile claimed vaguely to be
working on a “contrivance” with which to perform his experiments, and apparently tried to let
the matter drop. When pressed, he repeatedly promised to bring something to the next meeting,
his usual ingenuity apparently not serving him very well on a matter he found distasteful. 61 What
is interesting is Hooke's response to requests to do something he did not want to do. He seemed
unable to perform the experiment, but equally unable to outright refuse the Society's orders. In
September,  perhaps  predicting  the  flurry  of  requests  to  come,  Hooke  had written  to  Boyle
saying, “I hope I shall prevail upon Dr. Lower, and for him, so as to get him anatomical curator to
the Society,”  not least  because of  his  “most dextrous hand in dissecting.”62 Whether  directly
influenced by Hooke or, perhaps indirectly by the contrast between Lower's success and Hooke's
reticence, the Society did decide that Wilkins should talk to Lower about becoming an anatomical
curator.63 He did so, but Lower also said he was too busy with his physician's practice.64 Hooke
was specialising. He never seems to have considered the position of  Curator to have been unique
– performing experiments was the bread and butter of  natural philosophy, and as such was far
59 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:482; Hooke to Boyle, 10 November 1664: Hunter, Clericuzio, and 
Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 2:399.
60 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:181–216. Lower seems to have been happy to perform the 
experiments. Sometimes he was assisted by Edmund King, who seems almost to have relished them, helping 
Lower with no (noted official) bidding and in July providing the Society with accounts of  seven gruesome 
experiments he had performed apparently on his own initiative. Ibid., 2:189–192.
61 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:209, 216, 227. The lecture included as an Appendix to this thesis is 
interesting in this regard: Hooke touchingly claims it is one of  the microscope's great benefits that they leave the
subject intact through investigation.
62 Hooke to Boyle, 5 September 1667. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 
3:332.
63 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:206.
64 Ibid., 2:212.
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more than the work of  any one person.65
The salary difficulties Grew faced in the 1670s give Hooke's experiences a decade earlier
a fatalistic air.  In July 1664 the Society had agreed on a yearly £80 salary for Hooke as curator,
but it was not obvious where this would come from.66 He received his first payments from the
Royal Society, totalling £50, only two years later, in November 1666. At the time, the Society was
£678 5s. in arrears.67 When Hooke recommended Gresham College to Grew he was a professor
and resident there, and was all too familiar with the possibilities for additional income the College
provided. 
The Royal Society  had been eager for Hooke to secure an appointment  at Gresham.
They met there, and a professorship would not only give their curator convenient lodgings, but a
salary at a time when they could not afford to pay him.  In May 1664 Hooke applied for the
position of  Professor of  Geometry, recently vacated by Isaac Barrow, but lost out to Arthur
Dacres.68 Another opportunity existed though, and the Society were determined not to let it get
away.  Sir  John  Cutler  –  a  wealthy  member  of  the  Grocers'  Company,  slightly  self-serving
benefactor  of  various  civic  institutions,  and  acquaintance  of  Fellow  John  Graunt  –  had
apparently promised to inaugurate for Hooke a £50 per annum lectureship on “the histories of
trades” at Gresham.69 Hooke wrote to Boyle in October 1664 to relay the good news that he had
moved into Gresham College in the summer, and that  Cutler had “not only kept his word, but
been better than it,” sending half  a year's salary in advance. But he also found himself  “engaged
in a very great design, which I fear I shall find a very hard, difficult, and tedious task, and that is,
65 It is worth noting also Hooke's introduction of  Denis Papin to the Society in 1679. Papin was offered scribal 
work by the Society, but proved an ingenious mechanic and was quickly promoted to curator. See Pumfrey, 
“Ideas Above His Station”, footnote 30; Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 3:486, 491–504; Birch, The 
History of  the Royal Society, 1757, 4:277.
66 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:453.
67 Royal Society Account Books I, cited in Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, footnote 38.
68 Gunther, Early Science in Oxford, 6:179, footnote; Pugliese, “The Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke,” 2–4. 
Both cite for their information regarding Hooke's bid for the Geometry chair John Ward's Memoires relating to 
Gresham College, preserved in a manuscript (Book I, British Library Additional Manuscript 6195).
69 See Hunter, Establishing the New Science., pp. 283-288 for some background on Cutler and suggestion of  his 
reasons for endowment, as well as more on the following story about Hooke's employment.
199
the compiling a history of  trades and manufactures.”70
The Society's aforementioned resolution, in July 1664, to pay Hooke an £80 salary had
an important caveat. The amount was to be kept secret until Hooke was secure in his Cutlerian
lectureship.  It  was  the  Society's  aim that  £50 would come from Cutler,  and  only  £30 from
Fellows' subscriptions.71 Hooke was apparently happy with the arrangement, but the merger of
incomes implied a merger of  positions.72 The Society wanted Cutler's money to support the work
Hooke did for them, not him. When the lectureship was announced before the full Society on 9
November 1664, a delegation was sent to get Cutler's word that he was “willing to refer it to the
president, council, and fellows of  the Royal Society of  London [...] to direct and appoint the said
Mr. Hooke how many lectures he shall read, and when, and upon what subjects; or what kind of
inquiries,  by  way  of  experiment,  he  shall  be  engaged  to  prosecute.”73 With  an  insidious
semicolon,  the  Royal  Society  were  explicitly  conflating  Cutler's  endowment with  Hooke's
curatorship, rather than seeing it as payment for a separate position. As they thanked had Boyle
for lending them Hooke's services, so they thanked Cutler for paying “Mr. Hooke 50l. per annum.
for such employment, as the Royal Society should put him upon.”74
This, it  would become  clear,  was  a subversion of  Cutler's intentions.  Though Cutler's
reasons  for  founding  the  lectureship  are  not  very  clear,  it  seems  it  was  intended for  public
education about trade practices. Likely the Society thought his patronage was a gesture for the
benefit of  his own reputation, and that he would be as hands off  as the Gresham Trustees, who
70 Hooke to Boyle, 6 October 1664. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 
2:342–344. Cutler could well have had a hand in Hooke's failed application to the Geometry Professorship. In 
later litigation hearings between Cutler and Hooke, Hooke mentioned running into his benefactor in a public 
house just after the failed application and mentioning his disappointment “by the deportment of  some of  the 
Electors to whome or one of  them [Cutler] had some relation” (an extended quote from the hearing is given in 
Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 287.) Cooper suggests the most likely explanation for Hooke's failure is “a 
conspiracy between Cutler, Foote [Samuel, Cutler's brother-in-law, who was on the election committee], and the 
Bateman brothers [likewise] to save Hooke for Cutler's sponsorship” (Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 24.)
71 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:453.
72 When the hitherto secret details of  the Office of  Curator were made public and Hooke was proposed by 
Wilkins for the position on 23 November 1664, the salary was set at £30 per year. Hooke was recorded to be 
happy with the lowered rate given the “fifty pounds a year, upon the account of  reading lectures of  experimental
philosophy” that he was to receive from Cutler. Ibid., 1:490, 496.
73 Ibid., 1:484.
74 Ibid., 1:479.
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dealt with weary resignation with the routine chaos that was the College.75 After March 1665,
when Hooke petitioned for his application for the Geometry post to be re-examined and was
duly elected to that position as well he had little difficulty discussing a wide variety of  things in
those lectures.76 The many times that a Fellow reported to the Society that Cutler was leaving the
ambit of  the lectures to the Society also might indicate that they were quite deliberate about
subverting the public philosophy of  the College to their own ends.77 When the Council debated
the number and topic of  the lectures, the latter was settled on “the History of  Nature and Art.”78
They  were  to  be  given  in  the  same  room  as  and  immediately  preceding  Society  meetings,
indicating the two offices were intended to be connected, and the lectures of  interest to and
attended by Fellows.79
Where the Society saw a way to maintain their Curator, Cutler saw his money being used
for something he did not want to pay for. Cutler's  patronage  gave Hooke means, but it  also
resulted  in litigation over  salary  and  commitments  which  was  only  resolved on  Hooke's  61st
birthday. On 18 July 1696, Cutler's estate was ordered to pay arrears, having withheld his salary,
and Hooke was overwhelmed. “I was Born this Day of  July 1635. and God has given me a new
Birth,  may I never forget his Mercies  to me; whilst  he gives me Breath may I praise him.” 80
Hooke's diary was not usually so emotive; receiving his settlement clearly meant a lot to Hooke,
75 Michael Cooper relates the state of  the College following a report in 1676: “Only two professors (one was John 
Mapletoft, Professor of  Physic, the other was Hooke) were resident in the College; the rest, having let their 
lodgings, were either living at ease in the country or overseas, or pursuing their careers in other places. Thomas 
Baines, Professor of  Music, had let his lodgings and stable to Elias Harvey. Sir Andrew King rented the stable of
Walter Pope, the Professor of  Astronomy, but lodged in the College's public rooms. Walter Pope's lodgings were
either empty or let to Mr Barfoot (it could not be ascertained which). A Mr Crispe, who rented the lodgings of  
Roger Meredith, Professor of  Law, had converted the stable and hay room into a hall and kitchen and made a 
door and steps out into Broad Street” (Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 25). Ten years later the Trustees found 
“the same in great disorder” (ibid.).
76 Cf. his 'Lectures of  Light.' See Pugliese, “The Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke,” 2–4, for more on the 
situation.
77 Wilkins related to the Society that Cutler had told him he was resolute in paying Hooke his salary for doing 
whatever work the Society required of  him, and William Petty reported that Cutler had “intimated” the 
management of  the position should be left to the Society. Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 1:479, 499, 
503.
78 Ibid., 1:499, 503.
79 Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 292; Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 24.
80 “The Life of  Dr. Robert Hooke,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, xxv. Hooke's actually wrote “D O M S H L G I S 
S,” which Waller then expanded: “Deo Opt. Max. summus Honor, Gloria in secula secularum, Amen.”
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more than simply the money involved. Moved to think of  a higher power and his own humanity,
Hooke's words have a sense of  closure and fulfilment. Cooper has suggested he saw the decision
as a vindication of  his life as a natural philosopher, and as someone defined by his status as
reliant employee rather than free, unconfin'd gentleman, this seems a likely suggestion.81 Towards
the end of  his life his lectures are peppered with frustrated asides – the Royal Society repeat
experiments again and again, people do not record or share their observations, knowledge is kept
in closed communities. His reaction to the settlement evokes a sense of  just treatment by a power
greater than those whose mercy he was immediately at, and who regularly frustrated him.
Pumfrey has equated Hooke's position to a professional career such as a government
official,  teacher,  or  land  steward.  These  careers  potentially  rewarded intellectual  and physical
labour with elevated social status. Generally beginning with a low status and low salary, and often
a patron, the possibility of  becoming 'pseudo-gentry' beckoned.82 But the difference for Hooke
was the ascent was unestablished and insecure. A patron rewards their client for things the patron
wants, but a professional receives a salary for fulfilling a role. There was no precedent for Hooke's
role,  and he worked to establish it. Arrangements like the one between the Society and Cutler,
which Hooke had no say in, represented a failure to do this and stabilise his position as  their
employee, working for the institution and rewarded by them for his labour.
Out of  all of  this payroll  confusion came the  General Scheme.  It is likely the result of
Moray  suggesting  in  February  1664/5  that  “Mr.  Hooke's  lecture  might  be  perfected  and
printed.”83 Which lecture  Moray means  is  not  entirely  clear,84 but there  is  significant  overlap
between  the  General  Scheme and  a  lecture  Hooke  gave  sometime  after  the  lectureship  was
81 Bennett et al., London’s Leonardo, 21.
82 Pumfrey, “Ideas Above His Station,” 11; see also Stewart, The Rise of  Public Science.
83 Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:16.
84 In general it is difficult to pinpoint which of  Hooke's lectures belong where, but Pugliese and Hunter have both 
worked to identify some: Pugliese, “The Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke,” 11ff; Hunter, Establishing the 
New Science, 299–301.
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inaugurated in October 166485 and March 1665.86 In both  the  General Scheme and this lecture,
Hooke lists the same attributes required of  the natural historian, and uses the same examples to
illustrate how discoveries about one thing can lead to discoveries about others. There is a passage
which appears almost verbatim in both and that has been added later to the lecture manuscript,
written on a separate sheet and attached. This at least indicates that Hooke returned to the lecture
to edit it after he had completed it, though whether before or after he delivered it is unclear.87
Hesse has dated the General Scheme to 1666; Wood to 1665; and Pugliese and – following
him – Hunter,  to  1668.88 The disagreement  comes from a  confusion of  publications  in  the
Philosophical Transactions, and there is good reason to prefer Hesse's original dating.89 This date is
85 Hooke's first Cutlerian lecture is probably the first part of  the manuscript Royal Society Classified Papers 
20/50(b). This is a straightforward acknowledgement of  Cutler for “promoting of  Soe Excellent and Usefull a 
Designe as the Compiling of  A Philosophicall history.” (fol. 110, reproduced in Hunter, Establishing the New 
Science, 337.) Writing to Boyle on 6 October 1664, Hooke mentioned he is so busy  that “[t]he most I think I 
shall be able to do in this business this term [...] will be only to make a short speech, both in praise of  Sir John, 
my noble patron, and of  the excellency and usefulness of  the design it self, and of  what method and course I 
shall take in it” (see Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001, 2:344.)
86 The lecture is preserved as Royal Society Classified Papers 20/50(a), and has been reproduced by David 
Oldroyd: Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke.” It seems to immediately precede a lecture Hooke gave 
about comets Hooke was ordered to publish in March. Birch, The History of  the Royal Society, 1756, 2:19. This 
lecture is preserved as London Metropolitan Archive CLC/495/MS01757, 11, formerly London Guildhall 
Library Ms. 1757, 11.
87 Compare: Hooke, Posthumous Works, 29; Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke,” 154.
88 Hesse, “Hooke’s Philosophical Algebra,” 68, footnote 3; Wood, “Methodology and Apologetics,” 24; Pugliese, 
“The Scientific Achievement of  Robert Hooke,” 9–10; Hunter, Establishing the New Science, 299, footnote 70.
89 She and Pugliese both point to the same internal evidence – Hooke mentions his discovery “about two Years 
since” of  the “Motion of  [Jupiter] about its own Axis, by means of  a somewhat darker spot in the Body of  it” 
(Posthumous Works, 15). Hesse gives the correct date of  this discovery – 9 May 1664 – but gives the reference for 
a different observation, published in the Philosophical Transactions on 2 July 1666 (1665-1666, 1:245). This 
observation, also by Hooke, and also of  Jupiter, was made on 26 June 1666. Pugliese takes this later date to be 
the one Hooke mentions in the General Scheme, and therefore dates the text to 1668, two years later. The missing 
publication, of  the May 1664 observation, was in fact published in the Philosophical Transactions on 6 March 1665 
as 'A Spot in one of  the Belts of  Jupiter' (1665-1666, 1:3). A third monograph in the Transactions settles the 
matter. This article, published between the two others, reports that in addition to the shadows of  the moons 
passing over Jupiter, “there hath been observed, by Mr. Hook first (as is mentioned in Numb. 1. of  these Transact.)
and since by M. Cassini, a permanent Spot in the Disque of  Jupiter; by the help whereof, they have been able to 
observe, not onely that Jupiter turns upon his own Axis, but also the Time of  such conversion; which he 
estimates to be, 9 hours and 56 minutes” (Philosophical Transactions 1665-1666, 1:143). The key is the addition of  
the discovery of  the period of  revolution – “not onely” the revolution itself. The discovery simply that Jupiter 
rotates was surely that of  9 May 1664, when Hooke observed a spot on its surface and “observing it from time 
to time, he found, that within 2 hours after, the said Spot had moved from East to West, about half  the length 
of  the Diameter of  Jupiter” (Philosophical Transactions 1665-1666, 1:3). The observations are easily conflated, but 
the discovery Hooke references is surely the one from 1664. Two years after that, in 1666, he wrote the General 
Scheme.
In fact, Hooke also includes a mention of  the issue in his later Lectiones Cutlerianae, in a small editorial aside: “The
Revolution of  the body of  [Jupiter] upon its Axis I first discovered in May 1664, and published in the first 
Transaction, which was a considerable time before it was discovered by Monsieur Cassini; but we are obliged to 
him for the perfecting the Theory, as we are also for many other rare Discoveries and excellent improvements in 
Astronomy” (Hooke, “Microscopium,” 78).
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given further credibility by a letter from Oldenburg to Boyle on 27 January 1666 referencing what
sounds like Hooke's methodological tract: “Mr Hook has also ready (having shewed it to me and
others) a Method for writing a Naturall History, which, I think, cutts out work enough for all
Naturalists in the World; and intends as I heare, to print it ere long.”90 No other methodological
work by Hooke (except the Preface to the already published Micrographia) was intended for print.
Furthermore,  what  sounds  like  a  criticism from Oldenburg  was  of  course  the  point  of  the
General Scheme: a description of  the work of  naturalists, which Hooke himself  admitted seemed
“infinite and impossible to be completed.”91
If  this  is  correct  it  would provide a  neat  efficient  cause  for  the  General  Scheme,  but
perhaps the details are not so important.  Either way it certainly  overlaps considerably with the
content of  early Cutlerian lectures, and is thus strongly related to his employment, his role in the
Society,  and  in  London's  philosophical  community.92 The General  Scheme is  not  simply  an
unfinished and unpublished tract which details Hooke's personal ideas about the proper method
of  natural philosophy. When Hooke stood in front of  his audience of  Fellows and the London
public  and delivered  it,  he  was  making  a  public  proposal  about  the  roles  and structures  of
knowledge creation which were in the process of  being negotiated and institutionalised, and in
which Hooke himself  was implicated and invested. It was  a performance  which, alongside his
experimental demonstrations, shaped his role and persona in the experimental project.
90 Oldenburg to Boyle, 27 January 1666. In Hunter, Clericuzio, and Principe, The Correspondence of  Robert Boyle, 2001,
3:46.
91 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 28.
92 That Hooke was a long time in thinking about the issues in the General Scheme is evident from a mention in 
Micrographia's preface, written in 1664, that he might “in another Discourse […] attempt to propose some 
Considerations of  the manner of  compiling a Natural and Artificial History, and of  so ranging and registring its 
Particulars into Philosophical Tables, as may make them most useful for the raising of  Axioms and Theories.” 
Hooke, Micrographia, sig. B1v.
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Hooke's Histories
With the opening lines of  the lecture, Hooke  let his audience know,  in no uncertain
terms, the importance of  experiments and observations.
Philosophy, though of  almost as great an age as the world, is yet as much in its infancy as
ever[.] [I]t grows not but as the antient Mythologists fained Cupid it is for ever childish, and
never has arrived to a manly perfection and activity. Its stature is Dwarfish, its constitution very
tender,  its  power  and  strength  exceeding  weak,  its  growth  scarce  sensible,  if  at  all,  its
command, nothing or insignificant. Soe that it seems rather monstrous and deformed than
Naturall  & be[a]utifull.  The reason of  all  wch seems to have been because  it  has  not  had
convenient food administred; that wch is the staff  of  its life has not been sufficiently supplyed.
Naturall and Experimentall history has been but very thinly gathered and less of  it has been
applied to the  raising  and Increase  of  Naturall  Philosophy,  and therefore  soe  long as  the
materiall cause is wanting noe wonder if  the efficient can performe no thing.93
It was the historian's job to provide, in a very literal sense, material for the philosopher.
Guido Giglioni has recently written of  Bacon that “the solipsistic and idealistic assumption that
the thinking activity can do without matter is very distant from Bacon's philosophy.” 94 So too in
Hooke philosophy feeds off  matter rather than discourse. The matter of  observational records:
experiments registered in a certain way, in certain language, with certain details, and available for a
community to use.  As we shall see, and is intimated in the quote above, the task of  nourishing
philosophy  was  far  from  a  straightfoward  or  menial  task.  Because  the  history  “we  find  in
Aristotle,  Pliny, and others...is so uncertain and superficial,”95 all that has resulted is a dwarfish,
childlike philosophy. Pliny filled his Natural History with wonders and monsters, tales of  strange
things from strange lands beyond the Roman Empire, and the philosophy that has fed on it itself
93 Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke,” 151. In what follows I will use Oldroyd's transcription of  the 
lecture in Classified Papers 20/50(a). I follow his editorial decisions, but leave out his marks indicating uncertain 
words.
94 Giglioni, “From the Woods of  Experience to the Open Fields of  Metaphysics,” 261.
95 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 3.
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turned monstrous and deformed.  A “Naturall & beautifull” philosophy  needs to be built  from
the right materials. As Hooke shows in Micrographia, natural beauty is found everywhere: small
hairs on a fly's wings resemble Persian carpets; moss is as beautiful as any flower; even frozen
urine reveals a “very regular and curious Figure.”96 His point was  not just to  pay attention to
everything in nature,  but  to pay attention to the right  details of  everything.  “[T]here must be
Judgment in the Historian to discern what will be material and useful” to philosophy. 97 There is
no need  for  such judgement  or  discernment  for  the  philosopher. This  is  something  Hooke
emphasised throughout his career, in his preface to Robert Knox's report on Ceylon, for instance,
and as he wrote in Micrographia: “the storing up of  all (particulars) [...] will only tend to darkness
and confusion. We must not therefore esteem the riches of  our Philosophical treasure by the
number only, but chiefly by the weight.”98
History  is  “material”  to  philosophy,  and the  right  kind  of  observations  have  more
“weight”  –  they provide  more  material  to  be  turned into knowledge.  The  primacy  of  such
observation  is  clear  from the  self-conscious  opening  of  Micrographia,  Hooke's microscopical
enactments of  Euclid's first three axioms: the point of  a needle, the line of  a razor's edge, and
the plane of  linen cloth. Though the naked eye “cannot distinguish any parts of ” the point of  a
needle, under the microscope it is revealed as complex and ragged.99 The point exists in the world
as a material object, at the end of  a needle, or printed and labelled in geometry textbooks. And,
Hooke shows us, it never lives up to the mathematical ideal of  an insensible, unextended object.
Imaginative  assumptions about the  undivided  point are not physically true. This is not merely
wordplay.  The  philosopher  should  not  use  imaginings  and  stipulations  to  construct  their
philosophy, but materials,  and it was exactly the materiality of  the point which was in question.
What the point was influences its  meaning in later theorems. Michael Barany sees in Hooke the
final step in  a transition in the meaning of  the Euclidean point: from being the foundation of
96 Hooke, Micrographia, 174, 131, 91.
97 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 19., p. 19.
98 Hooke, Micrographia sig. A2r; see also Knox, An Historical Relation of  the Island Ceylon, sig. A2r.
99 Hooke, Micrographia, 2.
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exact knowledge in the sixteenth century, it became the source of  the problem of  exact knowledge
in the seventeenth. Early modern English versions of  Euclid defined the point in different ways,
as the endpoint of  a line or as the thing which combines infinitely to generate lines, dependent
on the author's interest in practical or theoretical geometry.100 Which should take precedence? For
Hooke,  all  definitions  must  be  grounded in  observation.  As he says elsewhere,  “we are noe
farther certaine of  the truth of  this proposition, that one & two are three, than that in all the
sensations we have yet had, we have found it so.”101 Not even mathematical axioms are innate,
but may “extend soe far only, as to things which fall under the power of  our senses.” 102 The
point,  in  Micrographia,  is  more  heuristic:  the  geometer  serves  as  a  model  for  the  natural
philosopher.  “How  much  therefore  can  be  built  upon  demonstrations  made  onely  by  the
productions of  the Ruler and Compasses,  he will be better able to consider that shall but view
those  points and  lines with  a  Microscope.”103 Before  certain  knowledge  comes  a  thorough
understanding of  the materials that construct it.
Two heavily related issues come out of  this general picture: first is Hooke's description
of  the jobs of  the historian and the philosopher, and secondly the persona which he attaches to
the historian.
History and Philosophy
Compiling a natural history  begins with  identifying  the subject matter to be explored.
This could be anything:
[T]here is no Body or Operation in the Universe, at least if  it can be any way brought to our
Knowledge, that is not some way or other to be taken notice of  in this Great Work, the most
100 Barany, “That Small and Unsensible Shape.”
101 From a lecture transcribed in Oldroyd, “Some ‘Philosophicall Scribbles’ Attributed to Robert Hooke,” 19.
102 Ibid., 20.
103 Hooke, Micrographia, 2.
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precious are here not more considerable, nor perhaps so much as the most trivial and vile.104
Hooke, like the empiricist not the idealist, the practical man not like the metaphysician,
divided the world into “heads of  enquiry” not “according to the Nature of  the things themselves,
[but] according to their Appearance or Respect to us.”105 The first division is between art and
nature,  followed by headings  within each.  Natural  subjects  range from “Comets  and Blazing
Stars” down through the atmosphere and weather phenomena, the magnitude and figure of  the
earth, seas, lakes, ponds, mountains, vales, and plains, all the way to mushrooms, mosses, ground
animals and worms  (see  Figure  7.1).106 This,  Hooke suggests, will be sufficient at least for the
“first Book of  Entries”. More detail will come with more work.
104 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 21.
105 “General Scheme,” in ibid.
106 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 22–23.
Figure 7.1: Hooke's divisions of  natural history. Posthumous Works, 22.
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As noted above, all kinds of  bodies might be equal, but not all information about them
is. The history of  each subject should only contain relevant, useful facts. The first thing to do,
then is:
to consider what information or proprietys are wanting to make A full and perfect discovery
of  its nature, And in Order hereunto to propound to one[']s self  & set downe in writing as
many quaerys as can be thought of, the solving of  which would give one a perfect knowledge
of  ye Nature of  ye body that is to be examined.107
The experimenter should draw up a list of  particular queries about their subject, and set
about answering them with three techniques, each of  which gives us different information about
a subject:
I. By the Help of  the Naked Senses.
II. By the Senses assisted with Instruments, and arm'd with Engines.
III. By Induction, or comparing collected Observations, by the two preceding Helps, and ratiocinating
from them.108
In this, Hooke differs from Bacon. Bacon “set little store by the immediate and peculiar
perception of  the sense,” and went as far as claiming that “the sense judges only the experiment
whereas the experiment judges the thing.”109 As I  have  discussed in the previous chapters,  for
Hooke, investigating a subject was not about getting the one true view of  a thing  but about
comparing and blending the various impressions that come from various senses and instruments.
Though I wish to avoid understanding Hooke only in relation to Bacon, some further points of
comparison will be illustrative.
107 Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke,” 153.
108 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 35.
109 The Plan of  the Work, in Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:35.
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Bacon associated different sorts of  knowledge with different metaphorical places: the
woods (silva) of  experience, the open fields of  axioms, and the level ground where we descend
from the axioms to produce works.110 Emerging from the woods, shifting from particulars to
universal  statements,  is  the  beginning  of  philosophy.  This  extended  metaphor  points  to  an
important but subtle difference between Hooke and Bacon. Bacon recognised that “long and
agitated  lingering  on  experience  and  matter” may  give  an  impression  –  like  Oldenburg's
impression of  the work described by Hooke in the General Scheme – that the work to be done is
impossibly complex, and “casts [the mind] into the blackest hell of  confusion and distress.” 111
The final goal of  natural enquiry might be to cross the fields and improve the human condition
with works,  but the path there is  not easily  come across  and can be daunting.  According to
Bacon, there is significant therapeutic and heuristic value to spending time lost in the woods of
experience, encountering the world in a pre-lingual,  pre-knowledge way. Such dense, constant
confrontation with the materials  of  the world remind one “how great is the gulf  between the
Idols of  the human mind and the Ideas of  the divine,” and thus that truth about nature cannot be
invented by humans.112 Natural particulars are far fewer in number than the convolutions and
repetitions of  human discourse. The edge of  the forest is always nearby.
While  wandering  around  the  silva,  the  investigator  should  keep  an  eye  out  for
particularly enlightening instances  which will lead  them out of  experience and to axioms.   His
famous instantia crucis, Instances of  the Fingerpost, borrow their name from signposts by the side
of  roads, guiding travellers toward their destination in “a case of  the parting of  the roads.”113 By
following  the  right  signs,  the  observant  experimenter  will  be  led  from mere  phenomena  to
knowledge of  the underlying causes behind their experiences.  In fact,  given his geographic talk
of  knowledge, many of  Bacon's metaphors are of  similar progression – travel beyond the pillars
of  ancient learning, the gradual ascent up the pyramid of  knowledge, out of  the woods and into
110 Giglioni, “From the Woods of  Experience to the Open Fields of  Metaphysics.”
111 Novum Organum, book 1, aphorism 124. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:187.
112 Novum Organum, book 1, aphorism 124. In Ibid.
113 Novum Organum, book 2, aphorism 36. In Ibid., 11:320.
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the clear. For him, knowledge is a specific type of  thing which happens after experience.
Hooke,  by  contrast,  speaks  of  circulation  and  of  landmarks.  Linear  analogies  are
replaced by multi-dimensional ones.
[I]n Physical Enquiries, we must endevour to follow Nature in the more plain and easie ways she
treads in the most simple and uncompounded bodies, to trace her steps, and be acquainted with her
manner of  walking there, before we venture our selves into the multitude of  meanders she has
in bodies of  a more complicated nature; lest, being unable to distinguish and judge of  our way, we
quickly lose both Nature our Guide, and our selves too, and are left to wander in the labyrinth of
groundless opinions;  wanting both  judgment,  that  light,  and  experience,  that  clew,  which should
direct our proceedings.114
This passage,  from the beginning of  Micrographia,  is  clear  on the importance of  the
microscope – we ought not start our histories with comets and stars. These elusive things require
'meandering'  investigation,  using both judgment and experience together.  There is a constant
interplay  between  observation  and  more  abstract  knowledge.  Inquiry  is  made  strong  by
circulating through the senses, memory, and reason “as the body of  man is by the circulation of
the blood through the several  parts of  the body.”115 By observing carefully with the unaided
senses, we gain a certain familiarity with the world; moving through the wood of  experience, we
begin to follow Nature “closer and closer at the heels,” so that we see “where she begins to make
a Deflexion out  of  her  common Road.”116 When this  happens  we  switch methods,  and  use
instruments and experiments to find her again. For instance, from plain observation it is obvious
that bodies generally expand when heated. But water expands when it freezes too – the common
road has been abandoned and “[w]e are at a loss to find what way Nature should take with two
quite  contrary  Agents,  to  bring  forth  the  same  Effect.”117 At  this  point,  conjecture  and
114 Hooke, Micrographia, 1.
115 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. B2r.
116 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 34–35.
117 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 35.
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experiment are necessary. Perhaps ice is always full of  minute, invisible air bubbles, and so takes
up more space? When Hooke observed ice with his microscope he found this was not the case.
With no immediate explanation for all instances of  expansion, he instead enlisted the memory,
and “set up a rest” – marked the place where the investigation had halted, and waited for a new
experiment to suggest itself.118
Relatedly, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, Hooke emphasised much more than Bacon did
that those experiments in which “Nature is as 'twere put to Shifts and forc'd to confess” will be
rare, and inquiry is really a gradual process of  gaining familiarity with nature. 119 The microscope –
the new optics generally, as we saw in the previous chapter – showed that through our gross
senses we perceive the world as various constantly shifting qualities. Hooke gives a list of  these
“prime sensible qualities”:
1. Light and Darkness.
2. Transparency and Opacousness.
3. Colours, commonly distinguisht into real and appearing.
4. Sounds, Musical and Harmonious.
5. Tastes.
6. Smells.
7. Heat and Cold.
8. Gravity and Levity.
9. Density and Expansion.
10. Flexibility and Stiffness.
11. Maleabiilty and Brittleness.120
Moving beyond these appearances to find out the properties of  a body which are the
causes of  such  sensory qualities is the aim. For Hooke this meant constantly shifting between
118 “General Scheme,” in ibid.
119 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 34.
120 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 23–24.
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different experiments and subjects, not concentrating on only one thing at a time. “[F]inding out
the Cause of  Fluidity, Heat, Gravity, Brittleness, &c. in one Body, will much facilitate the Inquiry
after the like Properties in any other Body.”121 Experiments give knowledge, but are possible only
with knowledge. The two are interdependent, and often inquiry will stop, as with the expansion of
ice,  until  new  knowledge  opens  another  avenue  to  pursue.  More  than  anything  else,  what
underwrites  Hooke's  recommendation  to  the  natural  historian  is  the  idea  of  'imperfect
knowledge'.
For it cannot be expected, that any one should be alike able to make Queries of  those things in
which he has not been much, if  at all conversant; as one that has had the Opportunity of
acquainting himself  more particularly with the Nature of  it, and has imbib'd in (though he
knows not how) a great deal of  imperfect Knowledge of  the Proprieties of  it.122
As so often in Hooke's own writing, another example illustrates this point best.  On
discovering  that  cork  is  light  because  it  is  being  riddled  with  pores  which  trap  air,  Hooke
supposed the same to be true of  all wood. He looked at “Wood both green and dry” through his
microscope,  and could  not  immediately  discover  any  pores.  But  his  'imperfect  knowledge'
informed his practice, and he conjectured that perhaps they were hidden somehow, maybe under
a  layer  of  sap.  By  heating  the  wood to  evaporate  the  sap,  he  discovered  he  was  correct.123
“[T]rying the Experiment over and over again, I found the same Propriety was not only to be
found in one or two other kinds of  Wood, but was common to all sorts of  Vegetables that I was
able  to  charr.”124 Hooke  emphasises  the  power  not  of  direct  investigation  but  of  analogical
thought,  which was  guaranteed to be effective because underneath nature's dizzying superficial
diversity, “there seems to be multitudes of  proprietys or natures which are common to a great
121 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 29.
122 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 27.
123 Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke,” 153–154; “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 28–29.
124 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 29.
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number of  bodys.”125 The 'nature' of  a body here means something like 'riddled with holes.'
Knowing  this  cause  of  levity  gives  imperfect  knowledge  about  objects  that  appear  light,
suggesting queries about them. Knowledge about one thing leaks into those nearby.  In a sense,
Hooke was refining Bacon's famous tables of  presences and absences. Where Bacon suggested a
direct course, from an exhaustive itemisation of  objects with a particular quality to knowledge of
that quality, Hooke's method meanders. Enquiry begins with a body, moves to qualities, and from
there  back  to  other  bodies,  and  round  to  the  quality  again.  As  we  saw  in  Chapter  3,  his
experimentum crucis against Descartes' theory of  colours was carefully crafted and interpreted given
the imperfect knowledge he was developing about light, lenses, and mica.
The comparison between the two men's methods is stylised. As well as  Bacon's  tables
and his prerogative instances, he suggested eight more methods of  investigation, though never
completed them in  as much detail.126 Furthermore, Dana Jalobeanu has recently pointed out a
distinction in Bacon's writing between two types of  natural history, one which he prescribed in
his  methodological  writings,  and  one  which  he  actually  wrote,  particularly  Historia  ventorum,
Historia densi et rari, and Historia vitae et mortis. The former, which Jalobeanu calls 'mother histories',
“[picture] natural history as resulting from an essentially collaborative enterprise sketched on a
cosmographical scale, and comprising narrative histories of  bodies.”127 The latter, in contrast, are
“middle histories,” much more like Hooke's, and largely concerned with virtues, qualities, and
appetites  of  matter  – “a more sophisticated natural  history,  a sort  of  'middle term' between
natural history and philosophy.”128
Still,  if  we continue to press on this distinction between history and philosophy,  an
important difference appears in the way the  concept of  'knowledge' appears and is used in the
two  men's  schemes.  The  point  becomes,  unsurprisingly,  less  abstractly  methodological  and
reduces more to the roles of  the people involved in their methods.
125 Oldroyd, “Some Writings of  Robert Hooke,” 153.
126 Novum Organum, book 2, aphorism 21. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:273.
127 Jalobeanu, “Bacon’s Natural History and the Senecan Natural Histories of  Early Modern Europe,” 227.
128 Ibid.
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Bacon, following the Aristotelian tradition before him, distinguished between historiae as
descriptive  accounts of  phenomena,  and  philosophia as  explanations  dealing  in  causes.129 He
emphasised  the  importance  of  natural  historical  knowledge  for  attaining  philosophical
knowledge, and likely  overemphasised the novelty of  this view, but knowledge proper was the
work of  philosophy. “Natural History describeth the variety of  things;” he wrote in The Advancement
of  Learning , “Physic, the causes, but variable or respective causes; and Metaphysic, the fixed and constant
causes.”130 Bacon's middle histories, as a step towards philosophy, included multiple possible causal
explanations of  phenomena. The benefit was largely heuristic, as he made clear in The Plan of  the
Work:
I quite often adjoin my own observations, which are like the first gestures, nods, or glances of
history towards philosophy, to give men some guarantee that they will not forever be tossed on
the waves of  history, and to make everything readier for when we come to the work of  the
intellect.131
One can climb a tree in the forest and look to the horizon. But the open fields are a
different place. For Bacon, experience (experimentum) was pre-lingual, before the “work of  the
intellect.” To explain a phenemenon was to generalise from a particular instance to a universal
causal  story.132 This,  properly,  was  'knowledge.'  Hooke,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasised  the
continuity  of  methods of  investigation,  and the  cognitive work involved in experience itself.
Causes and abstract knowledge – prestigious notions which carried a certain social cachet – were
necessary to the work of  the historian. Wandering in the wood of  experience was a thoughtful
task, and involved knowledge of  causes.
129 For more on the meaning of  'historia' in the Renaissance, see Pomata and Siraisi, Historia.
130 Bacon, The Works of  Francis Bacon, 1858, 6:218.
131 Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:41. See also Rees, “An Unpublished Manuscript by Francis Bacon”; Giglioni, 
“Mastering the Appetites of  Matter”; Garber, “Merchants of  Light and Mystery Men.”
132 See Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of  Early-Modern Philosophy, 149.
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Induction does not take Hooke out of  the woods of  experience, it leads him deeper
into it. By “putting several Observations and Informations together, and collecting from them,
and by reasoning and deducing from them” we can investigate “Effects produced at a greater
Distance, and more remote from immediately affecting the Sense.”133 Natural history divided the
world into topics according to their relation to people, and things that were close at hand could
give an historian insight into things further away. There is more to stars than their appearance as
small bright dots, but “we cannot go to the Sun, nor fetch Fire so far distant from us.”134 Instead,
we can bring “our Inquiry into Subjects much nearer to us.” When we have found out “what the
efficient Cause of  Fire and Light are, we shall by Analogy easily find out what is also the Cause
of  the Light in the Sun.”135
Going 'beyond' experience  like this  helps  to  overcome sensory limits,  but  the  limited
memory is no less important in necessitating induction.  As  Nick Wilding has  pointed out, by
conceiving of  the memory as a physical organ, Hooke “invokes the same logic of  supplementary
arts that potentially characterize other postlapsarian senses.”136 It is too imperfect to rely on, and
in any case cannot be shared. There is a serious question of  how knowledge should be registered.
In Chapter 4 we saw the value Hooke placed on pictures as records of  details that could not be
“fully and sensibly exprest by Verbal Description.”137 That is all very well for ants or razors, but
not everything lends itself  to illustration. How is the historian to record their observations on the
spring of  the air? Even pragmatically speaking, the job of  the experimenter must involve some
form of  generalisation or explanation.
 
If  the  Natural  Historian  proceeds  no  further  in  his  Examination  (than  observation),  his
Information will be very imperfect, and he that shall afterwards come to make use of  it will
find himself  necessitated almost to begin the whole Inquiry anew, to make over again all those
133 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 42.
134 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 93.
135 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 100.
136 Wilding, “Graphic Technologies,” 125.
137 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 64.
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Experiments and Observations that he finds Registred, and to intermingle divers others to the
end that he may find out that which ought to have been ready prepared to his hands; and in
Truth, without prosecuting this third way  (of  answering queries, that is, by  induction – see
above) 'tis  not  possible  to  make Experiments  with  any  Judgment,  that  is,  to  know which
Experiment is more or less significant, or of  greater or less Concernment as to the Discovery
of  the Proprieties sought, for most Experiments are like single Letters which seldom signify
but when they are joyn'd and compounded in Syllables and Words.138
As writers like Michael Polanyi and Andrew Pickering have more recently illustrated,
communicating the tacit knowledge involved in the messy beginnings of  inquiry is problematic.139
One solution that Hooke gives is to reach a level of  abstraction that can be adequately expressed
linguistically.  Another  solution  is  implicit  in  his  model  of  memory  we  saw in  the  previous
chapter:  build  it.140 It  is  interesting  that  while  Hooke  uses  the  term  “imagine”  throughout
Micrographia to mean something like the the limits of  what is possible to think, the  faculty of
Imagination does not feature at all in his model of  the mind 15 years later. He speaks instead of
the memory as the “repository” of  ideas. The omission speaks to two concerns. The first is that
Hooke  was  distancing  himself  from  the  possibility  that  sensory  knowledge  is  dangerously
unreliable because indistinguishable from the fantastical productions of  the mind itself.141 The
second, more pertinent to my discussion here, returns us to the comparison with the purely visual
memory of  Alpers' northern artists. “Repository” has a very particular resonance when used by
the Curator of  the Royal Society.  Hooke had been given charge of  the Society's Repository  in
1663, a museum which Thomas Sprat tells us was to be “a General Collection of  all the Effects
138 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 42.
139 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge; Pickering, The Mangle of  Practice.
140 It should be noted that Antonio Perez-Ramos found this idea of  knowledge in Bacon too. The point of  my 
comparison between him and Hooke was not so much to express difference as to bring out Hooke's ideas. A 
comparison more a propos of  this task is perhaps between Hooke and 'Baconianism,' where the latter is 
something directed to contemplative truth, of  which works are symptoms. See Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea 
of  Science.
141 I am grateful to Megan Baumhammer for many conversations about this topic. See her “Optical Instruments 
and the Early Modern Imagination.” See also the final chapter of  Gal and Chen-Morris, Baroque Science.
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of  Arts,  and  the  Common,  or  Monstrous  Works of  Nature.”142 Appearances  were  certainly
important  in  such  a  marvellous  collection,  but  so  were  the performances  and  processes of
artifice.143 One could know the form of  a  thing,  or a  thing could know a natural  process by
replicating it  artificially.  Instruments articulate knowledge.144 This,  of  course,  was the implicit
power of  Hooke's artificial eye  demonstrations.  To explain a process in nature could  therefore
simply be to design and build a machine that would recreate that process. Jim Bennett and Ofer
Gal have separately discussed the two sides of  interchangability of  theory and material in Hooke.
Hooke  treats  his  instruments  and  demonstrations  as  explanations  of  phenomena,145 and  he
deploys  and  manipulates  ideas  as  he  would  material  tools.146 Theory  and  equipment  are
inseparable, and parts of  both are dropped, swapped, or replaced as the need arises. As a model
for the individual memory, the strong implication of  the repository is that some knowledge is not
expressed in images or in words, but in action.
These issues confound a neat division between experience and knowledge. There is no
dividing line between compiling a natural history that is useful for discovering causes, and using it
to do that. There can be no difference between empirical investigation and philosophical learning
– succesful experimentation  requires knowledge even as it creates it.147 Causal explanations are
not just the aim of  inquiry but part of  the process, materials to be used to complete natural
history.
There is certainly the possibility of  theorising beyond the end of  Hooke's histories, but
he is generally dismissive of  this type of  thought. He typifies the broader meaning of  mechanical
philosophy that Jim Bennett has identified, rather than a narrower one focused more particularly
142 Sprat, The History of  the Royal Society, 251. For more on the Society's repository see “Between Cabinet of  
Curiosities and Research Collection,” in Hunter, Establishing the New Science.
143 For the Kunst- und Wunderkammer for concepts of  nature and natural knowledge, see Bredekamp, The Lure of  
Antiquity.
144 See Baird, Thing Knowledge.
145 Bennett, “Robert Hooke as Mechanic and Natural Philosopher.”
146 Gal, Meanest Foundations and Nobler Superstructures, 43–41.
147 Paul Feyerabend could have been writing about Hooke when he said that “experience arises together with 
theoretical assumptions not before them.” Feyerabend, Against Method, 168. His objection, topical to the career of
Robert Hooke, was that the distinction between theory and observation is irrelevant to the running of  science.
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on matter  theory.148 Bennett  is  exactly  describing  Hooke  when  he  writes  of  the  mechanical
philosophers,  “[t]heir  working conceptual  categories  were  mathematically-characterized matter
and its mechanical operations, and beyond this the ontological status ascribed to material entities,
derived from metaphysical argument, were niceties that had little effect in practice.”149
For an example, let us return to his investigation of  light. Hooke concludes, by looking
at a variety of  luminous objects, that there is one “Principal Cause of  all, which is in almost each
of  them conceal'd under a differing covering.”150 This cause is “a very short vibrating motion,” as
he registered  in  Micrographia.  Later, in  his  Lectures of  Light,  Hooke dismisses the idea of  Ismaël
Bullialdus  (1605-1694)  that  light  is  a  kind  of  'middle'  substance,  between  corporeal  and
incorporeal. Hooke does not understand it, and he does not need to. Light results from motion,
so for it to travel it must do so through a substance that transmits it.  But “there is no need of
supposing any other Substance, but Corporeal, or Body; and that, so and so qualified; that is,
perfectly Fluid, and perfectly Dense, and so Receptive and Communicative, of  all  manner of
Motion.”151 His conclusion is restricted to what was can intelligibly think. “I know not what can
be farther added, that is more known or more Intelligible than that it is  [… a] Substance, or a
something; that is infinitely fluid, or at least, indefinitely; if  that be more conceivable.” 152 What
exists is a wonderfully nondescript 'something', and it must only be 'indefinitely' fluid: only as far
as we can tell is  it  “free from cohesion [and]  susceptible to any kind of  Motion.”153 We saw in
Chapter 3 that Hooke certainly had ideas about the nature of  light beyond the relations between
phenomena that Newton wanted to establish. However, even that ended with ambiguity about
how  wedded  to  the  intricacies  of  the  mechanism  he  was  beyond  the  requirement  that  an
explanation of  refraction must involve some kind of  consistent and predictable alteration of
148 Cf. Henry Power – see Chapter 4. For this element of  Bacon's thought, see Giglioni, “Mastering the Appetites 
of  Matter”; Gaukroger, Emergence of  a Scientific Culture; Rees, “An Unpublished Manuscript by Francis Bacon.”
149 Bennett, “The Mechanics’ Philosophy and the Mechanical Philosophy,” 24.
150 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 51.
151 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid., 115.
152 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
153 “Lectures of  Light,” in ibid.
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light.  Here,  as  in the previous chapter,  what  is  important  is  that  a  model,  either  material  or
metaphysical, be both intelligible and consistent with experience. Such metaphysical postulates
turn into imaginative aids, to assist further inquiry by suggesting more queries to be answered.
Localised conjecture is necessary to make experiments.
If  theories and works are equivalent in one sense, it is clear which Hooke valued more.
The final  promise  of  his  method was  industry.  As  he  wrote  in  Micrographia,  by  his  method
“Talking  and  contention  of  Arguments”  will  dissolve  into  “labours,”  and  “universal  metaphysical
natures” will “vanish, and give place to solid Histories, Experiments and Works.”154
Writing His Own Job Description
Hooke's reconceptualisation of  knowledge as something more bodily and processual
effected the persona of  the person involved with it. At the turn of  the century, Bacon worried
that people would find the observations collected in his Sylva Sylvarum “vulgar and trivial, mean
and sordid, curious and fruitless.”155 He  answered humanists critical of  natural philosophy that
empirical investigation of  the world would lead to the kind of  “peace and tranquility of  abstract
wisdom” which they respected as noble for a philosopher.156 Interestingly, though he thought
they were important, collecting observations was not a job Bacon imagined for himself. The Lord
Chancellor spoke “complainingly” to his anmanuensis William Rawley of  the task. Bacon felt he
deserved to be a philosopher, an architect planning the edifice of  natural philosophy. Instead, he
was “forced to be a workman, and a labourer; and to dig the clay, and burn the brick; and [...]
gather the straw and stubble.”157 A resigned claim that it is honourable enough to observe God's
works was his little compensation.  Hooke, on the other hand, recommended  experiment and
observation themselves to “the Gentlemen of  our Nation, whose leisure makes them fit to undertake,
154 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. B2r.
155 Bacon, The Works of  Francis Bacon, 1858, 4:155–156.
156 Novum Organum, book 2, aphorism 124. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:187.
157 Bacon, The Works of  Francis Bacon, 1858, 4:156.
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and the plenty  of  their fortunes to accomplish, extraordinary things,”  and promised as reward not
only  a  “high  rapture and  delight of  the  mind,”  but  the  “material and  sensible Pleasure”  of
investigation.158 With the elevation of  the historian to a crafter of  knowledge, it is difficult to see
what Hooke thinks is  left  for the philosopher.  If  Bacon was clear about the  importance of
natural history, Hooke emphasised the worthiness of  the occupation, and the importance of  the
natural historian himself.
The natural  historian is  of  course Hooke.  If  he was an active force in redescribing
natural history as genuine knowledge, and experimenters as producers of  that knowledge, he
certainly had an interest in doing so. When he wrote of  the many “Accomplishments requisite for
a Natural Historian” to ensure they could fulfil the demands of  their important task, they were
attributes he himself  possessed.159 At first he volunteered his services to the Society, but by the
mid 1660s he was redefining his role, and presented himself  as a model Curator.
The  natural  historian,  he  stood  in  Gresham  College  and  explained, must  be
knowledgable about both current theory and practice. The hypotheses of  existing philosophies
are  as  important to guide experiments as trade techniques, mechanics, and mathematics  are  to
carry them out. This knowledge should be handled with care. Part of  the importance of  knowing
different philosophies was, as Boyle also held, that the mind does not get overly attached to any
particular one. Though the natural historian ought to be literate, so as to be able to read existing
philosophical works and keep abreast of  current research, skill in writing is not very important.
They should record the results of  their experiments plainly and ingenuously, without rhetorical or
poetic  flourishes.  Draughtsmanship,  on  the  other  hand,  is  very  important,  both  to  design
instruments and experiments, and to record results more exactly and failthfully than can ever be
done in words.160
158 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. D2r.
159 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 19.
160 “General Scheme,” in ibid., 19–21.
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This is  a pretty good self-portrait.  Hooke was widely read in philosophy, conversant
with trade practice, his skill with instruments was unequalled in the early Royal Society,  and he
could certainly draw.161 It is interesting that Hooke  furnishes the requirements for the natural
historian with a sustained allusion to Christopher Columbus. The historian should, for example,
take heart from experimental results, “as Columbus did from the decreasing Depth of  the Sea, the
Drift  of  Weeds  on the  Surface  of  the  Water,  and the  White  Clouds  that  appear'd  near  the
Horizon, and the like[,] to incourage and direct him in his Course.”162
Hooke does not explicitly make much of  the analogy, but the resonance is clear. 163 The
famous frontispiece to Bacon's Novum Organum depicts two ships sailing between two columns –
Columbus  travelling  beyond  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mediterranean.  In
Renaissance tradition  the Pillars  bore the inscription 'non plus ultra' to caution travellers of  the
empty  beyond,  and  had  to  Bacon  come  to  represent  the  misleading  constraint  of  ancient
authority. The inscription had been proven wrong, and knowledge had progressed through literal
movement to a new place. The scholastics never strayed far, preferring to move in circles around
their libraries and studies, as their knowledge did in their repetitive disputes. It was explorers who
were advancing knowledge.  Bacon's  frontispiece was probably a deliberate copy of  that of  an
earlier Spanish work on navigation, the  Regimiento de navegación of  Andrés García de Céspedes
(1606),  just as Joseph Glavill's defense of  the Royal Society  Plus Ultra shared its title with the
motto of  Habsburg Spain.  The Spanish crossing  of  the Atlantic  represented the advance of
knowledge, both in terms of  the technical success of  the voyage, and the discovery New World
novelties.164
Bacon had also compared himself  to Columbus, laying out “just as Columbus did before
his  epic  voyage across  the  Atlantic,”  the  reasons  why  he  thought  his  ambitious  project  was
possible. “[R]easons which, though rejected at first, were afterwards vindicated by his experiment,
161 As well as the obvious evidence in Micrographia, see also Hunter, “Hooke’s Figurations.” 
162 “General Scheme,” in Hooke, Posthumous Works, 20.
163 See also Hunter, Wicked Intelligence, 50.
164 For more on spatial discovery as analogy for philosophical, see Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts.
222
and were the origin and cause of  events of  vast consequence.”165 By the seventeenth century
Columbus had been reimagined, as Anthony Grafton has noted, from the “equivocal figure that
his own writing reveals him to be,” into a “prototypical hero-explorer.”166 Hooke was tapping into
a rich analogy to flesh out his curatorial persona, for which there was no precedent in Restoration
England. In analogy, Hooke could step away from the literal situation and describe the optimistic
possibilities for this role. By drawing on the the established and praiseworthy attributes of  the
explorer, he was able to imply the same things about the natural historian. The explorer was a
model  of  progress,  impartial  discovery,  and  the  possibility  of  a  successful  collaboration  of
materials, men and money. The historian takes the tiller of  natural philosophy – it may not be his
boat but his importance is undeniable.
When he stood in front of  the Fellows of  the Royal Society and the London public and
told  them  about  the  “Methodical  Proceeding  in  the  making  Experiments  and  collecting
Observations whereby to Compile a Natural History, as the Solid Basis for the Superstructure of
True  Philosophy,”  Hooke was  crafting  himself  as  an  experimenter.  While  the  Society  could
emphasise their respected, gentlemanly make up for the benefit  of  outsiders, what about the
natural historian within the Society? Trust was crucial, in both directions. The Society needed to
be  able  to trust  the  results  of  his  experiments  and demonstrations,  and also  that  he  would
convert their institutional resources into luciferous experiments in the first place. And he would
be reliant on their judgement and discourse as guides, and their money for income. Both aspects
were  contentious.  The  role  was  rewarded  by  the  confused  situation  of  patronage  and
employment I outlined earlier – a situation it is not difficult to read as 'no one really knew what
was going on.' What would count as success in this role? What was the meaning of  experiment?
It  was  a  formative  stage  in  his  both  Hooke's career  and  profession  of  the  experimental
philosopher. Indeed, though the institutional structure changed after Hooke's death when Isaac
165 Novum Organum, book 1, aphorism 92. In Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, 11:151.
166 Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts, 64, caption of  Figure 2.2.
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Newton  became  President  of  the  Royal  Society,  later  curators  like  Denis  Papin  and  John
Theophilus Desaguliers in no small way had their roles shaped by expectations and precedents set
by Hooke.
As a final comment,  later in his career Hooke acted  much  more like a collector and
systematiser of  histories than a historian himself. He became Secretary of  the Royal Society and
replaced Oldenburg's Philosophical Transactions with his own Philosophical Collections, and he wrote to
correspondents, most famously Isaac Newton.167 He recognised the importance of  Moses Pitt's
English Atlas and strove to secure Royal Society sponsorshop for it, and wrote of  the importance
of  the travel books published by Samuel Purchas and Richard Hakluyt.168 He began to enact what
was  implied  by prescribing  his  role  earlier:  that  in  looking  at  the  job  from  the  outside  he
transcended it.169 Hooke was a super-historian, the captain of  the ship.
167 See Gal, Meanest Foundations and Nobler Superstructures; Nauenberg, “Robert Hooke’s Seminal Contribution to 
Orbital Dynamics”; Gal, “Hooke’s Programme: Final Thoughts.”
168 See Johns, The Nature of  the Book, 451–453 for Hooke’s role in Pitt’s work; his preface to Knox, An Historical 
Relation of  the Island Ceylon for his approval of  Purchas and Hakluyt.
169 Stephen Gaukroger has made a similar point about Francis Bacon's New Atlantis: Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the
Transformation of  Early-Modern Philosophy, 130–131.
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Conclusion
Hooke shaped the meaning of  experiment and instrument  use in natural philosophy.
The epistemic insight behind his contrived experiences was that even the everyday experience of
humans in the world was fundamentally arbitrary. The senses were not conduits to the essences
of  bodies but limited instruments. “The power of  distinguishing by the naked eye is that which
bounds and limits all the other niceness,” he wrote in his critique of  Hevelius' astronomy, “and
whatever part  is  more curious then that  can equalize,  is  of  no significancy.” 1 To escape this
limited view of  our animal bodies required a certain kind of  experimentalism, not one aimed at
interrogating  nature  directly  but  one  that  would  move  nature  into  the  view  of  the  human.
Whether he was monitoring the height of  a mercury column in an air pump in front of  Margaret
Cavendish, or smiling at an engraving in a traveller's report from the New World, the job of  the
natural philosopher was to make the insensible sensible. It was an act of  translation, a movement
through different perspectives  that would  follow nature along her meandering path.  The great
promise of  collaborative instrument-based philosophy was that instruments could be copied and
information shared, and the woods of  experience might be explored more quickly.
Hooke's  microscope  exemplifies  his  approach. His  use  of  this  instrument  went  far
beyond peering through a lens: it involved constructing his own novel instruments, and machines
for making those instruments. His ability to produce clear views of  his subjects extended even to
the old natural magician's skill  in manipulating light  itself,  knowledge  which he set down as a
hypothesis about its nature. Although the tiny cells and mouths he saw through his lenses were
remarkable revelations, there was more to  enlarged  vision than information about cork or lice.
1 Hooke, “Animadversions on the First Part of  the Machina Coelestis,” 4.
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This approach was the foundation of  certain and comprehensive natural knowledge.
The knowledge he sought was of  how nature produced phenomena – not only those
those that  we perceive, but also those that we miss, that other creatures  see  or  that  the small
machines of  nature react to. Preliminarily, this knowledge might take the form of  descriptions or
pictures of  things from beyond the senses. But the grander aim of  philosophy was to understand
how to recreate natural processes in the workshop: to express knowledge through  words and
instruments.  Works would redescribe the relation of  humans and nature,  thus  fulfilling “great
prerogative of  Mankind.”2 We were not only meant to contemplate, but reclaim that ease with
which the first humans had lived amongst nature. Hooke's apparently inexhaustible ingenuity and
his  broad scholarly learning; all the techniques and theories and stories he read in books and
heard in the coffee houses, workshops, and colleges of  Restoration London; were funnelled into
the task of  making the  human perspective of  nature unnecessary  –  precisely because it  was
human  nature  to  do  so.  It  was  an  important  conceptual  move:  the  creation  of  an  evenly
illuminated world, not viewed from the point of  view of  humans, but made understandable for
humans.
2 Hooke, Micrographia, sig. A1r.
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Appendix: “The Uses and advantage of Microscopes”
The following is a transcription of  a manuscript kept in the Royal Society Archives,
Classified Papers 20/84. It was a lecture delivered by Hooke at a meeting of  the Royal Society on
29 November 1693. The first half  is praise for the microscope, and the second is a review of  the
then recently published Micrographia curiosa of  Filippo Bonanni.
The manuscript has  been heavily edited  by another hand. Likely  it  was  prepared for
publication by one of  Hooke's posthumous editors, Richard Waller or William Derham, though it
appears in neither of  their volumes of  his works. Derham did include a tract entitled 'Mr. Waller's
Observations  upon  Dr.  Hook's  Discourses,  concerning  Telescopes  and  Microscopes,'  which,
despite the differences in the title, is obviously Waller's notes on the lecture below.1 It is heavily
truncated and focuses mostly on Hooke's opinions of  Bonanni, missing, I think, a good deal of
the interest of  Hooke's lecture.
My guess, based on the editorial marks on this and other manuscripts,  is  that Derham
picked over the manuscript to prepare it for publication, but found Waller's observations on the
lecture and published them instead.
What follows is a semi-diplomatic transcription. I have silently followed any corrections
Hooke  himself  made,  but  have  indicated those  made  in  the  second pen.  Derham's/Waller's
changes are  marked with  <chevrons>,  and  those words he deleted or replaced are footnoted.
Uncertain  words  are  marked  [thus?].  The second pen has  has  underlined  several  words  and
passages. I take this to instruct the printers to italicise these words and I have followed this
instruction, so all italics are Derham's/Waller's. All parentheses are Hooke's. The large paragraph
on ff. 2-3 in {braces} is entirely crossed out by the second pen in the manuscript.
1 Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, 270.
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[f. 1]
<The uses and advantage of  Microscopes>
<Read before the Royall Society Nov. 29. 1693.>
Among the various methods of  inquiring into the Latent and innermost Structure
and composition of  Bodys, that by the help of  Microscopes has not been the least
significant, but when we consider the nature of  the informations it has and may yet
afford,  it  may  possibly  appear  to  Deserve  to  be  ranked  even  among  the  most
Considerable,  and  that  upon  this  account  that  it  doth  immediately  inform  the
<sight>2 of  the true and naturall construction of  the minuter and otherways wholy
insensible constituent parts of  bodys, discovering their forms & shapes and how they
serve to make up the more gross & Sensible parts both by their texture and motions,
which carryes the Inquirer soe much farther into the Latent and internall mechanism
of  Bodys, whilst they are yet intire and undisturbed in their Naturall State whereas
the other ways of  Examining of  the Nature of  Bodys, (as by fire or chymistry) the
naturall constitution of  the bodys to be examined is wholy vitiated and Destroyed,
and torne all to pieces, and scarce soe much Left Intire as may Deserve the name of
the [ruines?] of  it, but ought Rather to be called the Rubbish and Corruption thereof,
for that noe one part of  the [construct?/compleat?] is Left Intire but every part is as
it were ground to Dust and attomes by the Action of  the fire or menstruum and not
only  soe  but  even  those  attoms  of  Dust  are  blended  &  compounded  by  other
heterogeneous substances insinuated and mingled with them, that are properly parts
of  the Fire or Menstruum that Dissolved them. Now as this method of  Dissecting and
anatomising a body is a much more probable and <has> Experimentally proved a
2 Replaced: 'sense'
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more effectuall way to Discover the construction make and use of  the Constituent
parts of  animated bodys  and the uses to which they are subservient, and as living
Dissection, or inspections and Experiments & observations made whilst nature is yet
acting,  are more informing than by Destroying the Life of  the animated body &
beating  it  all  to  a  mash in  a  morter  with  water  or  any  other  substance  & then
examining of  the  Composition:  Soe the Discoverys to be made by the  microscope are
upon both those accounts to be preferrd before those other that I have named, for
that  <in> a  multitude  of  such  kind  of  observations  as  are  to  be  made  by  the
Microscope you  may  not  only  Discover  the  texture  and  fabricks  of  the  parts  by
Dissecting or anatomising them, but you may with pleasure & admiration behold the
wonderfull construction, motions, operations & uses of  the parts whilst Nature is
still & at peace undisturbed, and working in its Direct and Naturall course, without
any  such  Dissecting  and  without  any  Dislocation  of  Parts  or  any  alteration  or
Disturbing of  the motions, or <the> effects thereof. This is a Prospect that is wholy
due to the  microscope,  and is hardly to be found in all  the visible  phenomena to the
Naked Eye, for that the texture and constitution of  most animate bodys <as to the
parts>3 thereof  that are visible, to the naked eye are of  Bulk enough to make [f. 2]
them opaque or not  of  transparency enough to Discover the internall  make and
motions thereof  through them, whereas there are thousands of  Objects that by the
microscope may  be  found  whose  Skin,  Rind  or  inclosing  teguments  <4> are  Soe
transparent as to admitt a free prospect for the sight to Discover through them the
fabrick,  figure,  texture,  <&> motion  <5> thereof:  for  As  most  of  the  parts  of
animated bodys are  in minimis transparent enough to permit a free passage for the
light free enough to Discover pretty cleerly the differring shapes and lineaments of
3 Replaced: 'is but the part'
4 Deleted: illegible word.
5 Deleted: 'and effect'
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the parts behind them, and the variety of  the Refraction & reflection of  Differing
parts is sufficient to make a Sensible difference in that appearance where too many
of  them are not Confounded & blended together as in those Smaller fabricks of
animalls & vegetables, visible only by the assistance of  the microscope. Soe in most
others that  are Discoverable by the bare eye,  there is soe great  a masse of  such
transparent  <particles>6 joyned  together  that  those  varietys  of  Refractions  and
Reflections <7> blended all together doe confound each other & by that means they
are made big enough to be visible to the Eye they appear opaque and as it were in a
fogg or cloude. Of  these kinds of  Discoverys I have given Severall Specimens in my
Micrography,  as  in  the  Gnat,  Mite,  Louse,  and  some  others,  but  had  not  then
oportunity of  instancing or Relating all  the Severall observations I had made, my
Designe in that being rather to Show in what variety of  Subjects  <8> Discoverys
might be advantagiously made by ye help of  microscopes, & other <optical glasses>,9
by exhibiting some one or other instance thereof, then to persist in prosecuting any
one Species of  all those varietys. That designe indeed as it would Require much time
and  Labour,  soe  if  it  were  well  performed  would  not  want  its  benefit  for  the
explaining the progresses and operations of  Nature and would prove as instructive a
piece of  Naturall history as any yet extant, and possibly for some uses much more
than any other that has yet been published as to exhibit the Structure fabrick and
Contexture of  animated bodies.  for  that  most  of  the History  we have either  of
Plants or animalls give us only a superficiall and outward Description of  their visible
shapes and of  the more grosse appearances of  them, But tell us not the inwards
Fabrick operations vertues & uses of  their parts, And even there where anatomy has
been applied for that Purpose, we are gone noe farther then to the forme & make of
6 Replaced: 'parts'
7 Deleted: 'are'
8 Deleted: 'the'
9 Replaced: scarcely legible, perhaps 'optick glasses'
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the  greater  constituent  parts  such as  are  big  enough to be  visible  to  the  Eye &
tractable to the hand, But all the organs that are Lesse then such a Bulk they remain
in their Primitive Obscurity and are only the Objects of  Conjecture and imagination.
{Now how wide such conjectures  to  [be  probably?] from the truth of  the thing
under consideration may be conceived from this Similitude. If  to a wild Indian that
had never heard of  or seen clock watch or wheel one should Describe or shew him a
watch inclosed in a Leather case of  the bignesse and shape of  a small [turnep?] and
tell him that this did keep a certain account of  the time and did divide all the time
from noon to noon into 24 equall parts or hours and at every hours end tell by soe
many distinct sounds which hour it then was, he would certainly conclude that there
was some very cunning creature included [inside a?] box. If  then you should open
the lid of  [f. 3] the case and shew him the face of  the watch and shew him the Diall
plate where he might see the Diall Ring and the hand pointing to the Divisions of
the Day, he would then understand somewhat more of  what the effects of  the watch
then what by seeing only the out case & hearing the noyse of  the strokes on the Bell
he did conceive, but still he would be apt to think some living thing was kept within
the yet unopened part, for that he could hitherto see noe more then the Diall face
and moving hand and hear the Pulse or beating of  the Ballance and at the hours end
the  noyse  & strokes  of  the  clock  part.  Tis  easy  to  conclud  that  his  conjectures
concerning the fabrick of  the watch would be differing enough from what they realy
were, if  the watch should further be opend to him to see the wheels move & the
Ballance beat and all the make of  them as they are to be seen when the watch is
opend he would still be at a Losse what twas that made these move, and would think
that the spirit of  the watch was either in the wheels or in the Barrell of  ye spring.
And soe as he could farther & farther Discover the conceald parts he would more
truly be informed of  its excellent contrivances.}
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Now how far such kinds of  Discoverys may be made into the curious fabricks of
plants and animalls tis not for me to Determine but it seems very probable that the
Microscopes will  show us many essentiall  and constituent parts of  which we had
before noe imagination, some specimens of  this kind I have formerly shewn, and Mr.
Leuwenho<oek> has since prosecuted  the  Inquiry and made Divers considerable
additions . Some others also have indeavourd to Doe somewt that way as Cherubine at
Paris  and  Grundelius  in  Germany  but have made but Little  progresse either for the
Improvement of  microscopes or for New discoverys by the help of  them.
That which Revived this Discourse [at Present?] is a new treatise Published in Latin
by Sigr Bonani10 the same that Published a book of  the Descriptions of  the shells of
Fishes: He calleth it Micrographia Curiosa sive Rerum Minutissimarum Observationes qua ope
microscopia  Recognita  et  Expressa Describuntur.11 Wherein he indeavours to Revive the
practise of  it in Italy shewing it to be very useful for the Convincing of  Atheists and
to bring them to the  Acknowledgement of  God by  contemplating the Wonderful
works  of  his  providence.  But  at  the  same  time  indeavours  through  his  whole
Discourse  to  prove  Spontaneous  Generation,  which  seems  to  have  a  contrary
tendency. He seems to have perused most of  the authours who have written any
thing considerable concerning microscopes and Microscopicall Observations, and upon
the  whole  has  given  the  Result  of  his  own  Sentiments,  first  concerning  the
instrument it self  Describing which kind he doth most approve of  & which he made
use of  for his own observations. and therein he Describes which way he thinks best
for  grinding  of  Glasses  to  a  true  figure  which  he  Delivers  in  a  Cypher  &
enigmatically in 3 Directions or Rules which I have Decyphered read thus. The tools
are to be made of  Brasse or tin to grinde the glasses of  their true formes, which
10 Filippo Bonanni, 1638-1725.
11 Micrographia Curiosa, or: observations of  minute things recognised and described with the help of  the microscope 
(1691).
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tools or Dishes must be  <of> a Due form to procure which he says care  must be
had  ut  non volve  ampla Sint  sed Lentis faciendae ita commensurentur,  ut Lens  fere  triplicem
diametri partionem occupet.  That is the dish must be 3ce the Diameter of  the glasse.
Next the glasse  must be ground to its figure in a tool or Dish of  a Little bigger
Sphere  then  perfected  in  the  Lesser,  which  is  thus  performed.  Utra  manu  simul
concurrente ita ut radente vitro scutellam [&?] ducurrat,  Leva autem Scutellam is  vitro adaptet,
altera obsecundante alteri. Both hands must be imployed the <right>12 to hold the glasse
and move it in the Dish and the Other hand to adapt the Dish to the glass and soe
both to Move them true one in the other. When by this means it be ground to its
true figure [f. 4] then it remains only to be polished and of  all the ways for doing this
he preferrs that by paper stuck fast with glue in the tool or dish in which it was last
ground & by spreading upon that paper the fine powder of  tripoly, and thereon to
work the glasse till it has acquird a Due polish. Which you may the better perform, Si
instrumento tornatili utaris quod beneficio Rota majoris velociter circum & satur. That is  if  ye
tool or Dish be fixt to a mandrill and that be made to run Swift Round by a larger
either foot or hand wheel. Both which ways I have seen commonly made use of  here
for  <13> above 35 years since. And also a better way which is by a reciprocating
motion: both which ways our workmen here very well know and commonly practise
yet I am apt to think the Last polish from the Bare tool without the Paper to be the
more exact, at least by Severall tryalls I have soe found it for object glasses. But for
the eye glasses I judge  <14> the Polish by  tripoly or paper as he prescribes to be
<sufficiently exact.>
The microscope he prescribes has too much apparatus and clutter and yet is wanting
of  many accommodations for examining or as it were handling & turning the Object
12 Replaced: 'left'
13 Deleted: 'much'
14 Deleted: 'sufficiently exact'
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into  all  postures  &  for  all  lights,  and  therefore  I  shall  not  spend  time  in  the
Description of  it.  Nor shall  I  repeat  here the names of  the multitude of  all  the
authors  which he has  mentioned who have been spoken of  this  way of  making
microscopes or the Descriptions of  Some kinds of  them: but in short to note that
each of  them is referrable either to the simple or the Compounded form, the Simple
is by one glasse  only but the compound by 2, 3, 4, 5 or more glasses, but still the
more  the  worse,  however  he  thinks  every  kind  some  ways  or  other  usefull:
concerning that of  Griendelius published in 168715 which that author would have the
world so believe that it exceeded all that had been ever made in England France Italy
or Holland, this author upon explaining it is quite of  a contrary opinion and thinks it
much inferior to them which I also was before Sufficiently Satisfied of  when I Read
the Said  Griendelius his Description of  it. But this Authour seems Most to approve
that  which  I  have  Described  in my micrography.  Omnes  fere  expertum esse  sine  fuco
Mendacis affirmato: nec ulla plene satisfactum Singula enim vitio aliquo laborabant nullam abunde
commodam  [iuvari?] ad observationes,  [profectionis?] si oculo attente respeciente,  manu delineare
vellet quicquid observabatur. Inter omnes utiliorem modum existimavi quo suas observationes fecit
A Hookius  &c.  however he has made some additions to it  for the fixing it  more
steadily to observe the object whilst it is in drawing which I conceive may be too
troublesome & yet not sufficient for all purposes.
The instances he has mentioned to have observed are [many?] taken out of  other
authours upon which he has added his own remarks. But he excuseth his inability for
Delineating them soe well as he could see them however he has copyed Severall of
those I have Described in my micrography & some also out of  others those of  mine
are the gnat worm in both formes, the foot of  the fly and the wing as also the eyes
the sting of  the bee, the louse and the flea, the stinging points of  nettles and the
15 Grindelius, Micrographia nova
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scales of  fishes. and he has both to those and all his other added his
own animadversion among which there are severall very curious. But
it would be too Long to mention them at this time, and much more to
adde  my objections  to  some  of  them,  which  I  may  have  a  more
proper occasion to doe in an other Discourse: I shall at present only
shew the figure of  the stings or thornes of  the prickly pare or indian
figge which I mentioned before 3 weeks since when the plant itself
was here produced. The Brown tufts on that prickly Pare I found to
consist of  a great number of  very Small & Sharp pointed thorns or
needles being abundantly Smaller then the finest needells I ever saw.
These thornes being soe very small soe sharp and yet soe stiffe do
easily peirce the  Skin of  whoever toucheth them, and which makes
them the more troublesome they being all over barbed with thornes
like a bramble almost or a bee's sting they stick to the flesh & cannot
be easily gott out when they are once enterd.
Figure A1: The thorn of  a prickly pear. From Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and 
Observations, 272. Derham notes that Hooke “gives a Microscopical Figure” which 
may well be this, but it is no longer with the lecture manuscript.
